Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (GENERAL POWERS) BILL (By Order)

Consideration, as amended, deferred till Monday, 4th June.

MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDER (BRIGHOUSE) BILL

MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDER (DONCASTER) BILL

MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDER (SIDMOUTH) BILL

Read the Third time and passed.

MELVILLE TRUST ORDER CONFIRMATION

Bill to confirm a Provisional Order under the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1936, relating to the Melville Trust, presented by Mr. John Maclay (under Section 7 of the Act); and ordered to be considered upon Wednesday next and to be printed. [Bill 118.]

Oral Answers to Questions — NATIONAL FINANCE

August Bank Holiday

Commander Kerans: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will consider introducing legislation to abolish August Bank Holiday, and add the day either to the statutory holiday period or let it be taken as convenient to employer and employee, bearing in mind the vital necessity to reduce motor traffic at holiday periods.

The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Anthony Barber): This is only one of the possibilities thrown up by the wider examination of the problem of extending the summer holiday season. Her Majesty's Government are not yet in a position to make any statement on this.

Commander Kerans: Is not the August Bank Holiday really nonsense in this modern age, bearing in mind that schools have already packed up and the holiday season is on? The real point is, do we want this vast number of cars on the road on August Bank Holiday, a number which increases year by year, especially if it is fine weather? Lubbock's day goes back to 1871 when August Bank Holiday was initiated, and is it not high time, with due respect to the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Lubbock), that it went?

Mr. Barber: These may or may not be relevant considerations, but I think that the House will agree that it would be best to consider them in the context of the wider examination which is at present going on.

Mr. Farr: Can the Minister say whether he has been in consultation with his right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport in this connection, and, further, whether he has received a document on this very subject from the Leicestershire County Chamber of Commerce?

Mr. Barber: With regard to the latter part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question, I have no recollection of receiving such a document. As far as the general examination is concerned, this is a matter for my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade. I should have thought it almost certain that those considering this matter will have had advice from the Ministry of Transport.

Medical Schools (Expansion)

Mr. Grey: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he expects to receive the report of the University Grants Committee and the universities with medical schools concerning the expansion of medical schools during the next five years.

The Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster-General (Mr. Henry Brooke): In about two months' time.

Mr. Grey: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is greater urgency? May I ask whether he has given further consideration to the request which I made some time ago that as soon as Durham University is separated from Newcastle it should have its own medical faculty?

Mr. Brooke: The hon. Member will recognise that nothing can be done on this matter until the University Grants Committee submits its recommendations to the Government.

Mr. Short: Will the right hon. Gentleman bear in mind that, in view of the staffing difficulties which the universities are having, especially the medical schools, many believe that it would be better to expand the existing medical schools rather than set up new ones?

Mr. Brooke: I do not want to enter, certainly at this stage, into this internecine controversy in the North-East, but I think the whole House will agree with me that it would be wrong for me to say anything at all until I receive the report of the University Grants Committee.

Dr. Stross: Would not the right hon. Gentleman agree that if there are to be new medical schools the place which is ripe beyond all other places is, of course, north Staffordshire, at Keele Universtity?

Mr. Brooke: I am greatly impressed by the constituency loyalty.

Richard Thomas and Baldwins Ltd.

Mr. John Hall: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if, when denationalising Richard Thomas & Baldwins, he will allow holders of post-war credits to have the option of converting the whole or part of their holdings into ordinary stock of the company, with such restrictions as to future sale or transfer of the stock as may be necessary.

Mr. Barber: I cannot comment on the arrangements which might be made on a sale of this company. My hon. Friend's proposal would, however, be open to serious objection.

Mr. Hall: Would not my proposal have two undoubted merits? One is that the present holders of post-war credits

might well find when they are eventually paid out that the purchasing value of post-war credits has gone down to about a quarter of the original value and that a share in an equity such as Richard Thomas & Baldwins might enable them to recover something from the wreck. Secondly, it would help considerably in the marketing operation which would have to follow the denationalisation?

Mr. Barber: Be that as it may, I think that the proposal of my hon. Friend would have at least two demerits. Any sale of Richard Thomas and Baldwins by a public offer of shares would be a large and very complicated operation if only because of the size of the company. It would be an intolerable burden on the issuing houses which would have to handle any such public offer if the arrangements were further complicated by a requirement that post-war credits were to be accepted in payment of shares. There are other lengthy reasons which, if he wishes, I will write to my hon. Friend about, but there are great difficulties in his proposal even if it were desirable in principle.

Mr. Hall: Is my hon. Friend aware that I do not regard the first objection as anything but a technical difficulty and I could explain how to overcome it if he desires?

Mr. Callaghan: Whatever the merits of the proposal, is not the Chief Secretary glad to hear that investment in a nationalised industry is likely to be so valuable that it would recover for the post-war credit holders the value of their credits which has been lost by Government inflation over the last ten years?

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: While understanding the fears which hon. Members opposite have in seeing a nationalised steel industry running so efficiently alongside those Which are denationalised, may I ask whether the hon. Member would agree that the Government have far more important things to think about than the denationalisation of Richard Thomas and Baldwins?

Mr. Barber: The importance which the Government attach to this question is, I think, clearly apparent from the answers which the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave only the other day, on 22nd May.

Social Services (Cost)

Sir C. Osborne: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what has been the total cost of all the social services combined for each financial year since the war.

Mr. Brooke: As the reply contains a large number of figures, I will, with permission, circulate it in the OFFICIALREPORT.

Sir C. Osborne: Could my right hon. Friend give the figure for 1951 and 1961? Do those figures uphold the accusation that the Tories would cut the social services?

Mr. Brooke: The figure for 1951–52 was £2,083 million and the estimated figure for 1961–62 is £4,233 million.

Mr. Wilkins: Will the Chief Secretary consider including in his reply to this Question the change in money values which has taken place in each of the years mentioned, so that Members of Parliament and the public generally may make a true and fair comparison of those figures?

Mr. Brooke: If the hon. Member will put a Question on the Order Paper, I shall certainly endeavour to answer it, but this enormous increase in expenditure on the social services under Conservative Government is one of the things which make me unpopular when I have to control further rate of growth.

Following is the information:

The table below shows the total expenditure by all public authorities on the social services and housing. The figures relate to current and capital expenditure, subsidies and grants. The services included are education, child care, school meals and milk, welfare foods, the National Health Service, National Insurance, non-contributory and war pensions, National Assistance, family allowances and housing.

Year
Total expenditure
Year
Total expenditure



(£ million)

(£ million)


1945–46
755
1954–55
2,539


1946–47
1,090
1955–56
2,708


1947–48
1,337
1956–57
2,919


1948–49
1,625
1957–58
3,099


1949–50
1,850
1958–59
3,419


1950–51
1,918
1959–60
3,655


1951–52
2,083
1960–61
3,864


1952–53
2,361
1961–62
4,233


1953–54
2,470
(estimate)

Diabetic Chocolate (Price)

Mr. Frank Allaun: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that, following the 15 per cent. tax on chocolate, some retail chemists have raised the price of chocolate for diabetics from 1s. 8d. to 2s. 4d. for a three-ounce block, an increase of 40 per cent.; and if he will take special steps by legislation to stabilise the price of diabetic chocolate.

Mr. Barber: The answer to the second part of the Question is "No, Sir". With regard to the first part, I have made inquiries and my information is that, in general, the increases in price have not been as suggested in the Question.

Mr. Allaun: If I can produce evidence that there are such cases, would not the hon. Gentleman think that a good way of avoiding such overcharging would be to remove the 15 per cent. Purchase Tax from all chocolates and sweets and then there would be no pretext for this increase?

Mr. Barber: We have already spent many hours considering that very question. I think the hon. Member knows the view of the Government on it very well. If he will let me have details of the particular case he has in mind, I shall certainly be glad to look at it.

Sir H. Linstead: Is it not a fact that at present there is a substantial remission of Purchase Tax on a large number of medicaments? Could that not be extended to diabetic foods and other requirements of diabetics to help them to lead a normal life?

Mr. Barber: We considered very carefully whether this type of product should be excluded from the scope of the new tax, but we came to the conclusion that if we were to do so it would inevitably lead to anomalies and disturbance in the trade. For these reasons, we decided that we must include it.

Mr. Callaghan: If the Minister will not take the special steps proposed, what other steps does he propose to take to control the price of these commodities, which enter into the cost of living? Is he aware that since we last debated the matter there has been a marked increase, of two points, in the cost of living and


that it has gone up more in the last 12 months than at any time since the end of the war, except in the year of the Korean War? Is he aware that a man's wages of £15 a week are worth 18s. a week less than a year ago? How does he expect to sustain the pay pause in that situation?

Mr. Barber: I thought I had made it clear already that, as a result of this Question beiing on the Order Paper, I had made inquiries and that the information I have is that in general the increase of prices is not as is suggested in the Question. As to whether we should take special steps by legislation to deal with the price of this particular type of chocolate, I would only say that the Government of which the hon. Member was a member tried price control and it was hardly an unmitigated success.

Service Pensions (Commutation Rates)

Dame Irene Ward: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer on what grounds commutation rates have been made less favourable as from 2nd April for officers wishing to make provision for their wives against widowhood; and what consultations took place with the representative organisation's concerned before this decision was made.

Mr. Brooke: The table of commutation rates has been brought up to date so as to take account of recent more favourable mortality experience and of the higher rates of interest paid by the Government for their own borrowing. I do not think it would be appropriate to consult non-Governmental bodies on matters of this kind. My hon. Friend will be aware that the Service pension code includes non-contributory pensions for widows; commutation of retired pay is not the normal way of making provision for them.

Dame Irene Ward: Is my right hon. Friend aware that most people, including myself, think that if ever the Government can have a go at Service widows they seem inclined to do so? If he thinks that the Government ought not to consult, that would not be the view of those who have to do what they can to remedy the very low pensions of widows, which the Government fail to accept as their

proper responsibility. I am very annoyed about this decision.

Mr. Brooke: I am sorry to be in controversy with my hon. Friend after the nice things she said about me in the House the other day. Until recently commutation was producing a lump sum which was worth more than the annual sums so commuted. When Parliament passed the Pension Commutation Acts I am sure that was not Parliament's intention.

National Economic Development Council

Dame Irene Ward: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what reply he has sent to the letter, dated 29th March, sent him by the British Gas Staff Association on the composition of the National Economic Development Council.

Mr. Brooke: If my hon. Friend is referring to a letter written by Sir Ronald Gould on behalf of the Conference of Professional and Public Service Organisations, on which the British Gas Staff Association is represented, I would refer her to the reply given to my hon. Friend the Member for Rye (Mr. Godman Irvine) on 10th April.

Dame Irene Ward: I was not referring to that letter. Has my right hon. Friend noticed that the price of electricity has gone up? Is it not about time that "Neddy" had in it some representatives from ordinary consumers and professional associations? Is my right hon. Friend aware that I do not think that "Neddy" is fully representative and that I am not at all happy about employers and trade unionists agreeing to an increase in prices to the detriment of the consumer? When is the consumer to get a run for his money?

Mr. Brooke: I cannot hold out to my hon. Friend any hope that the Chancellor will be prepared to revise the composition of the National Economic Development Council, but of course any organisation which has not got someone of its own on that Council is perfectly at liberty to write either to the Council or to the Chancellor and put forward its views.

Mr. Callaghan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is within his


power to withdraw the instruction to the electricity boards to increase their prices in order that they should finance new capital development out of the consumer? Would that not be a very good way of helping to reduce the cost of living?

Mr. Brooke: I find these questions about electricity tariffs a very long way from the Question about the British Gas Staff Association.

Inland Revenue Forms P.11.D.

Mr. J. Wells: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer (1) in respect of how many civil servants and local government officers Inland Revenue forms P.11.D.are completed;
(2) in respect of how many employees in nationalised industries Inland Revenue forms P.11.D. are completed.

Mr. Barber: The legislation in respect of which these forms are issued has never applied to civil servants; nor has it applied to employees of local authorities unless they are wholly or mainly employed for the purposes of a trade carried on by the local authority. In that case, the form is required to be completed, but no information is available as to the number of forms involved.
Information about the number of forms completed in respect of employees of nationalised industries is also not available.

Mr. Wells: Is not my hon. Friend aware that it will cause considerable disturbance among chartered accountants and other persons dealing with Income Tax matters, to learn of this very substantial privilege apparently being given to public employees? There can be no doubt that considerable fringe benefits are enjoyed by members of the nationalised industries. Will my hon. Friend give some further assurance that those fringe benefits will be properly scrutinised for tax purposes, ac they are in the case of private citizens?

Mr. Barber: I think that my hon. Friend misunderstood my Answer. The legislation does apply to the nationalised industries, and the forms have to be filled in by those who are employed by the nationalised industries. Civil servants and local authority employees,

other than those concerned with the trading activities of a local authority, are excluded because— and I think that this will be accepted by every hon,member— their expenses payments are more strictly regulated than is generally the case in industry and commerce. Therefore, the ordinary Pay-as-you-Earn machinery is normally sufficient.

Mr. Cleaver: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind the fact that this will give the public the impression that there is another fiddle going on?

Mr. Barber: Whatever impression my hon. Friend may have, I can only say that if he really thinks that this is some sort of fiddle, then he has a totally false impression.

Sport (National Council)

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether a National Sports Council will now be appointed to administer the money furnished by the Exchequer for the carrying out of the recommendations of the Wolfenden Report on Sport and Physical Recreation.

Mr. Ellis Smith: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will now make a statement about the proposed formation of a National Sports Development Council.

Mr. Brooke: No decision on a National Sports Council has yet been taken. My right hon. and learned Friend's statement of 8th May only concerned additional resources to be at the disposal of my right hon. Friends the Minister of Education and the Secretary of State for Scotland, and local authorities, for expenditure on sport and physical recreation for which they are responsible.

Mr. Noel-Baker: Will the Chief Secretary represent to the Chancellor that, while I have expressed gratitude to him on behalf of the Parliamentary Sports Committee for keeping the Wolfenden Report alive and providing money for a modest start, the chief recommendation of the Wolfenden Report, made unanimously by. a body of great authority, was that a Sports Council should be set up, because that would mean greater efficiency, and, therefore, greater economy?

Mr. Brooke: I shall certainly bring what the right hon. Gentleman has just said to the Chancellor's attention.

Mr. Denis Howell: Is the Chief Secretary aware that the House debated this matter exactly fourteen months ago, when the Government spokesman said that the subject was actively under consideration? Why has it taken the Government another fourteen months to consider the matter without reaching any conclusion?

Mr. Brooke: Because the Government do consider these matters very carefully.

Mr. Chataway: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that while the role of the Council in regard to public expenditure might be very difficult to decide, such a Council as this could be of great value in distributing the funds, both capital funds and those for maintenance, that are to go to voluntary organisations?

Mr. Brooke: I am sure that the Chancellor will consider what my hon. Friend has said, but my hon. Friend will realise that I am not in a position to say anything further today.

Mr. Bellenger: The right hon. Gentleman may be aware that, although many of us interested in these matters are grateful for the Treasury contribution, the Government are only half completing the work if they do not appoint a Sports Council which will have an overall supervision of the distribution of those funds.

Mr. Brooke: Frankly, I think that the important thing is that the amount authorised in this connection for this year will go up by £5½ million, and that an additional £200,000 will be made available to the voluntary bodies.

Land, Douglas (Restoration)

Mrs. Hart: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what application has been made under Section 52 of the Requisitioned Land and War Works Act, 1945, by the owners of the Douglas and Angus Estates, for funds to meet the cost of restoring the land at Happendon Castle, Douglas, which was a war-time camp and training area, is still littered with ruined buildings and is now under consideration as a suitable site for urgently-needed new industry.

Mr. Brooke: As far as I am aware, no such application has been made.

Mrs. Hart: Will the right hon. Gentleman draw the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Home, the members of whose family are, I understand, the owners of the limited liability company, Douglas and Angus Estates, to the opportunities that exist for such a grant? Would it not be a very great pity if it came to the pitch where the local planning authority had to exert pressure far improvements to be made that were necessary to attract industry to this part of Lanarkshire, which so desperately needs it?

Mr. Brooke: I am quite sure that my noble Friend will see what the hon. Lady has said. I understand that the local planning authority is, at the moment, considering whether to zone this area far industrial use.

Income Tax Act, 1952 (Section 159)

Mr. Goodhew: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will now implement the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Taxation regarding the repeal of Section 159 of the Income Tax Act, 1952.

Mr. Barber: I recognise that this Section gives rise to some anomalies, and I will keep the question of its repeal under review.

Mr. Goodhew: How long does my hon. Friend intend to continue keeping this matter under review? Is he not aware that, however much he may be under fire at the Treasury, the war referred to in this Section ended long ago? Is it reasonable that tax relief for expenses for travelling to and from work should be given to one part of the community because of changes in war time, while the rest of the community is denied that relief?

Mr. Barber: I see the force of my hon. Friend's point with regard to this Section considered in isolation, but the object of the Section is quite different from the object of some of my right hon. Friends with regard to a general tax allowance for travelling. That raises much wider questions and, indeed, I think I am right in saying that there are new Clauses about it on the Notice Paper for the Finance Bill.

Leeds University (Capital Development)

Miss Bacon: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what effect his financial policy with respect to universities will have on planned capital development at Leeds University.

Mr. Brooke: The non-recurrent grants available for allocation by the University Grants Committee for capital development in the universities are based on the four-year building programme announced by my right hon. and learned Friend in January, 1961, which has not been modified. The allocation of these grants as between one university and another is a matter entirely at the discretion of the University Grants Committee.

Miss Bacon: Is the Chief Secretary aware that Sir Charles Morris, Chancellor of Leeds University, said last week that the Government's policy would mean that the planned programme for the growth of Leeds University in the next five years might be brought to a halt before it was half completed? How does that square with what he has just said?

Mr. Brooke: My right hon. and learned Friend the Chancellor announced some eighteen months ago that the amount of building starts that could be authorised in the next four years would be well over 50 per cent. higher than the starts made in the past four years, but the precise allocation of the moneys available as between one university and another is not a matter for me; it is entirely the responsibility of the University Grants Committee.

Medical Schools, London (Departments of Virology)

Mr. K. Robinson: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer which London medical schools have applied through the University Court to the University Grants Committee for funds to set up departments of virology; and what has been the result.

Mr. Brooke: These are matters entirely within the responsibilities of the University Grants Committee and the University of London. It would be a breach of the established relationship between the Government and the

universities if I were to inquire into them.

Mr. Robinson: Is the Chief Secretary aware that virology is one of the growing branches of medicine, and that at least one London teaching hospital— Guy's— has been trying desperately to set up such a department; that it has the skilled professional staff available, and needs only the financial support of the University Grants Committee, which it cannot get as a result of the right hon. Gentleman's policies?

Mr. Brooke: I know the hon. Gentleman's interest in the universities and in the medical schools. I have myself in years past been a member of the Court of London University, and I am absolutely clear that it would be quite wrong for the Government to interfere in the work of the Court of the University of London, or in decisions taken by the University Grants Committee in regard to that body.

Former Civil Servants, India and Burma

Sir T. Beamish: asked the Secretary to the Treasury what total sums of compensation money would have to be refunded to officers formerly in the India and Burma Services if the Treasury were to revert, without any subsequent interpretations, to the terms of the statement made by the then Financial Secretary to the Treasury on 24th February, 1949, to the effect that two years had been fixed for the period within which the obtaining of an alternative career in the form of permanent and pensionable employment under Her Majesty's Government would entail forfeiture of compensation.

Mr. Brooke: Of the £190,000 compensation which has been refunded by officers of the Indian and Burman Services since 1948–49, it is estimated that about half has been refunded under the interpretation to which my hon. and gallant Friend refers.

Sir T. Beamish: Is my right hon. Friend aware that it would seem, from the figures which he has been kind enough to give me, that the abandonment altogether of the two-year rule might involve the repayment of about £200,000 in compensation while to


return the compensation to officers who actually obtained employment after the end of the two-year rule would apparently cost only about £20,000? Not only does it seem that there is a serious misunderstanding here, but it appears that a serious injustice may have been done to a small number of men. In view of this, will my right hon. Friend undertake to look into this matter again?

Mr. Brooke: If there has been any misunderstanding between my hon. and gallant Friend and myself I will do my utmost to remove it, but if he is asking that we should treat in a different way people who entered the Government service within two years and those who now have exactly the same pension rights, I certainly could not agree to that.

Mr. Tilney: Would not the Chief Secretary agree that the extra pension for those involved in the United Kingdom service is very small compared with the amount of compensation surrendered? Does he realise that there is strong feeling on both sides of the House about this matter?

Mr. Brooke: There is a further Question on the Notice Paper on this subject but it is concerned with people who entered the public service in an unestablished capacity and were then offered establishment. It was really for them to consider, in the light of all the factors involved, whether or not they would wish to accept establishment and pension.

Mr. Glenvil Hall: Why is this rule applied to members of the previous Indian Civil Service when, after seven- teen years, they are offered permanent employment? Surely that is against the whole tenor of the regulation at the time?

Mr. Brooke: I think that I should be anticipating a further Question if I answered that supplementary question.

Betting Tax

Mr. A. Lewis: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will consider the abolition of the present system of taxing football pools and greyhound racing and instituting a system of a 2 per cent. tax payable on all forms of betting, gaming and gambling, however and wherever carried on; and

whether he will cause an investigation to be made as to the best method of instituting a general and equally applied betting tax.

Mr. Barber: I have noted the hon. Member's suggestions, but I am unable to make any further statement at the present time.

Mr. Lewis: That is the sort of reply we keep on getting. Is is not grossly unfair that those who bet on football pools pay 30 per cent. tax and those who bet on greyhound racing by the totalisator pay 10 per cent. while no other person betting, gaming or gambling in any other way pays any tax at all? If we had a fair tax on all forms of betting and gambling a lot of money would accrue to the Revenue, the tax could be reduced and no one would have any grievance?

Mr. Barber: This is the sort of question I keep on getting from the hon. Gentleman, but he will appreciate that only the other day we discussed the level of duty on football pools at some length. Again, with regard to the Pool Betting Duty on greyhound racing and the countervailing duty imposed on bookmakers, these are matters which may come up in debate if we discuss a new Clause— I think it is in the name of the hon. Member for West Ham, North (Mr. A. Lewis)— which is on the Notice Paper.

Mr. Fisher: In view of the new forms of gambling—bingo, chemin de fer and betting shops—which have been introduced by the 1960 Act, would not my hon. Friend agree that the discriminatory tax on greyhound racing is now even more unfair than when it was first introduced fourteen years ago? Will he not now consider introducing a review of gambling taxation as a whole with a view to it falling more fairly on all these different types of gambling interests?

Mr. Barber: I said the other day in the debate that most certainly further consideration would be given to this subject before next year.

Mr. Lewis: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that it is quite simple for the Treasury, it would appear, to put a tax on sweets and yet it seems to be against putting a tax on betting? Is it not possible to have a form of calculating


machine in every type of betting shop to cover every type of bet so that, when the tax is deducted, the person making the bet receives a slip on which is stated the amount of the tax which has been deducted? The Inland Revenue could then collect it once a week or once a quarter. What argument is there against that?

Mr. Barber: I will certainly bear that suggestion in mind.

Taxation and Gross National Product

Mr. Warbey: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what was the percentage increase in direct and indirect taxes, respectively, between 1950 and 1961, including in indirect taxes the amount paid in National Health and Insurance contributions; and what, during this period, was the percentage increase in the gross national product.

Mr. Barber: In money terms, the increase in indirect taxes levied by the central Government, together with National Insurance and Health contributions, was 79 per cent. between 1950 and 1961. The increase in direct taxes on income and capital was 67 per cent. and in gross national product 102 per cent.

Mr. Warbey: Does not that reply show that, contrary to what the Financial Secretary has been trying to prove in Committee on the Finance Bill, the Government are, in fact, taking an increasingly larger share of the national income in the form of poll taxes on the whole population, largely in the form of progressive direct taxation? As the Economic Secretary tries to correct that figure by bringing in last year's Budget, will he bring in this year's Budget as well?

Mr. Barber: I anticipated that the hon. Gentleman might refer to the observations of my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary, and I can assure him that there is no inconsistency between what my hon. Friend said and what I have said. One cannot consider this matter of National Health Service contributions in isolation from the increased benefits received. The increase in National Health and Insurance contributions has been more than matched

in percentage terms by the rise in the corresponding National Insurance benefits. Furthermore, the cost of the National Health Service almost doubled in the period in question. This country much prefers what this Government have done to the Opposition's action in imposing a ceiling on expenditure in the National Health Service.

Mr. Callaghan: If the Economic Secretary really believes that, will he ask the Prime Minister to put it to the test to see if the country really prefers what this Government are doing? On the particular question, however, would the Economic Secretary tell us whether the ratio he has given would be the same if taxation of company profits were excluded from the calculation? Or would it not show that the proportion being taken in direct taxation, especially from those earning less than £20 a week, has increased very substantially?

Mr. Barber: My answer referred to direct taxation of both income and capital. If the hon. Gentleman will put down a detailed Question, I will provide the figures.

Pool Betting Duty (Court Judgment)

Mr. Dennis Howell: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer why he is withholding the repayment of Pool Betting Duty which was subsequently held by the courts to have been wrongly claimed by the Commissioners of Customs and Excise; by what authority repayment has been withheld; and how much money is involved in this matter.

Mr. Barber: I assume that the hon. Member is referring to the Stockport County judgment. This resulted in Pool Betting Duty being repaid in respect of subsequent competitions which were similar to those which formed the basis of the judgment, but it did not require repayment of duty paid on earlier competitions. After a review of all the circumstances in which this duty was paid, no reason is seen to make repayment in such cases.

Mr. Howell: Why does not the Economic Secretary answer the last part of the Question and tell the House how much money is involved? Is it not a serious matter that, when a High Court


judgment declares that the Government have been getting money out of football pools on a large scale illegally, the Government refuse point blank to pay it back to the people who paid it? Would not any ordinary individual be in gross contempt of court if he did the same, and will the Government give further serious consideration to the matter so that the law of the country can be maintained?

Mr. Barber: No authority is needed for withholding repayment. On the contrary, no case for repayment has been made out. Regarding the last part of the Question concerning the amount of money involved, it is not possible to give any precise answer because, of course, it depends on the facts of each case. Claims received and refused approach £2 million, but if all such competitions were entitled to repayment the amount. could be several times larger.

Profits and Dividends

Mr. Awbery: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what new consideration he has given to the need for a freeze on profits and dividends as a means of helping to deal with inflation and economic problems.

Mr. Brooke: My right hon. and learned Friend has asked for continued restraint in profits and dividends. He does not think that a freeze "on individual companies would be desirable or practicable.

Mr. Awbery: Is the Chief Secretary aware that many of us are of the opinion that he has a unilateral mind— a one-way street— when dealing with inflation? He is attacking the workers, but has his attention been drawn to the fact that landowners are increasing the price of their land, property owners are substantially increasing their rents and moneylenders and banks are increasing their rates? Is he not aware that this is an arrogant organised body which is using its political power to gain a bigger share of the national wealth?

Mr. Brooke: The only unilateral feature of the situation at present is that wages and salaries increased materially last year whereas profits fell.

Mr. Callaghan: How does the Chief Secretary to the Treasury reconcile that

Answer with the Chancellor's repeated statements that his wages policy has been a success? The two things surely are contradictory. [HON. MEMBERS:" No."] If wages and salaries have increased, how can the policy have been a success at the same time? The whole object of the policy is to keep wages and salaries down. Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that the cost of living has increased during the last twelve months by 6 per cent? How does he hope to get people to accept an increase in wages limited to 2½ per cent?

Mr. Brooke: One of the reasons for my right hon. Friend's policy and his measures of last July was the excessive rise in wages and salaries in the earlier part of the year. It is that rise which is the main cause of the increase in the cost of living this year.

Mr. Callaghan: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that his last answer is wholly inaccurate and that the chief causes of the rise in the cost of living are Government measures, through the Rent Act, through increases in electricity charges as a result of their instruction, through increases in prices brought about by the regulator, and in a number of other ways? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that it is the Government who are responsible for putting up prices today?

Mr. Brooke: That is entirely untrue and I would recommend the hon. Member to examine the facts.

Mr. Ridsdale: If any controls are needed in the private sector, would not my right hon. Friend agree that far the best method would be to lower tariffs and bring in greater competition?

Mr. Brooke: That is certainly one of the courses that require consideration.

University of Keele

Mr. Swingler: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will state the amounts of the recurrent grants proposed for the University of Keele for each year of the forthcoming quinquennium; what increases in student numbers were originally allowed for by the University Grants Committee; what increases are provided for in these grants;


and to what extent these grants allow for further increases in the salary scales of university staffs.

Mr. Brooke: The matters referred to in the first three parts of the question are entirely within the responsibility of the University Grants Committee, and it is not for me to announce or comment on the amounts of recurrent grants allocated by them to individual universities. In reply to the fourth part, additions are made to recurrent grants when the salaries of university teaching staffs are increased.

Mr. Swingler: Does not the Treasury take any responsibility for the results of this action? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the University Grants Committee specially requested the University of Keele to provide an extra 400 university places in the next five years? Is he aware that the consequence of the financial strait-jacket put on the University Grants Committee by the Treasury is that already this young university has had to impose a 75 per cent. cut on its rate of expansion? Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise the terrible disappointment that this causes in a new university? Would he reconsider the matter with the University Grants Committee?

Mr. Brooke: The hon. Member will not tempt me to make any comments on the ways in which the University Grants Committee, in the discretion given to it by this House, decides to allocate grants as between one university and another. I am answerable to the House for the total amount made available to the University Grants Committee and I am prepared to defend the Government's policy on that.

Mr. Swingler: asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he is aware that the recurrent grant for 1962–63 now to be made to the University of Keele will permit only one-quarter of the increase in student numbers which had been planned; and, in the light of the need and demand for more university places, if he will review the amount of this grant.

Mr. Brooke: No, Sir. I should not be justified in reviewing an individual allocation made by the University Grants Committee.

Mr. Swingler: Will the right hon. Gentleman kindly investigate on what understanding between the Treasury and the University Grants Committee that Committee asked the University of Keele to provide extra university places for which the Treasury now refuses to provide the money? Will the right hon. Gentleman take responsibility for this situation and investigate and discuss it with the University Grants Committee?

Mr. Brooke: The hon. Member can have it one way, but he cannot have it both ways. As long as it is understood that the University Grants Committee has discretion in these matters and acts as a barrier to protect universities against interference by Parliament, I will not pursue in detail the sort of inquiries that the hon. Member desires.

Mr. Wainwright: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that the main fault here is that insufficient money is being granted to the universities to make more places possible? Is he not aware that in answer to a Question of mine only a fortnight ago he said that in 1964–65 the number of places will be one in twenty for the relevant age group? When will the right hon. Gentleman give more money to the U.G.C. so as to enable more places to be made available?

Mr. Brooke: The Government are giving over the next quinquennium an increase of no less than 55 per cent, in their grants to accommodate, I hope, an increase of 35 per cent, in the number of university students.

Mr. G. Brown: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, deliberately or otherwise, he is missing the question which he has been asked? An increase of a certain number in places has been planned, but the Government are making available money which will permit only a much smaller increase. Will the right hon. Gentleman explain why he is withholding the money for the number of places that the Government planned should be made available?

Mr. Brooke: It is not for the Government to say how many places should be made available. What the Government are doing is to make available a sum of money which will increase by 55 per cent, over the next five years and to


express the hope that the universities will be able to use that money to accommodate 35 per cent. more students.

NUCLEAR TESTS

Mr. Mason: asked the Prime Minister what information he now has about the length of the present series of United State nuclear tests; and what estimate has been made of the cost of United Kingdom participation.

The Prime Minister (Mr. Harold Macmillan): As I said on 8th May, President Kennedy has stated that this test series will be concluded within two or three months of its inception, which was on 25th April. The total cost of United Kingdom participation is likely to be of the order of £350,000.

Mr. Mason: Would it not appear, therefore, that our costs in this enterprise will be very small compared with the return which we shall receive? If tests are to go on and are necessary, it would appear that this joint enterprise will be a laudable and profitable one to the Americans and to this country. Could not the right hon. Gentleman, therefore, emphasise a point which he hesitatingly made in the debate on 15th May—that because of the possible success of joint testing it may not be necessary for us again to test our weapons on our own?

The Prime Minister: Of course we all hope that the tests will be brought to an end. It is true, as the hon. Member pointed out, that compared with the small sums we are spending, chiefly on scientific instrumentation and personnel, we shall have an equal share in the scientific results.

Mr. A. Henderson: Has the Prime Minister's attention been called to a proposal made in Geneva by the Mexican Government delegate that the three neutral Governments should fix a date beyond which there would be no nuclear testing. The delegate proposed 1st January, 1963. Is that acceptable also to Her Majesty's Government?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir, not at the moment, but of course this and all other proposals will be considered,

because it is our purpose, if we can, to try to find a method by which these tests can be brought to an end.

Mr. Mason: asked the Prime Minister what assessment has now been made of the likelihood of fall-out of strontium 90 from the Russian series of nuclear tests coinciding with the short-term fall-out of radio iodine from the present United States nuclear explosions; and what estimate has been made of the resultant effect on living organisms.

The Prime Minister: While it is possible that these two types of fall-out may reach this country simultaneously, the isotopes in question have such different characteristics that their coincidence would have little biological significance, and would not appreciably increase any risk to health which otherwise might be caused. As I stated in my replies of 8th May, there is no reason to suppose that either short-term or long-term fall-out will reach any serious level as a result of the American tests.

Mr. Mason: I am obliged to the Prime Minister for that relieving Answer. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, since the Russians intend to go ahead with a fresh series of tests and the French have in mind continuing their tests as well, there is at least a possibility of coincidental fall-out from the tests conducted by the nuclear Powers, irrespective of Whether it be long-term or short-term fall-out? Will he, therefore, give an assurance that, even if the Russians blatantly go ahead ignoring these facts, the Western Powers, if they have to test again, will take this matter into consideration and plan their testing to reduce the hazard to a minimum?

The Prime Minister: This has not yet happened and, therefore, I cannot answer that question. To answer the Question on the Paper, which I was not able to answer when it was asked as a supplementary question, I have ascertained that the biological action of these two radioisotopes is so distinct that their coincidence is not of importance.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Prime Minister now taking the attitude that these tests are comparatively harmless? If so, why are not they held over America?

The Prime Minister: I am answering the Question on the Order Paper, which I was not able to answer When it was asked as a supplementary question, as to the precise effect of the coincidence of different types of isotopes. I hope that I have, after taking advice, satisfactorily answered that Question.

Sir C. Osborne: What are isotopes?

The Prime Minister: In answering that, I remind my hon. Friend of something equally important, that we release representative figures regularly of gross beta activity in air, and the figures of pico-curies per kilogram of air are, on the whole, satisfactory.

GENERAL DE GAULLE (DISCUSSIONS)

Mr. Stonehouse: asked the Prime Minister what matters he intends to discuss with General de Gaulle; and whether he will inform him that Her Majesty's Government will not depart from the commitments to the Commonwealth, with particular reference to the safeguarding of Commonwealth exports of food and raw materials, in order to secure Britain's entry to the European Economic Community.

Mr. Frank Allaun: asked the Prime Minister which issues he proposes to discuss at his meeting with General de Gaulle next month.

The Prime Minister: I expect that we shall have a general review of the problems which concern our two countries. As regards Commonwealth interests, I would refer to what I said in reply to a supplementary question by the hon. Member for Chester-le-Street (Mr. Pentland) on Tuesday.

Mr. Stonehouse: Has the Prime Minister's attention been drawn to widespread reports that General de Gaulle will ask for the provision of nuclear secrets? Is it the right hon. Gentleman's intention to provide nuclear secrets to France as part of the price for our joining the European Economic Community? On Commonwealth exports, may I ask whether it is the right hon. Gentleman's intention to insist upon Commonwealth countries having comparable and permanent safeguards for their goods in Europe?

The Prime Minister: On the second part of that supplementary question, I refer the hon. Member to the statement made in the House by my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal on 16th May, a detailed note on which he circulated in the OFFICIAL REPORT. As for the first part of the supplementary question, I am not responsible for newspaper reports.

Mr. Allaun: But could not the Prime Minister give the House an assurance that there will be no agreement with General de Gaulle to provide him with nuclear information in exchange for an easing of the terms of entry into the Common Market?

The Prime Minister: My discussions with General de Gaulle will be confidential and I do not wish to be drawn into this or that statement. The hon. Member knows, of course, the terms upon which British nuclear information has been obtained from the American Government.

MEMBERS (EXPENSES)

Mr. A. Lewis: asked the Prime Minister, in view of the fact that Members of the House of Lords, who have no constituency expenses or correspondence similar to Members of the House of Commons, receive £3 3s. a day attendance money, whether he will initiate a similar scheme for Members of the House of Commons to enable them to meet the rising cost of the expenses necessarily incurred in carrying out their duties to their constituents.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. The maximum allowance of three guineas a day available to peers who are not remunerated for their services enables them to recover expenses incurred in attendance at the House of Lords. Quite different conditions apply to Members of this House.

Mr. Lewis: It is because there are quite different conditions that I put the Question down. I do not wish in any way to interfere with what the other House receives, but may I ask if the Prime Minister is aware that the other House does not have the day-to-day expenses which a Member of Parliament has in maintaining necessary expenditure incurred in carrying out his duties


to his constituents? Is it not unfair that Members of Parliament who have to maintain two homes and other expenses—[Interruption.] Is it not unfair, when Members of Parliament must maintain their hotel expenses here—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Is it not unfair—[Interruption.] Mr. Speaker, if you yourself will not ask hon. Members to keep quiet, I must wait until I can get my Question in.
May I ask the Prime Minister whether it is not unfair that noble Lords should receive three guineas a day for attending their House when they have none of the day-to-day expenses incurred by hon. Members of this House? Would it not, at least, be fair that those hon. Members who do, in fact, turn up here every day and not occasionally—

Hon. Members: Oh.

Mr. Speaker: Order. In the general interest, let there be less noise so that we can get on.

Mr. Lewis: Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Will the Prime Minister go into the matter again to see whether something can be done for those hon. Members who are in real need within the terms of my Question?

The Prime Minister: I should not like to be drawn into a consideration of the domestic difficulties or complications of either commoners or peers to which the hon. Gentleman referred. I remind the House that we did have this system, or a system not dissimilar, called, I think, the sessional allowance, and I believe that it was the general view of the House that that had better be abolished and concentrated in a single salary. I think that the House as a whole prefers that system.

Mr. Lipton: As an alternative, would the Prime Minister consider giving certain hon. Members three guineas a day for not coming here?

The Prime Minister: I am sure that the usual channels would be very ready to arrange that.

THAILAND (DISPATCH OF BRITISH FORCES)

Mr. Shinwell: asked the Prime Minister if he has yet received a request for the dispatch of troops to Thailand.

Mr. Warbey: asked the Prime Minister whether he has yet received a request for the sending of British Forces to Thailand.

The Prime Minister: Following joint consideration by the British Government and the Thai Government, we have now been invited to dispatch a contingent to Thailand and, as I informed the House on 17th May, we consider that a squadron of the Royal Air Force would be the most suitable contribution. The arrangements for the reception of the squadron are now being discussed with the Thai Government.

Mr. Shinwell: Will the Prime Minister arrange for the Government spokesman in the course of the debate this afternoon to disclose the terms of the request from the Thai Government and also the date on which it was received by the United Kingdom Government? Will the Government spokesman at the same time produce the evidence in support of the contention that it was the intention of the Pathet Lao forces to commit an act of aggression against Thailand?

The Prime Minister: Without going into the details, perhaps I ought to say now that, when a special meeting of the S.E.A.T.O. Council representatives met on 16th May, the Thai representative drew attention to the communiqué issued by the Thai Prime Minister the previous day which stated that the circumstances following the fall of Nam Tha—I quote his words—
constitute a threat to the Kingdom of Thailand and the safety of the Thai people".
The Thai representative went on to say that Thailand hoped that other friendly Governments would give consideration to her plight.
It was in view of this plea and the provisions of Article 4 of the Manila Treaty that we consulted immediately on the measures we could take. The Thais have now told us of their wish for the presence of the Hunter Squadron.

Mr. Shinwell: Is it not true that the statement that the Thai Government was in danger from an act of aggression was initiated by the American Central Intelligence Agency in the first instance, and will the right hon. Gentleman be good enough, in the interests of propriety and sincerity in matters of this sort, to produce evidence to justify the contention that the Pathet Lao forces intended an act of aggression?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. This will be debated, but I think that I ought to say that great tension was caused by the flagrant breach of the cease-fire by the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese allies at Nam Tha. Reference to the map and the long exposed frontier of Thailand and the difficulties of Thailand will show, I think. that it is not unnatural that the Thai Government felt that the arrival of some stabilising forces would be of great assistance to them, and as allies we have thought it right to respond to their request.

Mr. Warbey: Can the Prime Minister say whether there is a shred of evidence that there is any threat to Thailand? Secondly, can he say whether the tortuous negotiations and hesitations of the past week have been due to the fact that the Government have been trying to disguise that the initial request for the sending of British troops to Thailand actually came from the President of the United States?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir; the hon. Member has twisted and misrepresented the situation. We have tried to do two things: to add our part in what we hope will be a stabilising effect upon the Thai people and Government, and—the second half of it—to pursue, as we have done with every possible effort, the formation of a neutral Government and an agreement by which Laos can itself become a neutral country. I feel that some progress—in fact, considerable progress—has been made, and our hopes are that this, after a long delay, will now be accomplished.

Mr. W. Yates: The House and the country will appreciate the fact that the object of sending British troops in addition to the American forces is to try to achieve a stabilising element in Thailand, but will my right hon. Friend bear

in mind that the Prime Minister of Thailand has laid claim to Greater Thailand, which includes the southern area of Laos? Will he also bear in mind that the Commander of the Royal Army of Laos is a nephew of his? Will he therefore tell the House his intentions about the situation in Laos?

The Prime Minister: Whose nephew?

Mr. G. Brown: We welcome what the Prime Minister says about the need to get a neutral Government in Laos and recognise that this matter is to be dated later today. However, may I ask him two questions? First, will he make it quite plain, which I believe is the case, that the purpose of our contribution is to help Thailand and that under no circumstances will we get involved in Laos? Secondly, since Thailand feels herself threatened in this way, are the Government taking any steps to bring this to the attention of the Security Council or ensuring that other thought is given to it?

The Prime Minister: In answer to the first part of the right hon. Gentleman's supplementary question, I have stated the objective—to help to stabilise opinion, to keep things calm, and to give comfort to our allies in Thailand. With regard to the second part, the Secretary General of the United Nations is being informed of the action which Her Majesty's Government are taking. But it is not proposed at the moment to present the matter to the Security Council because the action taken is in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. H. Wilson: The right hon. Gentleman will realise that we shall want to debate his last statement as well as the whole issue in the following debate. In view of the statement by the Head of Government in Malaya last week, will the right hon. Gentleman tell us from where the squadron is coming, particularly since it has been stated that this squadron was recently in Thailand and was withdrawn from Thailand only a week or two ago and is now going back? Is that true?

The Prime Minister: This squadron was on an exercise some time ago, one of the many exercises carried out. It


will be flown in from Singapore. Since this is to be debated, perhaps I can leave the more detailed questions for the debate.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. G. Brown: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business of the House for next week?

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Iain Macleod): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 28TH MAY—Debate on the Fifth Report, 1960–61, and the Fifth Special Report, 1961–62, from the Estimates Committee, relating to London's Airports.

TUESDAY, 29TH MAY, AND WEDNESDAY, 30TH MAY—Finance Bill.

Further consideration in Committee.

THURSDAY, 31ST MAY—Second Reading of the Jamaica Independence Bill.

Report and Third Reading of the Colonial Loans Bill, and of the Northern Ireland Bill [Lords].

Motion on the Motor Vehicles (International Circulation) (Amendment) Order.

FRIDAY, 1ST JUNE—Private Members' Bills.

MONDAY, 4TH JUNE—The proposed business will be: Debate on a Government Motion to take note of the White Papers on Hospital Plans for England and Wales and Scotland. (Command Nos. 1604 and 1602); and the Motion on the Functions of Traffic Wardens (Scotland) Order.

Mr. G. Brown: First, may I say that we on this side of the House will want the opportunity of an early debate on the cotton industry. Secondly, will the debate on the Common Market, the week after next, be a two-day debate?

Mr. Macleod: I note what the right hon. Gentleman says about the cotton industry. I know that my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade expects to make a statement on that matter before the Whitsun Adjournment. I can confirm that there will be a two-day debate on the Common

Market in the week before we rise for the Whitsun Adjournment.

Mr. S. Silverman: With regard to the promised statement by the President of the Board of Trade about the cotton industry, to which I am sure all of us are looking forward with some anxiety, will the Leader of the House bear in mind what my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) has put to him? It referred, not to a statement by the President of the Board of Trade, but to an opportunity of debating the cotton industry. Will the Government offer an opportunity before then to debate the situation of the textile industry in Lancashire in the light of any advice which the Government are able to give?
Further, do the Government propose to give us an early opportunity of debating, and of reaching a decision in the House on, the wisdom or otherwise of the action announced by the Prime Minister a few minutes ago, of sending British forces into a foreign country without any authorisation by the House of Commons?

Mr. Macleod: I can, I think, promise the statement on the cotton industry, but I cannot promise a debate, because, with a two-day Common Market debate, all the days up to the Whitsun Adjournment are mortgaged. I note what has been said. If the Opposition wish to use a Supply Day for a debate, one could be provided very shortly after the Whitsun Recess.
It will, of course, be in order to discuss the statement which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has just made to the House—it will form one of the threads of discussion—during the foreign affairs debate, on which we shall be embarking in a few minutes.

Mr. W. Yates: Has my right hon. Friend noticed two Motions on the Order Paper standing in my name, one relating to Private Notice Questions, dated 28th February, and the other concerning the official duties of the Leader of the Opposition? One is:
[That this House reserves always the absolute right to debate and vote on any situation concerning the committal of the armed forces anywhere, and cannot accept that the official duties of the


Leader of the Opposition include that of opposing a Motion concerning the armed forces under Standing Order No. 9, and therefore calls for a reduction of his salary at the appropriate time.]
and the other is:
[That this House considers that any hon. Member, having obtained leave of Mr. Speaker by 12 noon, should have the right to convert one question down for oral answer on the Order Paper into one of Private Notice, provided that by so doing he does not anticipate the question of any other hon. Member already on the Order Paper, and that any rule to the contrary should be laid aside].
I think that the House is in some difficulty about Private Notice Questions, because in Chapter 17 of Erskine May there is a rule Which states:
A question cannot be asked by private notice in order to anticipate a question of which notice has been given.
No doubt the Leader of the House has noticed what occurred on Thursday last, when the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) had a Question down and leave was given to answer a Private Notice Question by the Leader of the Opposition. The Leader of the House might be aware that this position occurred once before, in 1944—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I do not know what the hon. Gentleman is doing. If he wishes to criticise a decision of the Chair, he must do it in the proper way. If he looks at the Question to which he has referred, he will see that there could be no reasonable question of anticipation. If the hon. Gentleman wishes to ask a question about business, let him do it.

Mr. Yates: I respect what you have said, Mr. Speaker, but I hope that I was not in any way criticising a decision of the Chair. I was pointing out a Ruling Which a former Speaker gave in 1944. However, if you, Mr. Speaker, desire that I should raise this matter after the business for next week is dealt with, I will do so.

Mr. Speaker: I thought that the hon. Member was proposing to ask a question of the Leader of the House relating to the business for next week. This is the time for doing that.

Mr. Yates: In view of that, may I leave the Leader of the House with these two points? The whole problem of Private Notice Questions deserves debate, and, in fairness to hon. Members, may I ask my right hon. Friend what he proposes to do about it?

Mr. Macleod: With respect to my hon. Friend, on the question of the admissibility of a Private Notice Question, he was, in fact, criticising the Chair and, obviously, this is not the time nor the way to do it. I have no intention of replying to that point, nor of supplying Government time to debate the salary of the Leader of the Opposition. If I may express a personal view, I think that he earns his salary and that he will have many, many years in which to prove it.

Mr. C. Pannell: Further to that point of order. In so far as the rights of—

Mr. Speaker: Will the hon. Member help me? Can we finish the business questions first? It was not a point of order. I do not know what it was. The hon. Member did not rise to such.

Mr. Pannell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I rise following the Ruling which you have given to the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mr. W. Yates) and this is the appropriate time. The hon. Member raised the question of the rights of the Leader of the Opposition on Private Notice Questions. I am asking you, Sir—

Mr. Speaker: I am sorry, there is a confusion. As I understand the matter, the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mr. W. Yates)—I hope that I do not misrepresent him—began to refer to a Motion which he has upon the Order Paper, which is No. 67. It was tabled a long time ago. From that, we entered into a discussion which, I felt, my duty obliged me to stop. The hon. Member then referred to a further Motion of his relating to the official conduct of the Leader of the Opposition and was told that time would not be found for it by the Government. I do not think that anything else arises.

Mr. Snow: In the forthcoming debate on the Common Market, may we assume that the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food will be one of the Government spokesmen?

Mr. Macleod: That is very likely, but the list of Government speakers has not finally been decided.

Mr. Peyton: Since last week, when I mentioned for the third time my excellent Road Traffic (Amendment) Bill, the horrible but, I hope, unjustified suspicion has crossed my mind that my right hon. Friend might not have read the two lines that compose this admirable Bill. Does he realise that I have been driven to this beastly suspicion by the belief that nobody of his known perspicacity and judgment, having read the Bill, could have failed to adopt it with enthusiasm on the part of the Government?

Mr. Macleod: On the contrary, my hon. Friend must be frank with the House. The reason why he has been driven to that conclusion is that he asked me whether I have read his Bill, and I said, "No."

Mr. G. Thomas: Can the Minister hold out any hope that we shall have a statement of policy in the near future on legislation on leasehold reform? Is he aware that many promises have been held out about a statement, but that the sands of time are running out?

Mr. Macleod: No, I cannot hold out any such promise. No doubt my right hon. Friend will study the question which the hon. Member has put.

Mr. Russell: The Common Market debate, as my right hon. Friend is, I know, aware, clashes with the meeting of the Western European Assembly in Paris. Has it not been possible to rearrange matters?

Mr. Macleod: I am sorry, no. I understand that difficulty, which affects hon. Members, but it simply is not possible to have a two-day debate on the Common Market, which most hon. Members want, on any other days before the Whitsun Recess. There is bound to be inconvenience to some Members of the House, but, as my hon. Friend knows, we are doing what we can to minimise the inconvenience in that case.

Mr. Bellenger: Can the Leader of the House say on what Motion the debate on the Common Market will arise?

Mr. Macleod: It is likely to be on a Motion for the Adjournment.

Mr. Peyton: In view of my right hon. Friend's deplorable confession, may I hand him a copy of my Bill? It would not take him ten seconds to read it.

Mr. M. Foot: Reverting to the question about the salary of the Leader of the Opposition, does not the Leader of the House think that he could best overcome any embarrassment and difficulty by handing it over to my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman)?

Mr. Kershaw: In view of the fact that the Acts of Parliament Numbering and Citation Bill [Lords] does not appear in the business for next week, may I take it that my right hon. Friend has decided to dispense with this useless and provocative Bill?

Mr. Macleod: No, sir. We intend to take its final stages at a convenient moment after the Recess.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Do I understand the Leader of the House to say that we can probably go into something which might develop into an ugly little war, or, perhaps, a big war, in Thailand without any opportunity given to the House of Commons to approve of it?

Mr. Macleod: The question of debating this matter in the House is obviously in order in the debate on which we are just about to start. The Government are confident that their action in meeting this request from the Thai Government is right and do not think it necessary to fortify themselves accordingly with a vote of the House.

Mr. Wigg: Can the Minister help the House to get the intervention in Thailand in perspective by telling us that 20 Squadron of the Royal Air Force, which is going in, has already been in Thailand since 22nd April until 1st May? Having got that into perspective, this is a political and not a military act. Will the Minister tell the House that on all occasions when British troops are committed the Government will seek the support of the House of Commons by having a debate?

Mr. Macleod: The point which is being raised concerns today's debate


rather than the business for next week. Rather than that I should improvise answers at the Dispatch Box, it is obviously right that the case should be deployed in full, as it will be, from the Treasury Bench today.

Mr. S. Silverman: Does not the right hon. Gentleman realise that the way he has just put the matter is in defiance of the whole basis of a Parliamentary democracy? He is now saying that he does not think it necessary to fortify the Government's decision by a vote of the House of Commons. It is true that he has said that he is confident—and we believe him—that the Government are right about this decision, and he has considerable support in that view in that a great many of my right hon. and hon. Friends are, apparently, also of that opinion.
If that is so, would it not be better constitutional practice to put that on the record, so that When the Prime Minister pursues this policy he does it with the express authority of the House of Commons? If it should turn out not to be true, will he not be accused of having deliberately avoided the opportunity of demonstrating that it was not true?

Mr. Macleod: No, Sir. I think that I have stated accurately the position in relation to today's debate. I again remind the House that the statement that I am now dealing with concerns the business for next week. The hon. Gentleman's question concerns an act Which the Government have done and which they are prepared to defend and which their spokesmen will discuss in the debate today.

Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order. I take it, Mr. Speaker, that we have finished with the questions about business—[HON. MEMBERS: "No."]—and, that being—

Mr. Speaker: On the assumption that what the hon. Member was last saying was still on the business for next week.

Mr. Gourlay: Reverting to matters of more domestic importance, has the Leader of the House observed the Notice of Motion on the Order Paper in the names of several hon. Members from

Fife concerning the question of toll charges on the Forth Road Bridge?
[That this House, whilst welcoming the prospect of the completion of the Forth Road Bridge, deplores the decision to impose tolls on its users; and, noting that such charges are not normally made on trunk roads, of which this bridge will be an integral part, and that the imposition of such charges could retard considerably the much needed industrial expansion required in Fife, therefore urges Her Majesty's Government to revoke this decision.]
In view of the adverse effect which such charges would have in attracting industry to Fife, will the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that we will have time to debate this matter immediately after the Whitsun Recess?

Mr. Macleod: No, I could not give that undertaking. If it is regarded as of sufficient importance, the matter could be raised on a Supply Day.

THAILAND (DISPATCH OF BRITISH FORCES)

Mr. S. Silverman: I beg to ask leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 9, to call attention to a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely,
the decision to send British troops into a foreign country without the authorisation of Parliament.
I wish to say only two things, in view of the fact that we discussed the matter at length a week ago. Since then, two things have happened. One is that the decision has been taken and that the troops are being ordered to go. Therefore, the last element of hypothesis that may have attached to the debate last week has now disappeared. This is now as definite, as urgent and as publicly important as any matter can possibly be.
The second change that has taken place—and I am grateful to the Leader of the House for making it so clear—is that, if the Government can help it, there will never be a vote of the House of Commons on this issue. If a matter is definite and urgent and of public importance, and it is clear that we are never to have an opportunity to vote upon it at all, I should have thought that it would


be absolutely essential that you, Mr. Speaker, should allow this Motion to be put to the House.
It is true, I say in conclusion, that there will be two opportunities today of debating the matter. One would be if the House did not accept the understanding about taking the Supply debate on the Foreign Office Vote formally. We need not take it formally; we could debate it. If we do accept the understanding, it can be raised again on the Motion for the Adjournment. But, in both cases, the procedure has been deliberately selected to prevent the House from coming to a clear decision upon this one matter, unaffected and unembarrassed by any other matters on which the division of opinion might be different in the House of Commons. Therefore, I submit that I have made a case under the Standing Order.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) asks leave to move the Adjournment of the House, under Standing Order No. 9, to call attention to a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely,
the decision to send British troops into a foreign country without the authorisation of Parliament.
I cannot allow the Motion to go to the House. There is an immediate, or almost immediate, opportunity to discuss that and any permissible topic on the Motion for the Adjournment.

Mr. Silverman: Nobody questions that there is a reasonable opportunity this very day to discuss that, but that is not the importance of Standing Order No. 9—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The distinction which the hon. Gentleman makes is between an opportunity for discussion and an opportunity to vote on a precise issue. I have them both in mind, but I desire to adhere to my Ruling.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered,

That this day Business other than the Business of Supply may be taken before Ten o'clock.—[Mr. Iain Macleod.]

Orders of the Day — SUPPLY

[18TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Considered in Committee.

[Sir WILLIAM ANSTRUTHER-GRAY
in the Chair]

CIVIL ESTIMATES, 1962–63

CLASS II VOTE 1. FOREIGN SERVICE

Motion made, and Question proposed,

That a sum, not exceeding £13,305,000, be granted to Her Majesty, to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1963, for the salaries and expenses of the Department of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; for sundry services; and for certain grants in aid. [£9,800,000 has been voted on account.]

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Chairman do report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

3.58 p.m.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: I wish to contest the proposition that, when we are about to enter upon the most important foreign affairs debate for six months, when the world is in as perilous a position as it has been for perhaps fifty years, certainly since before the First World War, we should deal with the foreign situation and the conduct of our affairs in the international field in a cursory, slipshod and negative fashion such as this. It is wholly wrong. It is not in accordance with our practice. It is, in my opinion, unconstitutional, in the spirit, if not in the letter. It is part of a general conspiracy between the two Front Benches—

Mr. Charles Pannell: On a point of order. The hon. Gentleman the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), when Mr. Speaker was in the Chair, was disallowed leave to move the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 9. What we are being subjected to now is merely a stratagem to get round something on which Mr. Speaker has previously ruled.
I submit that to you, Sir William, as a point of order. I think that it should be ruled out.

The Chairman: On the Question which I have to put to the Committee, "That the Chairman do report Progress and ask leave to sit again", it is open to any hon. Member to put arguments why I should or should not report Progress.

Mr. Silverman: I would accept the authority of my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, West (Mr. C. Pannell) on what is or is not a stratagem.
For my part, I am offering reasons to the Committee of Supply of the House of Commons why it should not deal with the conduct of our foreign affairs in the way that is proposed, and I was suggesting to the Committee, with apologies for the strength of my language, but perfectly sincerely and in all humility, that this way of dealing with the matter is the result of a conspiracy between the two Front Benches to prevent a vote being taken at any time in connection with a specific issue, such as has been raised. It is wholly wrong and out of accordance with our practice and with general principles.
I shall not waste time by dividing—[Laughter.] Well, I will if I am challenged to do so. I will withdraw my offer not to divide the Committee on this, since there has been a challenge to my decision. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] Because it seems to me that we ought not to accede to this Motion.
I beg the Leader of the House to consider even now, late in the day as it is, changing his policies and plans, and to give earnest consideration to whether he ought to persist in this attitude of shoving the House of Commons aside in international affairs which are fraught with the greatest possible terror to the human race. Let us have our discussion and our vote. If he has the overwhelming support of the House in the vote, it will not do him any harm. But why should not those of us who dissent have the opportunity of recording our votes?

4.1 p.m.

Mr. Harold Wilson: I want to put a very strong case that we should report Progress so that we can get on

with the debate on the Adjournment. I confine myself to one short and simple point. My hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) has suggested that we will want to discuss the situation in Laos and the statement made by the Prime Minister on Thailand. I am sure that that view is shared throughout the Committee. We all want to get on with the debate as soon as possible.
It may have escaped my hon. Friend's attention that the Motion, on which we are asked to report Progress, concerns the Foreign Office Vote only. Those of us who want a proper debate on Laos—as I am sure we all do—as well as on other subjects will find that we can do so much more freely and without the restrictions which at present apply if the debate is on the Adjournment.
It is, of course, for you to rule on a Motion to report Progress on the Foreign Office Vote, but if we did not hold the debate on the Adjournment we should be restricted narrowly on many points which I certainly want to raise, as do other right hon. and hon. Members, about the Prime Minister's statement. The sooner we can get to the Adjournment, the sooner the foreign affairs debate can begin. Many of us want to go far beyond Laos in the debate, because there are many other important issues. I suggest that my hon. Friend's point and the convenience of the Committee are best met by reporting Progress and getting on with the debate.

4.3 p.m.

Mr. William Yates (The Wrekin): I do not accept the view of the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson). One of our fundamental principles, if we are to vote money for the Foreign Office to carry out its various duties abroad, is that the Government should not commit Her Majesty's Armed Forces anywhere in the world at any time without the sanction of the House of Commons by vote. That is the proposition which the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) and I have been advancing.
I am convinced that, if this Motion were put to a vote, or if it were possible to get a vote on the proposition of our forces going to Thailand, either would be carried by an overwhelming majority.


But why has the Leader of the Opposition, on two occasions, sought to avoid a vote an a fundamental issue involving this country? That is the question to which I want to know the answer.

The Chairman: Order. The hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mr. W. Yates) is going a little beyond the subject of the Question now before the Committee, which is purely whether I do report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

Mr. Yates: I do not wish you to report Progress, or to beg leave to sit again, Sir William. This is one of the fundamental principles of the House of Commons. This is what we are here for. We are not here like a skittle alley for the two Front Benches. It is a fundamental principle, and it transcends all technical reasons. I am grateful to the Prime Minister and to the Government Front Bench for the statement, but we ought to give this decision an overwhelming vote. The only way in which we can achieve an overwhelming vote authorising the sending of troops to a foreign country is on a formal Government Motion.

4.5 p.m.

Mr. A. G. Bottomley: I am not certain whether I shall want to vote at the end of the day. The Government have not stated their case and I want to hear it. I have heard from my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) the reason why he thinks that the debate should be held on the Adjournment and I share his point of view. In these circumstances, I think it very unfair of my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) to accuse my right hon. Friend of a conspiracy. In the circumstances, he should withdraw that statement.

Mr. S. Silverman: My statement is amply supported by the fact that the Leader of the Opposition went into the Lobby with Tories only a few days ago in order to defeat a request for a debate.

4.6 p.m.

Mr. Michael Foot (Ebbw Vale): The question raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) on this Motion is not new. The manner in which the debate on foreign affairs is to be conducted in the

House today was raised during business questions last Thursday, when we discussed the arrangements for holding a foreign affairs debate this week.
Some of us protested then that we thought it most unwise and not in conformity with the best interests of the House of Commons and with proper discussion of the issues that four or five major subjects—Berlin, the structure of N.A.T.O., H-bomb tests and Laos—should be combined in one day's debate. It was because of this that some of us suggested to the Leader of the House that it was much better to have a further day to discuss these matters.
Moreover, when the subject of Laos arose last Thursday, there was an opportunity for the House of Commons to decide then to have a specific debate on it. Mr. Speaker himself approved the idea that there should be a debate in the sense that he agreed that it was a definite and urgent matter of public importance. But it was the decision of some other right hon. and hon. Members that we should not have that debate. It was the decision of the Government, supported by the Leader of the Opposition, although opposed by nearly 40 hon. Members on this side.
Therefore, if we are in difficulty about the debate on foreign affairs today, it is primarily because of the slipshod manner in which the business of the House was arranged last Thursday. Moreover, since then, some of the newspapers have supported protests that we are being forced to conduct a debate on all these subjects at the same time.
There was a further opportunity in which the business could have been rearranged. We had the new matter of troops being sent to Thailand and the Government statement by the Prime Minister today. The Government could well have taken the course—which I am sure we would all have approved—of putting down a Motion on the subject, asking us to debate immediately the dispatch of the forces to Thailand, with time being provided at a later date to discuss the other matters such as Berlin. If such a proposal had been made, everyone would have agreed that this was a better way of conducting our business.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) wants to get


on with the debate, but I understand that it was partly by his decision that all these subjects should be crammed into one day. If he had wanted more time to discuss Berlin and the H-bomb tests —as we all do—he could have had it. For the past month I have been urging, every Thursday, that we should have a debate specifically and exclusively directed to H-bomb tests. That has been denied by the Government with the connivance of the Opposition Front Bench. If my right hon. Friend wants more time to discuss foreign affairs, he has access to the usual channels. Why does he not press for it?
We are entitled to say that Government business has been so arranged that we have not adequate time in which to discuss foreign affairs issues and are denied the right to have a vote on whether the House of Commons approves of H-bomb tests. Now we are being denied the right to have a direct debate, and the opportunity of a vote, on the dispatch of British forces to Thailand. We say that this is a monstrously foolish and unsatisfactory way of conducting the business of the House of Commons. We spent three days this week discussing the Finance Bill, but all these major subjects of foreign affairs have to be crammed into a short time.
The Government will get more and more difficulties if they try to conduct the affairs of the House of Commons in this manner, particularly if, as it appears, in the arrangement of business so that we do not have essential votes on essential issues, the Government have the support of the Opposition Front Bench. There are some hon. Members who will continue to protest until the business of the House of Commons is conducted in a much better fashion.
That is why we are protesting—so that we can get a better arrangement of business in the future, but primarily because we demand the right of a vote in the House of Commons so that every Member can declare his views to the public and to his constituents, the people to Whom Members are responsible and who have the right to know what Members think and whether, for instance, they agree with H-bomb tests. There has been no vote in the House on the restart-

ing of the tests with British approval, partly because of agreement between the two Front Benches.
Now we have a second instance. Apparently, we are to proceed without any vote on the despatch of troops to a military dictatorship. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] Of course it is a military dictatorship. The Prime Minister said that we were sending troops there to bring comfort to the Government of Thailand and we are bringing comfort to what is undoubtedly a military dictatorship. Moreover, we have had no guarantees from the Government that the troops sent to Thailand will not be used in Laos, and we have fresh evidence today that part of the trouble in Laos is due to the activities—

The Chairman: The Chairmanrose—

Mr. Foot: I thought that you intended to intervene Sir William.

The Chairman: I understood that the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot) intended to resume his seat, as I was rising because I thought that he was going beyond what was proper on the Question before the Committee.

Mr. Foot: If I was going beyond what was proper, I apologise, Sir William, but it could have been only in the last few seconds that I possibly strayed over the line.
The Government must think about this matter seriously. We are not making this point flippantly. We think that hon. Members should reveal their conduct by their actions and by their speeches, but also by their votes, and we hope that the Government and the Opposition Front Bench will reconsider these matters and so arrange the business of the House of Commons that we can discharge our functions properly.

4.15 p.m.

Mr. J. Grimond: I am one of those who, on the information available to the House, incline to the view that the Government are under an obligation to send support to Thailand. I understand that we are bound by our treaty to send such support, if it is requested, and I understand that it has been requested. If I am wrong about that, I stand to be corrected, but at present I am a supporter of sending aircraft to Thailand.
However, I feel that there are aspects of this matter which deserve debate in the House of Commons. The report in The Times this morning of how the trouble in Laos arose, from which this whole question of Thailand, in turn, has stemmed, seems to demand further discussion and possibly further statements from the Government. [HON. MEMBERS: There is a debate today."] I am coming to the question of a debate today.
I am one of those who, last week, like the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot), asked whether the House could adequately discuss the whole range of foreign affairs in a one-day debate which would have to deal with tests, Berlin, the state of N.A.T.O., disarmament and Laos, and I still feel that to ask the House to tackle that whole range in one day's debate—I agree that it is getting shorter and shorter—

The Chairman: Order. I am most reluctant to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but the question of a one-day or two-day debate is not what we are now discussing. It is how we are to conduct this debate.

Mr. Grimond: I appreciate that, Sir William, and I appreciate your reluctance to interrupt me, which I share. With all respect, I am not discussing a one-day or two-day debate, but suggesting to the Government that the Leader of the House might put us all in his debt by now saying that he will find time as soon as possible, but in the near future, for a further debate on certain aspects of foreign affairs.

The Chairman: The right hon. Gentleman is doing exactly what I pointed out was not in order on the Question before the Committee. I invite the right hon. Gentleman to help me to conduct the debate in an orderly fashion.

Mr. Grimond: I appreciate that. The Question before the House is that you should report Progress and ask leave to sit again. I am suggesting that you should not be given that leave until we have had a statement from the Government about their intentions. Bearing in mind the statement on business today, I cannot believe that the business for the succeeding weeks of this Session is so vital that we could not find

further time to discuss these matters in which, I have no doubt, the majority of the House would support the Government, but which are proper matters for the House of Commons to discuss.

Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order. I wonder whether you could advise the Committee on this point, Sir William. Supposing the Motion to report Progress were carried, would it then follow that we would not have disposed of this Supply day or the Foreign Office Vote 1 and that on a future occasion we would be able to come back to it? If that is the situation, many of us might change our view about the Motion, if the Government would indicate that the resumed debate would not be too long delayed.

The Chairman: If I report Progress, having been so instructed by the Committee, we would not have voted on the Question which I originally put, but we would have used a Supply day.

Mr. Silverman: Further to that point of order. Would it be in order, or, if not quite in order, a permissible transgression, to ask the Leader of the House whether, if the opposition to this Motion were withdrawn, he would undertake to find time for the resumed debate on this Vote as soon as possible?

The Chairman: That is not a point of order.

4.8 p.m.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: This is a Motion to report Progress and I assume that the reply to the debate will be made by the Leader of the House. If he assures us that he will put down a Motion approving the Government action in sending armed forces to Thailand, then we will not divide on this Motion. But we should not report Progress until we have had a definite assurance from the right hon. Gentleman that this method of curtailing debate and slithering out of important decisions on grave matters of international importance will not be continued.
We are following the precedent which has been set on an alarming number or occasions. For example, there are three very important issues on which the Government have not received any endorsement of their policy from the House of Commons. I refer, first, to the Polaris


agreement. It has never come before the House and the Prime Minister has no right to give—

The Chairman: The hon. Member is getting on to another Vote altogether.

Mr. Hughes: I am pointing out, Sir William, the reason why we should not agree to report Progress until we get a definite assurance from the Leader of the House that we will have an opportunity of voting against the decision to send armed forces to Thailand, and I am arguing that the present procedure of the Government is in line with their action on Polaris and nuclear tests.

The Chairman: The hon. Member misunderstands the position. Polaris is not covered by this Vote and it is quite out of order to refer to it in this debate, which is concerned merely with whether we should report Progress and allow the House to continue its debate with the House as a House and not as Committee of Supply. That is what we are discussing.

Mr. Hughes: I was pointing out the series of precedents which have made us take this action. This is the third occasion on which the Prime Minister, on an important issue, has come to the House and said, "Here is our agreement. It has the authority of the House of Commons", when, in fact, the decision has not been made by a vote of the House. The House did not decide on the tests, or on Polaris, and now we are going into something which might prove to be an ugly little war. We are embarking on military action which might start a flare-up in South Asia which will be disastrous to our people in this country. We are, therefore, entitled to the normal rights of people who are representing others and to say that we do not want these forces sent to Thailand. If we are to have a Motion—

Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: On a point of order. I wonder whether you would rule on this point, Sir William. Am I not right in saying that the Supply days which are at the disposal of the Opposition are not necessarily confined to a variety of subjects, but that as many Supply days as the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition might choose to pick can be taken to discuss

various aspects of foreign affairs under the Foreign Office Vote?
If that be right, would you also consider that this is an attempt to employ a debate on the Question, "That the Chairman do report Progress" as a means of protesting against the official leadership of the Labour Party, and ought not to go on?

The Chairman: Surely it is clear to the Committee that what is now being debated is the Question whether I should report Progress and ask leave to sit again? So long as the hon. Member's argument is relevant to the Question, it is in order.

Mr. Hughes: I have listened to many debates on the Question to report Progress. They have usually been rather wide, but I want to confine myself to this specific point that if the Leader of the House says that he will table a Motion asking the House to approve the sending of forces to Thailand and give us an opportunity of voting on it, we will not press this issue to a Division.

4.22 p.m.

Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: I support the arguments put forward by the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot), the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond). We are being asked, in effect, to give a blanket vote at the end of the day in one circumstance, and no vote in another.
One function which the House has is to give the Legislature the opportunity to keep the Executive in check. This is the fourth occasion on which the Government have committed British forces without getting the prior consent of the House of Commons. There are certain circumstances in which leave is not needed, and certain circumstances in which, for security reasons, it is impossible to obtain it, but this is the fourth occasion—the others having been in Jordan, Kuwait and Suez—on which British forces have been committed without the prior consent of the House of Commons.
This is a far greater power than the Executive in any other democracy exercises, and certainly far greater than the


power which the American President has. I therefore suggest—

The Chairman: Order. The hon. Member is going fax too wide of the Question before the Committee.

4.25 p.m.

Mr. Harold Davies (Leek): This has nothing to do with the Leader of the Opposition, but it has very much to do with the Leader of the House. I maintain that we should not report Progress because the Prime Minister today completely misinterpreted the Manila Treaty. He told the House that we were acting under Article 4 of that Treaty, but it is obvious that under that Article we have to act with the unanimous agreement of S.E.A.T.O. and in accordance with constitutional processes. There have been no constitutional processes in Thailand, nor has there been a unanimous S.E.A.T.O. decision to take this action.

The Chairman: Order.

Mr. Davies: Mr. Daviesrose—

Hon. Members: Order, order.

Mr. Davies: I do not care how much hon. Gentlemen opposite shout "Order". We are here to defend British democracy.

4.26 p.m.

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Iain Macleod): We are now, on the face of it, on an admittedly narrow point, That the Chairman do report Progress and ask leave to sit again.
With all understanding of the speeches that have been made, I should like to say that the point of view put forward by the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) is the right one. Over a wide range of subjects, covering matters additional to those raised in the discussion of the last few minutes, the Government are anxious to deploy their case, and no doubt the Opposition Front Bench axe anxious to deploy their arguments either in criticism of or comment on it.
The method being suggested to do this is in no way novel. It is an ordinary part of our procedure. With all respect to the hon. Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies), who said that this is nothing to do with the Leader of the

Opposition, this is not so. This is a Supply day, and by convention the form of debate is laid dawn by the Opposition.

Mr. S. Silverman: I suggest to the right hon. Gentleman that, inadvertently, he is not stating the position correctly. It is the function of the Opposition to select Supply days and to choose the subject. The Leader of the Opposition did that. He chose the debate on Vote 1 of the Foreign Office Vote. What we are now discussing is a Motion to stop that. It is the right hon. Gentleman who has interfered with the rights of the Leader of the Opposition.

Mr. Macleod: With respect, that is not so, because by long tradition of the House in these matters more than the subject is chosen by the Leader of the Opposition. The form of the discussion is also chosen by him and we have agreed with the form that has been suggested by the Opposition Front Bench.
I tried to deal with future opportunities to debate this when we discussed the business for next week, and I believe that it would be for the convenience of the Committee if we agreed to the Question, That the Chairman do report Progress and ask leave to sit again, and then, on the widest possible canvass, which is the Motion for the Adjournment, the Government will be able to deploy their case and the Opposition will be able to criticise it.

4.28 p.m.

Mr. George Brown: I tried to avoid taking part in the discussion, because it must be obvious to everybody that, whatever the argument put forward to justify this, what is happening is that the day on which we want to discuss a range of important subjects which have led to a number of worries in people's minds is being curtailed by a debate on a very narrow subject which, with respect, does not stand up to examination.
It would be open to the Opposition always to take their Supply days on the Supply Votes. But if we did that very often the debate would be curtailed by the Votes that we put down. This is not a personal decision of the Leader of the Opposition. This decision was taken by my right hon. and hon. Friends behind and beside me, and is a decision by which we all stand. We decided


on this occasion to take this debate on the Adjournment because this was felt to be for the convenience of the Committee and of those right hon. and hon. Members who wanted to raise a wide variety of matters. There is a simple way round this. We shall in future just put down the Vote. Had we done so today, the last hour could not have been spent in the way that it has been.
It would not make a vote at the end of the day any easier than a vote is at the end of this day. A vote is technically possible at the end of this day, under this procedure. Whether it comes or not will depend on a variety of circumstances. If we put down a Supply Vote instead of doing this it would still not make a vote any more possible or likely at the end of the day, but it could easily result in our not being able to discuss the things which the House wishes to discuss, and which our constituents wish us to discuss.
We ought to be debating these issues today, and I appeal to the House to let us debate them. The responsibility for asking for a vote of the House about the sending of the squadron to Siam is for the Government. The Government have decided not to ask the House for that vote. It is true that the Opposition have decided not to challenge that, and that is as much our right as it is anybody else's right to criticise. It cannot be fairly argued that those who do not wish to criticise ought to be pushed into arranging the form of debate so as to narrow the opportunities to raise other matters that we want to raise, simply because somebody else does not wish to raise them.
Minorities in the House have rights, and they have ways and means of expressing what they want to say and do, but I submit that they should not push around the great majority of people on this side of the Committee who—in their wisdom or otherwise—have decided that they prefer to use this day in this way. Laos, Thailand, the Athens conference, Berlin and the tests are all matters that we should be discussing. We are now short of an hour for discussing them. I appeal to the House to let us get on with it and not to use up time for what most of us understand to be quite different purposes.

4.32 p.m.

Mr. E. Shinwell: Until the Leader of the House addressed the Committee I was inclined to support my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. Harold Wilson), who submitted a reasonable case for proceeding with the debate on the Adjournment. But the Government are on the horns of a dilemma, for which they are responsible. Last week they refused to have a debate on the proposition that if a request came from the Government of Thailand they would send forces. That refusal was supported by some hon. Members on this side of the House, but a large body abstained, and some Members went into the Lobby against the Government's refusal.
Following what the Prime Minister said in reply to earlier Questions, the Leader of the House implied that we can discuss Thailand and the sending of forces there. What was the point of refusing a debate last week, if it is agreed that we can now debate the same subject? The Government have planed the Committee in a very difficult position.
Can we be told what we are allowed to discuss this afternoon? Will the Government deploy the case for sending forces to Thailand? Is that their intention?

Mr. Iain Macleod: If the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) will study last week's business statement in the OFFICIAL REPORT, he will see that I said that it was proposed to hold this debate on the Adjournment because, subject to the ordinary Rulings of Mr. Speaker and the conventions about legislation, and the rest, all matters, including Thailand and everything else, could have been discussed. There is no change between what I said last week and the situation today.

Mr. Shinwell: But the proposition last week was that we could have a debate on the Government's sending forces to Thailand if the Government of Thailand requested us to do so. That is not the proposition this afternoon. But I understand that we can discuss the question of sending forces to Thailand. If we are to occupy the whole of the time discussing tests, disarmament, the new structure for N.A.T.O., and all the rest,


we shall not debate the question of sending forces to Thailand.
Can the right hon. Gentleman escape from this dilemma by doing what has been done in the past? There are precedents for this action. Whenever forces are sent to a foreign country, or are about to be sent, the Government have either agreed to a debate either simultaneously with the sending of the forces or later. That is on the record. I cannot understand why that procedure cannot be followed on this occasion. Perhaps the Leader of the House will agree that we can have our debate on the generality of subjects concerned with foreign affairs and defence, and that the proposition of the Government to send forces to Thailand can be debated later.

Mr. S. Silverman: I want to make a suggestion which might resolve the difficulty. I assure my right hon. Friend that nobody wants, or feels himself able, to browbeat the majority of the House of Commons. The difference between us is a very narrow one. It is true that we can discuss all relevant subjects under the Supply Vote; it is true that we can discuss all relevant subjects on the Adjournment, and it is true that we can vote on either. The difference between us is that whereas if we

vote on the Adjournment or on the Supply Vote we are voting in one package on a wide variety of subjects, on which we may hold different opinions, if we have the opportunity of voting on one subject there will be a clear determination of Parliament.

It would be quite possible for the Motion to be withdrawn; to have a short debate on the Government's proposal to send troops to Thailand, on the Supply Vote, to take an immediate vote on that and then proceed to the Adjournment and to debate all the other subjects. That would have the effect that all the subjects that anybody wanted to be discussed would be discussed. It would have the advantage of allowing us to vote or not to vote on the compendium of subjects at the end of the day, and also of providing an opportunity for a specific vote on the one subject upon which we desire to have a specific vote. This would give everybody what he wants. If such a simple device is resisted it can only be because right hon. and hon. Members want at all costs to avoid a vote on Thailand.

Question put:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 158, Noes 6.

Division No. 201.]
AYES
[4.37 p.m.


Agnew, Sir Peter
Critchley, Julian
Hicks Beach, Maj. w.


Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)
Cunningham, Knox
Hill, Mrs. Eveline (Wythenshawe)


Arbuthnot, John
Dance, James
Hinchingbrooke, Viscount


Barlow, Sir John
Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M.
Hirst, Geoffrey


Barter, John
Drayson, G. B.
Holland, Philip


Batsford, Brian
du Cann, Edward
Howard, John (Southampton, Test)


Baxter, Sir Beverley (Southgate)
Duncan, Sir James
Hughes-Young, Michael


Beamish, Col. Sir Tufton
Eden, John
Hutchison, Michael Clark


Bell, Ronald
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)


Bennett, F. M. {Torquay)
Emery, Peter
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)


Berkeley, Humphry
Errington, Sir Eric
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey


Biffen, John
Farey-Jones, F. W.
Kerans, Cdr. J. S.


Biggs-Davison, John
Farr, John
Kerr, Sir Hamilton


Bishop, F, P.
Finlay, Graeme
Kershaw, Anthony


Bossom, Clive
Fisher, Nigel
Kimball, Marcus


Box, Donald
Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Kirk, Peter


Braine, Bernard
Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)
Lancaster, Col. C. G.


Brown, Alan (Tottenham)
Freeth, Denzil
Langford-Holt, Sir John


Browne, Percy (Torrington)
Gammans, Lady
Leavey, J. A.


Bullus, Wing Commander Eric
Glyn, Sir Richard (Dorset, N.)
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry


Butcher, Sir Herbert
Godber, J. B.
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)


Campbell, Sir David (Belfast, S.)
Goodhart, Philip
Litchfield, Capt. John


Channon, H. P. G.
Goodhew, Victor
Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)


Chataway, Christopher
Gresham Cooke, R.
Longden, Gilbert


Chichester-Clark, R,
Gurden, Harold
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh


Churchill, Rt. Hon. Sir Winston
Hall, John (Wycombe)
McLaren, Martin


Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N.W.)
Maclean,SirFitzroy(Bute&amp;N.Ayrs)


Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)
Harris, Reader (Heston)
McLean, Neil (Inverness)


Cleaver, Leonard
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)


Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)
Macmillan,Rt.Hn.Harold(Bromley)


Corfield, F. V.
Hastings, Stephen
Mathew, Robert (Honiton)


Costain, A. P.
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Mawby, Ray


Courtney, Cdr. Anthony
Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.


Craddock, Sir Beresford
Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Miscampbell, Norman




Moore, Sir Thomas (Ayr)
Rees, Hugh
Temple, John M.


Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles
Renton, David
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Neave, Airey
Ridley, Hon. Nicholas
Thomas, Leslie (Canterbury)


Nicholson, Sir Godfrey
Ridsdale, Julian
Thomas, Peter (Conway)


Noble, Michael
Robertson, Sir D.(C'thn's &amp;S'th'ld)
Thompson, Kenneth (Walton)


Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)
Robinson, Rt. Hn. Sir R.(B'pool, S.)
Thompson, Richard (Croydon, S.)


Page, John (Harrow, West)
Robson Brown, Sir William
Touche, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon


Page, Graham (Crosby)
Roots, William
Vickers, Miss Joan


Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)
Russell, Ronald
Walker, Peter


Pearson, Frank (Clltheroe)
Scott-Hopkins, James
Ward, Dame Irene


Peel, John
Sharpies, Richard
Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold


Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth
Skeet, T. H. H.
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Pilkington, Sir Richard
Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd &amp; Chiswick)
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Pitt, Miss Edith
Smithers, Peter
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Pott, Percivall
Smyth, Brig. Sir John (Norwood)
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Prior, J. M. L.
Speir, Rupert
Worsley, Marcus


Pym, Francis
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm



Quennell, Miss J. M.
Studholme, Sir Henry
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Rawlinson, Peter
Tapsell, Peter
Mr. J. E. B. Hill and


Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin
Teeling, Sir William
 Mr. Gordon Campbell.




NOES


Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)
Lubbock, Eric
Mr. Sydney Silverman and


Holt, Arthur
Wade, Donald
Mr. Thorpe.

Committee report Progress; to sit again Tomorrow.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Redmayne.]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

4.45 p.m.

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Edward Heath): The dilemma with which the House is very often faced on the occasion of our debates on foreign affairs has been vividly illustrated this afternoon. I do not wish to enter into the constitutional arguments put forward by the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman), although I recognise the strength and passion with which he holds them.
When we discussed this matter at business time last week, the Leader of the Opposition, as has already been mentioned, asked that the debate should cover the Berlin situation, the N.A.T.O. Conference and the defence decisions taken there, the disarmament negotiations and the position in South-East Asia. There is, of course, a danger, which we all recognise, in dealing with these matters piecemeal and concentrating on questions which are hitting the highlights at the moment. There is an obvious danger for those who speak from this Dispatch Box. Hon. Members are at least in the position of being able to devote their speeches to one subject, if they so wish. But when speaking from the Dispatch Box one is open to

the accusation, either that one does not cover enough subjects—let me hasten to add that my hon. Friend the Minister of State, when winding up the debate, will endeavour to deal with those on which I do not speak now—or with the alternative accusation that one has covered so many subjects that there is no detail or substance in those with which one has dealt.
There is, I think, a more important danger. It is that the impression is created that we are producing or handling a defensive foreign policy; that we and our friends in the West are only reacting to the individual events as they occur in the trouble spots of the world. It fails to recognise that our foreign policy should be, and is, a positive one in a much broader sense, and in the ordinary way one would have liked to direct the attention of the House to those broader aspects of positive foreign policy.
The problems which we have been asked to discuss are, of course, important in their own right, and indeed, in some cases, as has been said this afternoon, they are vital. But they are individual tactical problems in our foreign policy as a whole. I should have liked to put these individual problems in the broader setting which I have been mentioning to the House. But it is quite obvious beginning the debate at this time, and knowing that so many hon. Members wish to discuss these individual problems, that I ought to put that background more briefly than otherwise I should have done. I had been looking


forward to explaining the broader aspects of foreign policy on this occasion to the House, but there are other matters that I wish to touch on in addition to those mentioned by the Leader of the Opposition.
When we are looking at foreign policy in its positive sense, it is related to the three dominant features which have emerged in the post-war years. The first are the possibilities as a result of the technological revolution of our time, of increasing the wealth and strength of individual countries throughout the world. The second feature is the sudden development, change and modernisation of individual societies, particularly throughout Africa and Asia. The third factor in the situation is the present attitudes of the Communist countries of the East as compared with those of our own Western group.
Against these factors, the positive object of our strategy ought to be to increase the prosperity and strength of our own group in order that we can foster and maintain independent societies and countries wherever we can. I emphasise "independent", because the hon. Member for Ebbw Vale (Mr. M. Foot) a moment or two ago cited the nature of the Government in Thailand, which I do not want to debate at this particular point, as being a reason why action should not have been taken there, as I understood him. The position which I am putting to the House is that the object of our foreign policy should be to help where we can to maintain the independence of these countries and especially where they ask for help to do so.
Particularly, in this strategy, there is the position of the West and of Europe. Europe has an increasing voice in these affairs. It is quite natural that as Europe regains its strength so this should happen. It is also quite natural that as it grows and develops so stresses and strains emerge, some of which we have seen in recent weeks.
I do not want to anticipate the debate which we are going to have shortly about European affairs, presumably both political and economic. I want to say one thing before we come to that debate. We have the right and the duty to play a full part in the creation of modern Europe. It has been a disappointment

to Her Majesty's Government that the members of the European Economic Community were not able to reach agreement in April on the question of political union. We shall welcome it when they are able to continue their negotiations among themselves about the political future of Europe. We understand the difficulties. I do not wish to comment on them today. Above all, we want to see these difficulties in proportion. What we believe is that we will be able to play a useful part in working things out with them when the time comes for us to do so which, as the House knows, we have already suggested.
In increasing our own prosperity and helping to increase the prosperity of others we have played a very full part in all the international organisations. I do not wish to deploy that today because I wish now to come to the other matters in which the House has shown interest.

Sir Harry Legge-Bourke: May we take my right hon. Friend's observation this afternoon that he is hoping that the Six will get together and continue their own negotiations on the political set-up in Europe to mean that he is not now going to press the case for us being brought in should the Six decide to resume these negotiations?

Mr. Heath: No. I said that I hope that they would be in a position to resume their negotiations and we felt that we had a full part to play when they were able to adopt the suggestion I made in London just over a month ago that the time was now approaching when we should be able to play our part.
I have emphasised the importance of a positive policy of helping to increase the wealth of other countries throughout the world. The second object is to support their independence. This brings me, without developing that theme as I would like to have done, to the question about which the House has just been speaking in Committee. That is the position in South-East Asia. The situation in Laos is a dangerous and disappointing one to Her Majesty's Government, and indeed I think to the whole House. Last year, in the course of a year's hard and difficult negotiations, considerable success was achieved at


Geneva. Agreement was reached on virtually all the details of an international settlement. In that we would all pay tribute to Mr. Malcolm Macdonald for the week which he did together with the other delegations there in creating this agreement between all of them.
Unfortunately, the three parties in Laos have not yet come to terms which would enable this agreement to be put into effect. That has been the position for some months, to the great disappointment of all of us. During this time Her Majesty's Government have been using all their influence, as I believe everybody in the House knows and agrees with, to bring the parties together so that they should be able to form a Government of national union and then consider the agreement reached at Geneva. In this success appeared to be very close when Nam Tha fell. There is still a dispute about the circumstances.

Mr. J. J. Mendelson: Is it not a fact that Boun Oum and the Rightwing section of the people concerned in the conference refused to receive Souvanna Phouma when he called upon him after the Geneva Conference and that there was no hope of agreement at the time of the moves and countermoves in Nam Tha?

Mr. William Warbey: Mr. William Warbey(Ashfield). Will not the right hon. Gentleman agree with this undeniable fact—[Laughter.]—that during the time of the fall of Nam Tha General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum were out of the country seeking military help for the continuation of the conflict?

Mr. Heath: I do not see the relevance of whether either the Prince or General Phoumi was away. I would have to check the dates carefully to find whether General Phoumi was away at the time that Nam Tha fell. I think he went away after the fall of Nam Tha. The situation was certainly better before the fall of Nam Tha in moving towards an

agreement between the three Princes. The fall of Nam Tha produced two results.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker: Would the night hon. Gentleman comment on what I have been putting to him for several months and what is now dealt with in a message from Washington this morning, in Which we learn that the American
Administration is now convinced that the Central Intelligence Agency has been up to its old devices again and must share a large part of the responsibility for the situation in Laos.
The message goes on to say that
the swarm of C.I.A. agents in Laos deliberately opposed the official American objective of trying to establish a neutral Government.
Will he tell us, in view of the work which the C.I.A. has done in places where Britain has vital interests— Burma, Laos, Cuba and elsewhere— what representations we have been making to the American Government against these activities, of which the whole would has been aware?

Mr. Heath: I have told the right hon. Gentleman before that neither I nor Her Majesty's Government can have any responsibility for the activities of the C.I.A., nor can we be expected to have knowledge of their activities. Of course, we have seen the report in The Times today reporting the views from Washington. What I do know is that the policy of the President of the United States and of the American Administration is to find a political solution to the problem of Laos to help to create a neutral Government, to support Prince Souvanna Phoutma in so doing, and bring all the pressure possible upon General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oun to take part in that tripartite Government. That is the policy of the American Administration, and I am quite certain that the Administration is doing its utmost to pursue that policy. [HON. MEMBERS: "Not the C.I.A."] We cannot be responsible for the activities of the C.I.A.

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: What representations have Her Majesty's Government made to the American Government against these activities, which were being carried out by an agency under the authority of an allied Government and which were obviously endangering the peace of the world?

Mr. Heath: My noble Friend is the Co-chairman and we, together with our allies in S.E.A.T.O., are in the closest touch, but the responsibility for this organisation rests with the American administration.
The first thing that happened as a result of the fall of Nam Tha was that the forces of the Pathet Lao were moved some 30 miles further on towards the Thai frontier. It was therefore no surprise in those circumstances, when the Royal Laotian Army crossed the frontier into Thailand and the Pathet Lao were pursuing them, that the Thai Government should feel that its own territorial integrity was threatened by the forces of Pathet Lao, which were advancing towards them and which obviously we know have been supplied from outside sources and therefore need be considered a threat.
The hon. Gentleman asked me the other day why these forces of the Royal Laotian Government were allowed to cross the frontier and then go back again. There is nothing in the Geneva Convention which prevents that or which puts the onus on the Government of Thailand of interning those forces and detaining them there. That is the answer to the hon. Gentleman's question.
That was the first effect of the fall of Nam Tha. It was, I hope the hon. Gentleman will realise, the first time that the cease-fire had been broken for a year, and it was a major break of the cease-fire. Of course, there had been minor disturbances, but it was the first major break in the cease-fire.
The second thing that followed the fall of Nam Tha was that as it was the first major break in the cease-fire, it was naturally asked whether the Soviet and Communist powers had changed their policy in Laos. Everyone was entitled to ask that question: whether, after a year, the Soviet and her supporters had grown impatient and had changed their policy. This again naturally made the Thai Government extremely anxious.
The Soviet Government had made it plain previously, while final attempts were being made to reach a settlement, that there would be no major breach in the cease-fire. Therefore, when this happened, it looked as though there may have been a change in policy; and, in-

deed, that the whole position in South-East Asia might be threatened. It was in those circumstances that the Thai Government felt that they needed reassurance, and indeed, asked for it. They asked for it, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said, in the S.E.A.T.O. Council, on 16th May, on which this was discussed. The Thai representatives there said to the S.E.A.T.O. Council that they believed that the circumstances following the fall of Nam Tha "constituted a threat to the Kingdom of Thailand and the safety of the Thai people," and it was in those circumstances that they asked for help and support. The United States Government promptly agreed to meet the request of the Thai Government.

Mr. E. Shinwell: As this is a vital point, would the right hon. Gentleman produce the evidence? In fact, did not the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Thailand declare, as reported in The Times on 16th or 17th May, that they did not make a request for troops, but that the United States offered to send troops?

Mr. Heath: My information is that the Thai representative made this request to the S.E.A.T.O. Council on 16th May. He was entitled to do that. That was the reply which he received. But surely the main point is: was he entitled to make the request? I have been trying to demonstrate to the House that in the circumstances that then existed he was entitled to do so because of the break down in the cease-fire and doubts whether this meant a change in policy.
The second question is whether those countries which were asked for support were entitled to give it. Her Majesty's Government are allied with Thailand under the Treaty of Manila, and under Subsection 2 of Article 4, if there is a threat to one of the members, then those members are entitled to consult together and to agree on measures which should be taken in the common defence.

Mr. Harold Davies: Mr. Harold Davies (Leek) rose—

Mr. Heath: I know what the hon. Member is about to say because he has said it already. That agreement does not mean that unanimity is involved. The S.E.A.T.O. members can agree if


they wish to take action by individual countries, which individual countries wish to take, and if they agree to do that, then the individual members can take the action in response to the request, and that is what has been happening.

Mr. Davies: With all due respect, the article says that
Each party recognises that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate …".
There is a reference to "constitutional processes". In other words, in the Treaty we have the very words "by unanimous agreement". What is the right hon. Gentleman trying to do?

Mr. Heath: I am trying to refer the hon. Member to the fact that I am dealing with subsection 2 of Article 4 and not with subsection 1 of that Article, from which he has been quoting. The hon. Member is quoting from subsection 1 of Article 4, which deals with armed attack. I am referring him to subsection 2 of Article 4 which deals with a threat to the area. The circumstances are different and the action taken is different.

Mr. Davies: Mr. Daviesrose

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: Order. Surely the hon. Member knows that if another hon. or right hon. Member has the floor he cannot intervene in that way.

Mr. Heath: Therefore, as Her Majesty's Government are allied with Thailand in the Treaty of Manila, and as subsection 2 of Article 4 provides for this action, Her Majesty's Government responded to the request.

Mr. Shinwell: I asked the Prime Minister this afternoon whether in the course of the debate he would arrange for the right hon. Gentleman to inform the House when the request was received to send forces to Thailand in order to resist aggression or the threat of aggression and what were the terms of the request.

Mr. Heath: I have told the House exactly what happened. At the meeting of the S.E.A.T.O. Council this statement was made by the Thai representative.
The representative asked for support in those circumstances. As a result, the Prime Minister shortly afterwards informed the House that if that request were received Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to take certain action. That request was later received. [HON. MEMBERS: "When?"] It was received yesterday. Following that, the Prime Minister has authorised the action, of Which he had already told the House, to be put in hand; as he said in his Answers, arrangements are now being discussed with the Thai Government.
That is the reason why Her Majesty's Government have taken this action in Thailand, but what, surely, is important also is that the negotiations should be got going again in respect of Laos, because that is the key to the whole question. For this reason we are glad that Prince Souvanna Phouma has agreed to go back to Laos and is on his way there. The Foreign Secretary was able to discuss these matters with him in London last Saturday, to discuss the situation fully and to assure him of Her Majesty's Government's support for him in his attempt to form a Government of national union. Prince Souvanna Phouma informed the Foreign Secretary that he was hopeful of arranging negotiations very shortly after his return.
What we also hope is that the Soviet and Communist Powers who are concerned in Laos will share the aim of Prince Souvanna Phouma and will help to bring about this national Government. The Soviet Government refused to meet our request about restoring the cease-fire and enabling the International Control Commission to do its work, but since then Mr. Khrushchev has publicly stated that the policy of the Soviet Union continues to be to work for a neutral Laos of the kind for which we have been working over this past year. He has also confirmed to the President of the United States that the understanding on this reached with him at Vienna is still valid, and therefore if the Soviet Government are still pursuing this policy and if the Chinese and North Vietnamese genuinely accept the same policy, there is still hope of securing a peaceful and satisfactory settlement in Laos, always provided that a Government of National Union can be brought about.
I have been dealing with an area in which a number of countries, for the most part poor and without long traditions of Government of a modern form, have suddenly achieved independence and have been beset by problems in the months and years since. We all know that the Congo is another area which has had problems arising from similar circumstances. The situation in Katanga has been quiet since last December, and the relations between Katanga and the United Nations have greatly improved. This is to be welcomed. I do not wish to go over the details of the present position in the short time which we have, but I should like to say something about the problem which faces the Congo and the United Nations at the moment.
We were disappointed with the first round of talks between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe. It may be that in these negotiations too much emphasis was placed on maintaining positions rather than on negotiations to reach a settlement. But the constitutional position is a matter for the Congolese themselves to settle, and the imposition by the United Nations of a settlement is certainly not a thing which falls under their present mandate. Nor do we conceive it as our duty to indicate to the Congolese what the solution can be, but if our experience can be of avail to them in any way, we will gladly offer it. We will gladly offer it to Mr. Gardiner, the Chief of United Nations operations, in the work of conciliation which he is doing. It seems to us that a compromise ought to be possible betwen Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe.
There are, after all, three questions between them. The first is the question of Katanga having been declared an independent State. We have always stated that we could not accept Katanga as an independent State, but it has been reported that before leaving Elisabethville Mr. Tshombe said that he recognised that Katanga did not possess its own sovereignty. Our view has always been that the future of Katanga lay as an integral part of the Congo State, and if his own views are now changing in this direction, it is certainly a step towards a settlement. It does not mean that the present constitution is immutable. In fact, Mr. Adoula himself has agreed that some amendment of it is necessary. It is clear that Congolese

opinion, not only in Katanga, is moving in the direction of greater autonomy for the provinces.
Secondly, there is the argument over the status of the Katanga gendarmerie. The control of the military forces of the State is in our view unquestionably a federal matter. There is no dispute over this. But the settlement of the question of the gendarmerie must go hand in hand with the restraining of the national Army of the Congo.
Thirdly, there is the question of finance. This is a vital element in any settlement. Katanga at the moment is withholding from the Central Government revenue Which without doubt ought to be divided. It has also, by expropriating certain firms, prejudiced the Central Government's enjoyment of revenues from those firms. But in these circumstances, and the three problems which I have described, I think that a compromise could be based on the Central Government being allowed to enjoy a rightful share of the revenue by arrangement with Katanga, with, at the same time, a reorganisation of the constitution in a less centralised form. As Mr. Tshombe is again in Leopoldville, we hope that it will be possible for the leaders to reach agreement on a settlement. There is, of course, still much to be done, but there will no doubt be means of helping Katanga and the Congo should they be able to reach a settlement.
What is quite clear is that stability will not be restored over this large part of Africa until its economic health is assured. I have mentioned two cases in the context of trying to increase wealth and prosperity and at the same time to maintain independence. The third principle of foreign policy is that of defending ourselves and our Allies. I should like to quote from the speech which Mr. Khrushchev made in Bulgaria as recently as 15th May. He asked,
What kind of international situation do we have?
He gave the answer,
For our socialist countries, we consider that it is good.
It is possible that one or two of his audience may have looked slightly dubious at this point, because he went on to say,
You will say: 'What is there so good about it, if there is such a rumpus in the


world?'. Yes, that will also go on … As long as both capitalism and socialism exist, as long as we do not have a uniform society—which means a socialist, communist society—we shall go on having struggles.
There are other quotations which I should like to give the House, but I will deny myself this because of lack of time. That is the background against which we must see the defensive alliances of which we are members.
Here I wish to meet the request of the Leader of the Opposition that in the debate we should also deal with N.A.T.O. and the last N.A.T.O. Conference at Athens. In recent years the advance of the Soviet Union towards nuclear parity with the United States has caused a great deal of heart searching amongst some members of N.A.T.O. They have been anxious in these new circumstances about the ability of the Alliance to protect them. Their main anxiety—and many who have talked with them in Europe will recognise it—has been that the Americans might be so reluctant to risk the devastation of their own homeland in a nuclear encounter that in certain circumstances they would regard parts of Western European territory as militarily expendable rather than use nuclear weapons to defend them. That anxiety exists, and it must be recognised. There has also been a feeling that the non-nuclear members of the Alliance have known too little about the arrangements for the deployment of nuclear weapons in N.A.T.O. and the plans for their use.
At the N.A.T.O. Council meeting in Athens, some important decisions were taken to allay these anxieties. I want to emphasise that these did not concern the basic strategy of the Alliance or the levels of conventional forces. They were designed to provide the Alliance as a whole with further assurances about the determination of the nuclear powers to defend Europe, and their object was to give more information about the way in which they would achieve this aim. Above all, the decisions which were taken at Athens make it clear, as the President of the United States said on 17th May, that the United States
cannot distinguish the defences of Europe from their own.
At Athens the United States undertook to provide N.A.T.O. with an adequate

supply of nuclear weapons for the defence of N.A.T.O. territory. The United States Government and Her Majesty's Government jointly undertook that their strategic nuclear forces—which, of course, at the moment are not under N.A.T.O. command—would continue to cover as fully as possible military objectives which threaten the Alliance and with which the existing N.A.T.O. forces cannot deal.
Secondly, a nuclear committee, which is open to all the members of the Alliance, was set up to receive and exchange information about the general organisation of N.A.T.O. nuclear defence. This will put the N.A.T.O. Council in a better position to take decisions about the future of N.A.T.O. forces, their size, their development, their arms, as well as about the strategy for which they will be designed.
Thirdly, the Council reviewed the action which it would be necessary for member countries to take in the various circumstances in which the Alliance might be compelled to use nuclear weapons.

Mr. George Brown: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he really meant what I understood him to say, that the Council decided to supply N.A.T.O. with nuclear forces? It sounded to us on this side of the House that that was what he said.

Mr. Heath: What I said, I think, was that the United States Government undertook to provide N.A.T.O. with an adequate supply of nuclear weapons for the defence of N.A.T.O. territories. That is the first part.

Mr. Brown: That is what I thought the right hon. Gentleman said. I used the word "supply" and he said "provide". But America undertook to provide N.A.T.O. with nuclear weapons for the defence of N.A.T.O. territory, for which, presumably, N.A.T.O. is to be responsible.

Mr. Heath: I said that this made no difference to the control at all. I made that quite plain, and then I went on to the nuclear committee and, thirdly, the action which the countries would have to take. There were those three points and I thought that I put them absolutely


plainly, In working out these arrangements Her Majesty's Government played a prominent part, and we regard them as a significant achievement in N.A.T.O. history. I would emphasise again for the right hon. Gentleman that they imply no alteration in existing arrangements for authorising the use of nuclear weapons. The power to do that remains firmly in political hands, and that is where we intend it should remain. What the Athens meeting did was to give all members of N.A.T.O. clearer information about the nuclear problems of the Alliance. Thus, they can share more fully its nuclear policies to the advantage of the Alliance as a whale, and we hope that, instead of having anxieties about the situation, the knowledge will breed confidence and that confidence will make for strength.
The remainder of the discussions were about Berlin—at least they were of a political nature and particularly about Berlin.

Mr. George Wigg: Are we to understand that at Athens there was no discussion at all about the size of conventional forces?

Mr. Heath: I know that the hon. Gentleman has raised this matter with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence in Questions and that my right hon. Friend has told him that there was no discussion in Athens of the kind he is suggesting about orthodox weapons and that that is a matter being dealt with in the review.

Mr. Wigg: Mr. Wiggrose—

Mr. Heath: I really cannot keep giving way. I have already left a lot out of my speech in order to meet the needs of the House. That is the situation, and if the hon. Gentleman wants to make a speech he will no doubt try to catch Mr. Speaker's eye.
I will now talk about Berlin and the situation there. The tension has eased since the talks which my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary had with Mr. Rusk and with Mr. Gromyko. At that time the Russians were dropping metal chaff "in the air corridors and they were tabling military flight plans which conflicted with the times and heights of advertised flights by Western civil aircraft. Since Mr. Gromyko returned to

Moscow there have been no further incidents of that kind. Mr. Rusk continued to have talks with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington and more are to follow. It cannot be said that these talks have yet produced a basis for negotiation. It is their purpose to do so, but it cannot yet be said that that has occurred. But they have at least been carried on in a reasonable and cordial atmosphere, and I am sure that the whole House will welcome the prospect of their continuance.
The best thing would be if these talks cleared the way for a permanent settlement, but if that is not possible then we should have to be satisfied with a modus vivendi which would enable East and West to live more comfortably with their differences over Berlin than they have been able to do during the past three and a half years. The main problem is still the question of access to West Berlin.
The Western Powers stand by their essential requirements, and Western troops must remain in West Berlin as long as the population want them there as a guarantee of the West's commitment to protect the city's freedom. We all welcome the relaxation of the tension which has occurred. No doubt many hon. Members will ask themselves why it should have occurred. Indeed, we all ask that question. It may be that the Soviet Government have came to realise that the problem of Berlin is not likely to be resolved in an atmosphere of recurring crises.
It may be that there is now a greater understanding of the vital interests of the West, but it would be unwise of us to draw too much comfort from the present lull. We welcome a decrease in tension, but it would be unwise to take the lull for granted. Certainly it does not lessen our interest in serious negotiations. At the same time as we have been dealing in Athens with strengthening the West and relieving these anxieties we have been making a serious, and, indeed, a very great effort, to come to agreement with the Soviet Union about disarmament and nuclear tests. My hon. Friend the Minister of State, who has just returned from Geneva, where he has been handling these matters, will in his wind-up deal in great detail with these matters.
I should like to make two points on the problem of nuclear tests to the House before hon. Members take part in the debate. First, the Western nuclear armoury is the basis of the deterrent power of the West, and it is the prime duty of the Western Governments, and must be, to ensure that it remains effective. We know the record of the Soviet Government. If it had been possible to secure an effective treaty banning further tests, the West would have been prepared to accept the fact that the Russians had already had another series. But we cannot afford to accept a moratorium which the Russians could again interrupt, or an ineffective treaty which they could circumvent. This would amount to letting them become two series ahead and would provide the Soviet Union with nuclear attack and defence capability so powerful as to encourage aggression. Therefore, it is to guard against this situation that the United States Administration are carrying out their present programme of tests in the atmosphere as well as tests underground. It must remain the prime duty of the Western Governments in these circumstances to defend their own resources in the deterrent.
The second point I want to make is this. It has been argued in the House and by the Soviet Government that an effective treaty banning nuclear tests is possible without international control. The Russians claim that all nuclear tests can now be detected and identified by instruments outside the country where the tests take place. Our best advice is still that in the present state of technical knowledge there is no way of making sure that some of the seismic disturbances originating on Soviet territory are the result of earthquakes rather than of man-made explosions except by on-site inspection.
My noble Friend the Foreign Secretary, when these statements were made by the Soviets, asked whether there could not be consultations between scientists in order that they could compare the information which they had. The other members of the Disarmament Conference made the same suggestion, and it has been made in the House of Commons by right hon. Gentlemen opposite and other hon. Members. In answer to this the Soviet Government have refused to

allow an exchange of information of this kind or a meeting of scientists in order to reconcile differences where they exist or to show that the Soviet Government are right in their belief.
That, surely, was a fair suggestion to make and one which could have been dealt with, for then we should have seen whether there exists scientific information which allows identification in all circumstances from outside the country to be carried out. But the best advice we have at the moment is that that is not possible.

Mr. Arthur Henderson: Will the right hon. Gentleman make clear whether Her Majesty's Government are now prepared to accept the proposal put forward by the neutrals at the Geneva Conference that any on-site verification should be carried through by an impartial international body of scientists and not by those representing various Governments?

Mr. Heath: The Minister of State will deal in detail later tonight with the neutral proposals and reactions to them.
To conclude what I was saying in this very important part of my reference to tests, our own scientists are vigorously pursuing the study of methods of detection and verification. So are the American scientists, and we are constantly exchanging information. Our scientists are prepared to examine any ideas to see whether it is possible to achieve a settlement of this problem, but the ideas must be supported by experimental data and observations which can be tested. These the Russians have so far failed to provide.
I have of necessity covered a very great deal of ground, I am afraid rather rapidly, in an endeavour to deal with the points for which the Leader of the House asked. I have dealt with the trouble spots which were mentioned by hon. Members. I have tried, albeit all too scantily, to state them in the context of what I was hoping to elaborate as a more positive foreign policy rather than a reaction to individual items spread across the world. The defence aspect of which I have been talking is only one aspect of foreign policy. If a détente and an agreement could be reached there would be liberated resources which we


and others could use for the first two purposes which I explained in our foreign policy. Until then we must maintain our defences and alliances. At the same time, we must try to create here and with our allies a sound economic basis on which we can promote the political strength and prosperity not only of this country and of our own continent, but also of the developing people:; throughout the world.

5.33 p.m.

Mr. Harold Wilson: It was unfortunate that, owing to the late start to the debate, the Lord Privy Seal had to cut down his speech, because it was clear, I think, that the parts he had to cut out were the more interesting ones. Certainly, I, and I think the whole House, have for once learned very little from his speech. I think that he added nothing at all to the knowledge in the possession of the House, but, to be fair, I do not think that he has subtracted much.
One thing which struck me while listening to the right hon. Gentleman was how delightfully simple things in the world look from the Foreign Office. Everything is neatly arranged, nothing is ever done wrong on our side, all the trouble comes from the other side, and we do not have to do very much to put things right. When there are awkward things, such as the C.I.A. activities to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker) referred, and which we must go into thoroughly today, the Lord Privy Seal brushes it off and says that he is not responsible for the C.I.A.
Of course, the right hon. Gentleman has no Ministerial responsibility—at least, I hope he has none—but his noble Friend the Foreign Secretary is co-Chairman and has a responsibility concerning Laos, and these damaging activities have been taking place in Laos. Has the right hon. Gentleman no views on this at all, or are those particular activities not visible through the particular brand of Nelsonian telescope which he uses when looking in that direction?
I begin with the question of Laos. Although we are in general agreement with what the right hon. Gentleman said about the objectives in Laos and about

what we are trying to achieve there, I must say that I was amazed at his account of the recent military operations in the Nam Tha situation. It just did not square with the accounts of any observer in any responsible newspaper in the Western hemisphere. It is, perhaps, rather important, in discussing Laos, of all countries, to avoid oversimplifying the issues and dividing people between, shall we say, those who follow the right and those who follow the wrong? Unfortunately, as I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will agree, the situation in Laos cannot be summarised in the familiar terms of television "westerns", with the "goodies" and "baddies" conveniently identified by their respective addictions to white shirts or black shirts, white hats or black hats. I think that the right hon. Gentleman was trying to identify the "goodies" and "baddies" very clearly.
That was the point of view of the late John Foster Dulles, a few years ago. When there was a neutralist ruler in Laos he was removed by the agents of the C.I.A. and the then American Government thought that was what we wanted to see in the world. Of course, this has been the cause of a lot of the trouble. The American position today has very considerably changed. America now accepts, as we do, the principle of a coalition Government representing the Royalist Right wing, the Communists and the neutralist groups under the premiership of Souvannah Phouma. That was the agreed basis, as the right hon. Gentleman reminded us, of the long-drawn-out negotiations in Geneva last year and again this January.
The main reason why we have had this trouble and the House has asked to debate this subject is that that agreement has not been carried out. The main reason why it has not been carried out is that Boun Oum and the hatchet man, Phoumi Nosawan, refused to give up the key portfolios of defence and internal security, although all of us in the West were asking that they should be given up. When we put this to the Lord Privy Seal at Question Time, he staunchly refused to apportion blame among the three princes, as he puts it. He knows perfectly well where the fault lies and why this coalition Government was not created.
It is only fair to point out that the United States Government who have no illusions on this matter—I am referring to the Government heads, not the wolf cubs in the C.I.A.—have put on continuous pressure, including the withholding of aid payments to the Royalist Laotian Government, to secure agreement and the fulfilment of the Geneva Agreement. It ought to be said, and I say it, that so far as the White House and the State Department are concerned I am completely convinced of American sincerity in this matter of attempting to secure this coalition Government.
There is, of course, every reason to believe that what has been the clear White House and State Department line has not been received with undiluted enthusiasm by some senior United States military people recently in Laos. We have reports from Washington this morning confirming what many of us have known to be the case, that for a very long time the C.I.A. has been taking part in activities which are completely opposed to the policy and doctrine of the United States Government. There is no doubt about that. I must say again categorically that in our view there is no chance of peace in Laos except on the basis of honouring the agreement for a coalition headed by the neutralists. I go further and say that unless this is pressed on the recalcitrant palace group with a great deal more vigour there is real danger that the threat to peace in Laos could escalate in a matter of hours into a threat to the peace of Asia and, indeed, the peace of the world. There is no doubt about that.
I come now to last week's fighting. We have had the Lord Privy Seal's description of it. What he has consistently ignored is the flood of messages which have been reaching responsible newspapers in this country and in America showing that what happened first was the tremendous and provocative build-up by the Royalist forces right up against the Communist Pathet Lao positions. I do not think that the Foreign Office would deny that. I shall not weary the House with all the quotations from newspapers—from The Times, the Guardian, the New York Times, the Daily Telegraph and others—but I do

not think there will be any dispute about this part of the problem. I do not think, either, that there is any question that this provocative action by Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan has been taking place in the face of the most categorical warnings and pressure both by Her Majesty's representatives and by United States official representatives in Laos.
It has been further alleged, of course, that it was not only a question of a provocative build-up, but that there had been forays into Communist-held positions under the cease-fire agreement; that, in fact, there was a deliberate breach of the cease-fire by Right-wing forces, and that this was based, as the Economist said last week, on
… a desire to wreck the Geneva formula and embroil the United States in a shooting war designed to make Laos safe for the General and his friends.
I am not in a position to know whether it is true, but there is this allegation, and there is some evidence to support it.
It has been authoritatively suggested, too, that the fighting has been greatly exaggerated. It is curious that we have as yet heard nothing from the Government about the extent of that fighting. On 15th May, the Daily Telegraph said:
But doubts are growing that Prince Boun Oum's troops were ever heavily attacked. An American official said this afternoon that the 12-man military assistance group attached to the Royalist garrison in the town was evacuated a few hours before the action began.
It is estimated that defenders out-numbered attackers by at least two to one.
What no one will dispute has been the speed with which the Royal Laotian forces got away from the action, a speed with which even the hon. Member for Lewisham, North (Mr. Chataway), with his sub-four-minute mile, could not compete.
That is why one really must ask for more information. The Government must have some information as to whether there really was fighting, and to what extent there was fighting, in this area; not least, I think, because on past occasions there have been clear statements made by the Laotian Government about alleged attacks and incidents which, when investigated, in one case a United Nations independent commission found no evidence at all to support the allegation, and, in the other case, it was


withdrawn by one of Boun Oum's own Ministers, who said that there had never been any trouble of any kind. Therefore, we must at the very least suspend judgment about what has actually gone on there.
Of course, those are not the only strange occurrences. Last week, I understand that Mr. Speaker and the House had some difficulty in deciding whether there was a definite matter of urgent public importance before the House as affecting the interests of this country. Whatever the arguments for that there may have been, there would have been no doubt in the minds of any hon. Member that the Royal Laotian Government and the people of Laos were last week facing a very definite situation of urgent public importance affecting Laotian interests. That was the basis on which the Prime Minister made his announcement this afternoon.
Yet, at that moment, Prince Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan set off on a goodwill visit to Formosa. If their stated reason for that visit be correct, that it was a goodwill visit, the most that one can say is that this reflects an extraordinary degree of frivolity. It suggests that we are all taking Laotian problems seriously, but that the rulers of that country are not. But was that their reason? I strongly suspect—as, I think, many others will—that the real reason was to get Chiang Kai-shek to reactivate the Kuomintang forces that have been operating in Burma, some of whom were moved from Burma to Thailand, and to get them to intervene in Laos. I hope that the Government will tell us something of the visit to Taipeh, and the reports they have had over the past few months of the activities of K.M.T. troops in Burma and Siam. I hope that the Lord Privy Seal will agree that here lies one of the most dangerous elements in the situation.
I turn to the request of Laos for military assistance, the request to the United States, not under S.E.A.T.O., under standing bilateral arrangements. I say at once that no one in this House would be prepared to tolerate a threat to Thailand's integrity. I think that that should be made clear. The United States was quite right to guard against any such threat, and so are we. If that is the question, I do not think that there

can be argument about it—and I shall come to that point in a moment—in relation to the Prime Minister's announcement. What we have to be on guard against—and this point was put by my right hon. Friend last week—is any involvement with Right-wing forces in Laos.
It is no secret that General Sarit is utterly opposed to the neutralist solution, of Laos under a neutralist Government, and to the policy of Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government and, of course, he is committed to the hilt to supporting his nephew Phoumi Nosavan. I was a little surprised when the Prime Minister did not seem to understand that avuncular relationship, and the concern which some Heads of Government feel for the future welfare of their nephews.
Some hon. Members, of course, will see in all this a deep-laid plot. I think that some of my hon. Friends, particularly after this morning's account in The Times about the C.I.A. agents in Laos, will say that this is all a deep-laid plot to get American troops involved in action with the Communists. They are right to have suspicions about that. I think that there may have been some plot, but I personally do not believe that the United States Government are in any way involved in it. It may be the intention of the Siamese Government that they should be, but I believe that the reaction of the American Government is, in fact, one of the best assurances that the plot will not be carried out —

Mr. Warbey: Mr. Warbey rose—

Mr. Wilson: I should like to finish what I was saying, and it is possible that, when I have done so, my hon. Friend will find that I have anticipated what he wants to say.
As I said, the position is that the Government of the United States are under very heavy pressure in their own Congress and Senate, and by their own Press, to drop the neutralist policy in Laos and go in for a get-tough policy such as is being followed in Vietnam. They are certainly under heavy pressure from Thailand. I have reason to believe that the motive of the American Government in taking the action they are taking is to isolate a possible threat


to Thailand from the problem of intervention in Laos, and that this is the best assurance that we shall now have greater vigour shown by the American Government in pursuing an independent Laotian policy.
I turn now to the statement made by the Prime Minister this afternoon. The right hon. Gentleman said of the Thai appeal that such a situation constitutes a threat to the Kingdom of Thailand and the safety of the Thai people. If that is true, we are right to send help; even the token help that is being sent, and token help it is, of course. It is, as the Prime Minister appreciates,  purely political gesture of practically no military value at all, and he made no pretence about that. I think that the planes were in Thailand about a fortnight ago and left just before the trouble started. If it is regarded as a satisfactory political gesture to send them back into Thailand I, for my part, do not object. If there is a threat, or if there is said to be a threat, to the Kingdom of Thailand it is right for us to do so but, equally—

Mr. Shinwell: Is my right hon. Friend suggesting that he is not certain whether there is a threat or not? He is not very clear about the threat. There may or may not have been a threat. But now he suggests that, irrespective of whether the Thailand Government make a request for forces to be sent, we should intervene.

Mr. Wilson: I understand that the Thailand Government have made a request to S.E.A.T.O., and I understand that S.E.A.T.O. has not made an agreed recommendation, but has left the matter to its individual members That is how I understand the position.
I think that that is the fact, but certain things follow from that. If there is a threat to Thailand—and there must be, or the Prime Minister would not have made his statement this afternoon—it is the duty of the Government to report it without delay to the Security Council of the United Nations, and the fact that they have not done so, and have refused to do so, casts some doubt on the Government's position. I repeat, it is absolutely vital to divorce the question of the protection of Thailand from the Laotian problem.
I conclude, on Laos, by saying that, first we need renewed vigour to get the coalition we have been discussing. I gather that there is some improvement in the position now that Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan are now willing to agree about portfolios. Secondly, the Government, as co-Chairman should, in view of the emergency, recall the Geneva Conference. In my view, they should immediately and quickly reactivate the International Control Commission. One of the things that will be vitally necessary will be to disband Boun Oum's Army and to run it down to police strength. An independent control commission would ensure that this was done.
Thirdly, the Government should press on the United States the need for action to insist that their Kuomintang allies should stop their mischievious and dangerous activities in Burma and Thailand. No less urgent, it is vital that the Prime Minister should make a personal communication to President Kennedy to ensure that he puts his C.I.A. house in order so that clearly defined American policy is not frustrated and sabotaged by these irresponsible elements. It is a serious thing to suggest that while the American Government have officially cut off aid from the Laotian Government, the C.I.A. has been making grants in aid out of its secret appropriations. If this is the truth the Prime Minister, rather than to have sent aeroplanes, might have done better to have sent the Comptroller and Auditor General to look into the C.I.A.'s affairs. This has been an extremely dangerous development.
I hope, also, that at the earliest possible moment the Government will look into some of the economic problems in that area. It is time that the economic problems of the Mekong Valley area were taken as a whole and I suggest that we must start to build up its economic and social strength with land reforms, with priorities and a Mekong Valley Development Authority. This idea has been put forward by some of the more imaginative and realistic Americans and I hope that the House will impress on the Government the need for action in this direction.
Before turning to the situation nearer home, in Asia, there is one issue we cannot ignore. I refer to Hong Kong and


the issue of the starvation in China. Yesterday, President Kennedy announced measure's for moving refugees from Hong Kong and I wish today to deal with the question of food for China. I know the arguments in favour of doing nothing—that it is all China's fault, that they have had the wrong priorities, collectivisation, that they have been playing politics with food production, that grain has been diverted to Albania and all the other arguments. Indeed, it is always easy to find reasons for passing by on the other side.
I know, equally, that there is strong feeling in America about these questions. I realise that they have not yet recognised the existence of China and no doubt we shall be told that if we wait hunger and discontent will so weaken the Communist hold over the people of China that Chiang Kai-shek will be able to walk 'unimpeded into Peking. This approach to this challenge is as dangerous as it is immoral. Does anyone think that Chiang Kai-shek would have a bloodless victory, or that it would be possible to avoid a bloody civil war which might engulf the world?
It can be argued, as people have, about the virtues of total blockade in total war and about the effects on the morale and will to win, but all history shows that he who engages hunger as his ally engages a very treacherous partner, that nations who seek to use starvation as an instrument of national policy soon find that bitterness and desperation works against them. Have we not yet learnt the lesson of the Russian famine?
I suggest, therefore, that with our Commonwealth partners and the fund of good will in the United States—and the amount of that good will might surprise the cynical—we should take the initiative now in promoting a world food programme for China and other areas in a similar plight. If we do this then let us do it sincerely and as a worth-while action, but do not let us make food a pawn in a political game.
I now turn to the Lord Privy Seal's remarks about Berlin. I think that we are agreed here about our objectives. They have been stated frequently, that no settlement can be accepted which does not guarantee the people of West Berlin the right to live in the kind of

society which they choose, or which does not guarantee, with safeguards more binding than paper treaties, freedom of access to and from the West. To get such an agreement we should be prepared to be flexible about accepting Germany's Eastern frontiers and for giving some degree of recognition, as a fact, to the present situation in Eastern Germany pending effective moves towards reunification. All of us will welcome the flexibility that the West has recently shown in the proposals for a 13-Power international access authority to control the autobahn and air corridors.
Dr. Adenauer's reaction to this was, in fact, a calculated act of sabotage. It would be easy for the Russians now to turn even more difficult on the ground that the United States did not speak for its Western partners. However, the hopeful feature—the only one, perhaps—is that America's firm reply to Dr. Adenauer has made it clear to the Russians for the first time that American policy of Europe is not dictated by Dr. Adenauer. This is a welcome development from the days of Foster Dulles. I suppose that we must accept, with advancing age, more and more unhelpful statements from the German Chancellor. I have considerable sympathy for Herr von Eckhardt, who must issue statements to say he had not said such and such, that he was not there, that he was mistranslated, that he had not meant it, or that he had been misunderstood.
The Lord Privy Seal's statement today entirely failed to present the Berlin issue in its wider setting of Central European security. This is why we have pressed so often for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and measures for scouring an area of controlled disarmament. This could be a powerful solvent to the Berlin question. These matters are equally relevant, but the Lord Privy Seal did not even refer to the Rapacki plan, or to the conclusion of a comprehensive disarmament and security treaty at Geneva.
On the question of disarmament and tests, I am tempted, as was the Lord Privy Seal, to cut down my speech because I can think of many reasons for omitting this part of it. But a commitment was given that this matter would be debated and I intend, therefore, to deal with it. I will not dwell at any


length on the negotiations at Geneva, the more so as we are hoping to have a full debate on this subject before the Summer Recess, when the position at Geneva becomes clearer. It is more important to go for a full disarmament agreement than to be satisfied with a test ban, even if we could get it, because a test ban agreement raises nearly all the problems of inspection, and so on.
We have two drafts of a comprehensive agreement, the Soviet one and the American one, and, despite their big differences, they have important points of contact. There are, of course, important difficulties. The biggest difficulty still is that of whether inspection relates only to arms destroyed, as the Russians suggest, or to arms remaining, as the West suggests. Obviously, the inspection must relate to both. Perhaps the next step would be for the Government to take the initiative and to table their proposals for bridging this gap.
I come to the question of tests and the test ban. Our position is virtually this: we oppose nuclear tests. We bitterly condemn the Russian decision to end the self-policed moratorium last autumn. We would have equally bitterly renounced the Americans had they been the first to breach it. Our resolution at Blackpool was clear. We appealed—and, indeed, the United Nations, with infinitely more authority, has done likewise—to all Powers to refrain from further tests. What has happened since? We have had 37 more tests from the Soviet Union, including one of 57 megatons and another of 30 megatons. We have had the Western appeal for negotiations for a test ban and the rejection on 23rd November by Mr. Tsarapkin of the eighteen Articles previously agreed over the long period of three years.
Then came America's decision to hold her tests. I know that this is a very difficult problem, particularly on this side of the House, and one would feel a little more confidence in the sense of responsibility in the Tory Party if it gave a little more thought to these problems. It is an extraordinary thing to find such monolithic unity in the Conservative Party on this question. We, at any rate, do not claim that.
If we take the view, as we as a party do, that while we for our part reject the ignis fatuus of the independent British nuclear deterrent and we support the Western Alliance having, in the United States, the nuclear deterrent as long as the Russians have it—if that is the view, and it is our view as a party—then, if the Russians are still free to test and are testing, we cannot in principle and for all time oppose all American tests. We cannot say that the Russians can go on testing and that at no point must the West test. All we can do, and this was our statement at Blackpool, is, first, to demand that
all the Powers concerned … concentrate with renewed energy on negotiations for general and complete disarmament".
Secondly, we can and must, and we have the right and the duty to, consider, if the Americans decide to test, whether their decision is justified as to timing, as to the effect on negotiations, and whether the further twist given to the arms race and the possible damage done to negotiations are justified or not by the claims of military necessity. This is What we did. We, and all of us, pressed in the House for delay in taking a decision about the American tests in order to give Geneva a chance.
Speaking for myself, I went further. I took the view that the United States should have delayed further to give the proposals of the eight uncommitted nations for neutral inspection a chance. That was my view. The Americans did not take that view and, looking back on it, I must say that I was wrong in thinking that a further delay would have enabled the neutralist proposals

ROYAL ASSENT

6.2 p.m.

Message to attend the Lords Commissioners:

The House went:—and, having returned;

Mr. SPEAKER: Mr. SPEAKERreported the Royal Assent to:

1. Coal Consumers' Councils (Northern Irish Interests) Act, 1962.
2. South Africa Act, 1962.
3. National Assistance Act, 1948 (Amendment) Act, 1962.


4. Police Federations Act, 1962.
5. Kent Quarter Sessions Act, 1962.
6. Wallasey Corporation Act, 1962.
7. Liverpool Corporation Act, 1962.
8. University of Keele Act, 1962.
9. Independent Chapel Mawdsley Street Bolton Act, 1962.
10. Assay Offices Act, 1962.
11. University of Sussex Act, 1962.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Question again proposed, That this House do now adjourn.

6.15 p.m.

Mr. H. Wilson: It seems that the stars in their courses are trying to prevent us debating foreign affairs today.
I was saying, if I remember aright—I hope that the House will—that all of us had the right and the duty to consider the rightness of the American decision in relation to such issues as the Geneva Conference, and I referred to the neutrals' proposals and said that I myself had expressed the view that a delay should occur to enable these to be examined. As I said, they were rejected by Russia.
I know that it will be said, as American leaders have said, that the United States is ahead of the Russians and so does not need to test. Unfortunately, it is not as simple as that. This is not like a race where one runner can be half a lap ahead of the other and then the other spurts ahead. The problem is now becoming qualitative as well as quantitative. A break-through, or prospective break-through, in antimissile technology, the unknown effects of high-level megaton explosions on both missiles and anti-missiles or warning systems—these things can in a qualitative sense completely destroy any quantitative balance or quantitative superiority.
I come now to two specific issues. First, the test in outer space. I am glad that President Kennedy is looking at this again. We know the defence arguments in favour and the scientific arguments against. It is not only a question of interfering with scientific observations. We still know too little about space radiation, what causes it and its pur-

pose in the scheme of things to be sure of the effects of disturbing the belt of radioactive particles. I think that the Prime Minister has a real duty to ensure a confrontation of British and American scientists on this question.
Secondly, and more dangerous, there is the proposal to send an intercontinental ballistic missile 6,000 miles from California to the Eastern Pacific containing a megaton warhead. This really is dangerous. Apart from the danger that it may miscarry—and this is always a possibility—what possible answer has the West if Russia then decides to retaliate with a missile carrying a 10-megaton or 20-megaton warhead? This could open the most dangerous chapter of all in the nuclear test race. We should make our view absolutely clear that this proposal, at least, should be dropped.
I think that it will be within the recollection of right hon. and hon. Members that part of the time since I began my speech we have spent outside. I do not wish to detain the House very much longer.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Before my right hon. Friend leaves the subject of hydrogen bombs, may I put a question to him? I am very interested in the argument about the Blackpool resolution. I must be dependent upon my right hon. Friend for the facts, because, as he knows, I was not there.
Is my right hon. Friend saying that the unanimous decision at Blackpool, on the motion of the National Executive and unanimously accepted, meant that the decision to oppose the American tests was conditional upon the Russians abandoning the series which everyone knew they had already started?

Mr. Wilson: It is not for me to construct for the benefit of a solicitor the wording of a resolution which was, I thought, very clear. What we said was that we deplored the Russian opening of the tests. We said that we regretted the Americans feeling obliged to start underground tests, and we then called on both parties, on all the Powers, to stop tests. What happened, as I said—I gave the figures—was that, immediately afterwards, there were the 37 Russian tests including a 57-megaton bomb and a


30-megaton bomb. I gave, clearly, I hope, the argument thereafter. I do not know how far, Mr. Speaker, you would wish to hear us pursue post-Blackpool arguments here. I can assure my hon. Friend that these matters are quite likely to be discussed not at Blackpool, but at Brighton, where not you, Mr. Speaker, but I, shall be presiding over the debate.
We undertook to raise today the question of N.A.T.O. and the Athens Conference. I still cannot understand what has happened to the Minister of Defence, who has had the most clear series of warnings that he should be here. Indeed, he said that he would be here. It is no secret that for a year and more the American and British conceptions of defence policy have been getting further apart. The precise issues were analysed by my right hon. Friends and myself in the defence debate.
First, there was the difference of view about the value of Britain's so-called independent nuclear deterrent. Secondly, a related matter, there was the urgent desire of America—again underlining a point we have repeatedly pressed—to strengthen the conventional forces of N.A.T.O., particularly in Germany, as against the very low priority that Her Majesty's Government gave to this task.
Thirdly, there is the difference of view about the rôle of tactical nuclear weapons in N.A.T.O., the dangerous over-reliance in defence thinking here on these weapons, as against the American insistence on having sufficient conventional strength to enforce a pause and to delay the transition to nuclear war long enough to enable everyone to think again. Fourthly, there is America's desire, the cardinal aim of her policy, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, an aim seriously prejudiced by Britain's futile insistence on having its own nuclear weapon.
I am sorry that the Minister of Defence is not here. He has had plenty of opportunity to be present. We have had enough interruptions today to enable him to get here.
I now come to Athens and one of the clumsiest exercises in diplomacy and public relations in our history. If the

Minister of Defence has failed to build up our national defences, as we believe he has, none will under-rate the dedicated work which he has put in to build up his Department's public relations network. His firepower may be weak, but the broadsides of his public relations department, if frequently misdirected, are frightening in their impact and recoil.
This is true of the whole Government, from the Prime Minister downwards—or sideways. I suppose that it is a measure of a century's progress. Whereas Lord Palmerston would have met a threatened crisis with a squadron of frigates, today the Prime Minister and his colleagues throw in not the Navy, but a squadron of public relations officers.
On the eve of the Athens Conference. our American allies were suitably softened up—this must have been the idea—with Ministry of Defence claims that the United States had suddenly come round to the British view on defence. Newspaper after newspaper, the following morning, printed headlines that the Americans had caved in and were accepting the British view on defence. The Daily Herald fell for it. I quote its main headline:
Kennedy swings over to British H-line".
It went on:
After months of bickering behind the scenes, Britain has now talked America into accepting our defence policy".
This was the story even in the Daily Herald.
The Americans, when they read this, were incredulous and then angry, and they deployed their own not inconsiderable public relations forces—hand-outs and discreet briefings of British defence correspondents. Days later we had the final communiqué. There was no evidence of American capitulation, no change in N.A.T.O. nor in American policy. The change which took place —a fundamental one—was in British policy.
The reason why the Minister, who, I am sorry to say, is not with us, was so coy about this was that British policy had lurched strikingly in the direction which we on this side of the House have been urging for years. It is still far from going the whole way with us, but it has gone in this direction.


Then we had the odd case of my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), who follows defence matters with a dedication which we all respect and admire. He tabled an innocent Question to the Minister. Of course, all of my hon. Friend's questions are innocent, genuinely seeking information. What does the Minister do? He prepares an anodyne reply adding nothing to what. the House knew. But before he gave the Answer in the House, with that broad strategic sweep which we always associate with him, he summoned a Press conference, referring in the notice, most unusually, to my hon. Friend's Question. While the House is told nothing, the defence correspondents are given full and, to them, surprising information. I invite hon. Members to read the defence correspondents in leading newspapers the next morning.
Of course, what emerged from that Press conference, although it was never said in the House, was a series of sorry admisions that the Government's defence policy was in ribbons, with the Rhine Army being increased from 51,000 to 55,000 by 1964, ultimately reaching 75,000. Where in this year's White Paper is there any suggestion of building up the Rhine Army in this way? Indeed, the House will recall that the whole philosophy of the White Paper was the other way about—keep them here; men on Salisbury Plain are as good as in Germany.
There was not a word about the arithmetic, or from where the men were coming. There was not a word about the economics of it. The White Paper, in March, clearly related our inability to meet our European commitments to a famine of foreign exchange. Now, apparently, foreign exchange is no problem.
I will leave my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) to develop these points. All this means, and should mean, a fundamental change in our over-dependence on tactical nuclear weapons. Up to now, the British Government's policy has been to use tactical nuclear weapons dangerously to save soldiers. Now there is a complete change in this policy. The Minister stood up in the House and denied that there had been any change. He said that there was no difference between what

he told the House and what the defence correspondents extracted from him.
The truth is—this has to be said—that the Minister has been less than frank with the House. The House is getting heartily sick of the way in which Ministers regard our Parliamentary institutions, and the absence of the Minister of Defence is a further proof of this. We were told that he would be accountable to the House. Where is he —at a Press conference? This is the attitude that we are getting all the time. Ministers think that their first duty is to Press conferences and not to this House. Information is regularly denied to hon. Members on security grounds which is then given at Press conferences to defence correspondents immediately afterwards.
I make this challenge to the Minister of Defence, if someone is able to locate him. The Press conference to which I have referred was tape recorded. Let the right hon. Gentleman place the full transcript—no editing and no "cooking"—in the Library of the House. If he refuses to do this, I suggest that he will be guilty of grave constitutional impropriety in that he refuses to make available to hon. Members information which he has already given outside.
Even after eleven years of this "ad mass Government", I hope that we have not yet quite got rid of the accountability of Ministers, not to the Press, but to the House of Commons. We are not in the Common Market yet, and this House is not the French Assembly. We shall expect the right hon. Gentleman to answer this challenge in this debate.

Mr. Harold Davies: Where is he?

Mr. Wilson: Can the Lord Privy Seal tell us where he is? A lot of messages have been sent for him. This is making a mockery of the debate. We have given notice that this matter would be raised. We asked that the Minister of Defence should reply to the debate, because this point would be raised. Although he told me that he would be here, he has not shown up. Can the Lord Privy Seal say where he is? We sent out messages for him a few minutes ago.

Mr. Harold Davies: For the information of back bench Members, is my right hon. Friend telling the House that


he gave notice that this question which the Minister is not here to answer would be raised?

Mr. G. Brown: I did so as well.

Mr. Wilson: That is certainly true. Both my right hon. Friends did it. Several messages have been sent since I got up to speak. I think that the Government will have to provide additional time out of their own time so that this debate can be properly conducted. Would either the Lord Privy Seal or the Minister of State tell me what has happened to the Minister of Defence, so that we can get on?

Mr. E. L. Mallalieu: On a point of order. Have back benchers no remedy at all in a grave Parliamentary situation such as this? Have the Opposition no remedy? Cannot we send for the Minister and adjourn the House until he comes?

Mr. Speaker: We are discussing whether the House should adjourn. I cannot help the hon. Gentleman. I have no power to compel Ministers to come here.

Mr. Wilson: We are in an extremely difficult situation. This concerns the rights not only of back benchers, but of the whole House. Since we have sent repeated messages and Ministers on the Front Bench refuse to answer my question, would you, Mr. Speaker, accept at this stage a motion for the adjournment of the debate so that the Minister of Defence could be sent for?

Mr. Speaker: We are discussing the question of adjourning now, are we not?

Mr. Wilson: Is it in order to move a motion that the debate be adjourned?

Mr. Wigg: Does my right hon. Friend realise that I put on the Order Paper a Motion of censure on the Minister of Defence?

Mr. S. Silverman: That no longer matters.

Mr. Wigg: I beg my hon. Friend's pardon?

Mr. S. Silverman: I did not wish to interrupt my hon. Friend, but, since he has asked, I will tell him the answer. There have been many occasions over

recent months when Motions of censure were regarded as what the Leader of the Opposition would call "peanuts".

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am confused about what is happening. There seems to be an intervention on an intervention, which is seldom a successful method of debating.

Mr. Wigg: I put a Motion on the Order Paper which was a censure of the Minister of Defence for having a Press conference and failing to tell the House.
[That this House deplores the action of the Minister of Defence in summoning a special Press Conference on Wednesday, 9th May at which he gave information regarding an increase in the strength of the British Army of the Rhine, following the decisions of the recent Athens meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, information which he failed to give this House in answer to a question by the honourable Member for Dudley earlier on the same day.]
I understood that the Minister of Defence would be here today to answer this charge.

Mr. Wilson: I hope that by this time the Government Front Bench are in a position to answer my question about the whereabouts of the Minister of Defence. He was given every warning that he should be here so that he would be accountable.

Mr. Warbey: On a point of order Some of us understood that today we would have a debate on foreign affairs. Some of my right hon. and hon. Friends seem to think that we should also have a debate on defence. As things are going, we are having neither a debate on foreign affairs nor a debate on defence. Would I be in order, Mr. Speaker, in moving, That the Question be now put?

Mr. Speaker: No. I would not accept the Motion.

Mr. Wilson: Obviously, we must get on. The Government have behaved regrettably to the House in this whole matter. It has been said for many weeks that this debate would be on foreign policy and defence. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] Oh, yes. That statement was made by my right hon. Friend the Leader


of the Opposition. This afternoon, both the Leader of the House and I said that the reason why we could not have the earlier debate satisfactorily was that only the Foreign Office Vote had been put down and we wanted to discuss defence as well as Foreign Office matters. That was clearly understood. That was why my right hon. Friends and I asked for the Minister of Defence to wind up the debate.

Mr. Shinwell: If it was the intention to debate disarmament, the N.A.T.O. structure, Thailand, Berlin and a variety of other Foreign Office questions, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether it was the intention also to debate defence? Was not that a subject that required almost a whole day for debate?

Mr. Wilson: My right hon. Friend knows perfectly well that when these matters were discussed it was felt desirable that we should discuss N.A.T.O. and the Athens Conference. This could be done only by bringing in the responsibility of the Minister of Defence. Having pressed the point, I leave it at that. I trust that before the debate is ended—

Mr. Stephen Hastings: Mr. Stephen Hastings(Mid-Bedfordshire) rose—

Mr. Wilson: We have been interrupted enough. [HON. MEMBERS "Give way."] I now press the Government

Brigadier Sir John Smyth: The right hon. Gentleman has said several times that he gave warning to my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence that he would raise this matter and that he asked him to be present. At what time did the right hon. Gentleman give that warning to the Minister of Defence? As far as I know, the Minister of Defence had no warning whatever from him.

Mr. Wilson: I am sure that the hon. and gallant Member does not want to mislead the House. The Minister has several messages. He himself told me last night, when I asked whether he would wind up the debate, that he would not do so and that he might be a few minutes late for the opening of my speech. For reasons known to the House, I was a few minutes late in speaking today, but the Minister still

has not arrived. He certainly knew of this.
I bring the point to a close. There are many other issues that some of us would like to have raised concerning the events that we have had to face, but there is one question which I want to put to the Lord Privy Seal. We have referred to the shape of N.A.T.O. following the Athens Conference. I believe that in some ways it is more hopeful. It is a hopeful factor, for example, that nuclear arms have been clearly refused to the Germans and all that that means. We have now heard, I hope, the end of a strategic nuclear element in N.A.T.O. itself.
The right hon. Gentleman knows, however, that there are many anxieties in Europe, particularly as a result of recent speeches by President de Gaulle and by Dr. Adenauer. At this hour, I do not want to go into the Common Market question—we shall be debating it in a few days' time—but I conclude by saying this to the Lord Privy Seal. We know what President de Gaulle has said in recent weeks. We know the danger to the N.A.T.O. Alliance of a possible split between the developing Paris-Bonn axis and their partners in the Six and also between the Paris-Bonn axis and the Anglo-Saxon Powers.
The danger which I foresee is that Common Market negotiations will be brought in as a bargaining weapon affecting the whole future of our security. It may be that President de Gaulle will erupt upon the scene, as he did in the Free Trade Area negotiations, and break them off, and that will be that. But I see a greater danger. I fear that we may reach a situation in which the President allows the negotiations to continue until a state of near-agreement is reached and that at that point he will come to the British Government and to the American Government to barter his assent to Britain's entry to the Common Market in return for Britain and the United States agreeing to transfer to him nuclear "know-how" and nuclear secrets, to make France a more formidable nuclear Power and, perhaps, also to alter the constitution of N.A.T.O. in practice so that there will be a three-Power directorate of France, Britain and America.
I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will be on his guard against such a development. It would be a dangerous thing for this country if these economic negotiations were to be bartered against such vital decisions for our security and for the future cohesion of N.A.T.O. I believe that no one in this House would contemplate such a surrender and I hope and trust that no British statesman would barter for an economic potage the birthright of peace.

6.37 p.m.

Mr. James Scott-Hopkins: I, too, like the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson), regret that my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal did not have time at the beginning of his speech to paint a larger canvas of the background to the decisions which Her Majesty's Government have taken, and are taking, in foreign policy. One of the things which I now begin to understand is the anxiety of hon. Members below the Gangway to have the debate confined to foreign policy. The way in which the right hon. Member for Huyton brought in defence matters and raised the hare concerning the whereabouts of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence broadened the whole debate and was an attempt to squash so many subjects into it that it is difficult to be compact. As a matter of interest, I should like to know why the right hon. Gentleman's colleague the "shadow" Minister of Defence is not present. He is conspicuous by his absence.
My right hon. Friend's remarks at the beginning of his speech about the reasons for the action that the Government had taken and the purpose underlying their actions in foreign policy are of the greatest importance. One must realise the basic purpose of foreign policy and judge its results by whether those purposes are fulfilled. In my view, the two main purposes are, first, that all foreign policy must be directed towards ensuring the security of the State in any eventuality, and, secondly, to advance both economically and politically the lawful aspirations of the State.
Therefore, if we examine the various foreign policy actions taken by my right hon. Friends, particularly concerning Thailand, we must judge them by those

two purposes. I entirely agree with the action taken by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in dispatching troops to Thailand at the request of that country, the troops in this case being a squadron of the Royal Air Force.
It is incontestable from what one has heard in the House this afternoon, as hon. Members on both sides will surely agree, that there has been, and is, a threat to the security of Thailand and that the Thais were, therefore, completely justified in asking for help from those to whom they were bound by treaty. This, I think, was the right action, and we have ourselves taken the right action in supporting our friends to whom we are bound by treaty.
There are no two ways about it, in my view. The threat which exists in the neighbouring country of Laos, which is undoubtedly engineered, or at least backed up, by the Chinese Communists, presents the greatest possible threat to the security of this part of the world. If, by our action by going in to support the Thai Government, we can do anything to bring stability to that area, I am quite certain that we shall have taken the correct action.
There is not very much time, and there are a great many hon. Members who wish to speak. I should like now to turn to the next point which has been covered in the debate—that about Berlin. Once again, it has been extraordinary that, throughout the speech of the right hon. Member for Huyton, until he came to the passage about N.A.T.O. he was in complete agreement with the policy of the Government right the way through. This is very encouraging to this side of the House, and, indeed, it is one of those things on which we must congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on having the good sense to realise that we are pursuing the right purpose in our Foreign policy, and particularly with regard to Berlin, where there has been a grave threat, not only to our security but also to the security of the West, by the Russian actions recently. This has been resolved by the firmness shown by my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal and by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, although I am not all that sure whether the action in East Berlin can be taken entirely in isolation.
In my view, a very grave situation exists today in Eastern Germany. At the


moment, the economy of that country is crumbling, and of this there is no doubt. Mr. Khrushchev is having to prop up its economy to a very considerable extent and the fact that most East German industry and trade is tied up with Western Germany is a relevant factor. Nevertheless, Mr. Khrushchev has to prop up this régime. The length of time for which he is prepared to go on doing this and the extent to which he will have to do it, is a matter for speculation, but, undoubtedly, the East Germans have got themselves into an extremely difficult situation. If, like all desperate men, they should decide that action has to be taken, there is only one way in which it could be taken to cover up their inadequacies in their own country, and this means action against the West, and, particularly, against Western Germany.
Therefore, I ask my right hon. Friend urgently to consider whether it is not now time to make some gesture towards supporting at this moment the East German régime, though not perhaps by financial means. If it is allowed to get into a desperate state, in which Mr. Khrushchev cannot be asked to support it any more, it will have to turn on Western Germany. In this case, it might possibly be to our advantage in the foreign field if we were to recognise the East German Government in some form or another. On the Berlin situation we have held firm in not giving recognition, although, in point of fact, as my right hon. Friend knows, there is de facto recognition in all that really matters between East and West Berlin and ourselves. The policy of the Government in this field has undoubtedly achieved the right result in securing that we do not have war over Berlin.
I should now like to turn to the situation of the other European country which is outside the E.E.C., and that is Spain. I believe that the time has now come, regardless of the political set-up inside Spain, to remember that Spain must be considered as one of the European family and that her application to join or to be associated with the Common Market countries, should be supported by my right hon. Friend and this country. It is quite true that we do not approve of the internal Government of Spain and that General Franco is to all intents and purposes still a dictator, but, indeed, it is the people of

Spain who matter. We must look to the future, and I think that, from our own point of view, from the defence and the economic points of view, Spain must once again be considered as part of the European Continent. If the other countries of Europe want to take us into E.E.C., Spain must come into association with the growing European family. I personally have no reason to like the régime in Spain, but, nevertheless, I think the time has come when we cannot always be looking over our shoulders, as many hon. and right hon. Gentlemen opposite do, but must look to the future.
I think that one of the most difficult problems that the Government have to face, certainly in the European field, is the position of the neutrals. I think that, at the moment, when all these negotiations are going on between the Common Market countries and ourselves—and here I must not trespass on what we shall be talking about in two weeks' time, although I join with my hon. Friend who mentioned the fact that that debate will take place during the Western European Union meetings, and, unfortunately, I shall be there—the position of the neutrals in regard to this field of negotiations and our association with E.F.T.A., must give rise to the greatest anxiety.
If we cannot have some sort of association for them with the Common Market countries, I think we have a duty to stay out of the European Economic Community. They are extremely anxious about their own position politically, and in being tied up politically with the Common Market countries. This position can be upheld, certainly as far as Austria is concerned. It is impossible for Austria to move from the position of special neutrality which has been created for her since the war. So far as the Swiss are concerned, there may be great advantage to us if they could retain a certain amount of their neutral status, particularly as Switzerland is a country which is so often called upon by many of the developing countries to settle disputes because it is completely untainted by any of the old European colonial ideas.
I am quite certain that these two countries cannot manage to survive within the European scene unless they


can find some form of association with the Common Market which would help them to get their economies integrated to the greatest possible extent with those of E.E.C.
This leaves on one side the Swedish problem, and here I have a feeling that in this case they may be moving slightly more towards some looser form of political integration with the Common Market countries.
We have had the warning that the situation in South-East Asia is very precarious; the Communist menace there has already shown itself in Laos, and is now showing itself in Thailand. But there is another small country in which again this pressure is being shown and which could be extremely dangerous. I ask the indulgence of the House for mentioning this matter now, but it is vital that in our foreign policy regarding the South-East Asian position we should pay great attention to the position of Nepal, acting as a buffer State between the Chinese in Tibet and the Indians in India.
If this State should go Communist I think that the result would be disastrous for the West in South-East Asia. The position at the moment is that the King of Nepal is managing to get enough support to keep the règime stable. This support depends to a large extent on Gurkha troops and those who have retired and gone back to live in the hills of Nepal. It is these men who have taken money into the country and keep the economy going because there is no industry there worth talking about. They are fiercely loyal to the King, and if the present position were undermined in any way the result would be disastrous for the West.
At the moment the Nepalese Government and King are managing to keep the position stable, but if the Chinese were to lean a little heavily on them I think that the position could deteriorate rapidly. The result would be disastrous for our position in Nepal and would be reflected throughout the whole of South-East Asia. I hope that my right hon. Friend will remember this should such situation ever arise, but I hope that it will not.
I think that in foreign affairs the Government are doing the right thing.

This applies particularly to their policy with regard to disarmament. Abortive negotiations have been going on in Geneva for many months, and my hon. Friend the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs has shown tremendous patience in keeping the negotiations going.
One of the most encouraging things to come out of the negotiations is the fact that our position is being made clear to the uncommitted countries of the world who are there and can listen to what is going on. It is being made clear to them that we are absolutely sincere in our desire to have general disarmament with verification. The Russian position, too, is becoming equally clear, that under no circumstances are they prepared to have any form of general disarmament.
I hope that we can manage to continue to talk to the Russians to try to make them realise that this disarmament must start in a small way, perhaps with the abolition of nuclear tests, and lead to general disarmament, but it is useless to make disarmament proposals unless provision can be made to verify not only the disarmament which is said to have been completed but that which still exists.
One of the interesting things to emerge from this debate is the difference of opinion which exists between right hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition Front Bench and their hon. Friends below the Gangway. These hon. Gentlemen, together with hon. Members of the Liberal Party, have consistently put forward proposals for unilateral disarmament. One fact which they have refused to face is that this would mean sheltering under the wing of the American deterrent and, if this happened, would necessitate us reintroducing general conscription to enable us to fulfil our obligations.

Mr. Eric Lubbock: Mr. Eric Lubbock(Orpington): Rubbish.

Mr. Scott-Hopkins: Does the hon. Gentleman want to intervene, instead of merely making comments from a sedentary position?

Mr. Lubbock: The hon. Gentleman referred to us sheltering under the American umbrella. Does he think that it appears in this light to the Norwegians?

Mr. Scott-Hopkins: That does not seem particularly relevant to what I said. If we can get verification accepted by the Russians, we must go on to general disarmament, starting with nuclear weapons, but so long as the Russians are reluctant to accept our proposals it is vital to the security of this country that we should continue to have the nuclear deterrent.
I conclude by saying that the Government's foreign policy will secure both the things that I have mentioned. Firstly, it will secure for this country a state of security in which we can live and work in peace. Secondly, it will secure our economic and political future and ensure that our influence is properly and rightly felt throughout the world.

6.55 p.m.

Mr. E. Shinwell: The hon. Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Scott-Hopkins) will not be surprised to learn that I disagree with almost everything he said, but he can console himself with two reflections. First, that I have not the least doubt about his sincerity, and, secondly, that this has been the most unsatisfactory debate on foreign affairs that I have heard since I entered the House forty years ago.
This debate has a most unsatisfactory background, not because of any inactivity on the part of hon. Members on this side of the House, but because of the Government's refusal last Thursday to agree to a debate on the proposal which was then mooted by the Government to dispatch some of our forces to Thailand.
I do not propose to speak at any length—which will no doubt afford a great deal of satisfaction to many hon. Members—because in a foreign affairs debate of so comprehensive and compendious a nature as this one it is obviously impossible to speak with any kind of relevance to any of the topics with the exception of one or two with which one is primarily concerned.
Nobody will deny that the Lord Privy Seal is one of the most amiable Ministers in the Government. It is true that his answers are usually unsatisfactory, but that in no way vitiates his desire to be amiable. I found the right hon. Gentleman's speech very unsatisfactory indeed. It consisted of the usual jargon about disarmament and references to

N.A.T.O., which showed that he completely misunderstood What happened in Athens. I disliked particularly—and I know that the right hon. Gentleman will not like this—what I regard as the fortuitous deception—I will not say that it was deliberate—relevant to the decision of the Government to dispatch forces to Thailand.
Last week, a suggestion was made by hon. Members on this side that we might have a debate on this subject. The Government refused to accede to this request. They have a huge majority in the House, and they did not require the adventitious aid of anybody on this side. Nevertheless, I was surprised to find that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and a few of my hon. Friends decided to support the Government in the Tory Lobby. This decision was unnecessary. It made no contribution to the successs of the Government, and in my judgment was a mistake.
It is true that two of my hon. Friends, out of a natural loyalty to the Leader of the Opposition, voted with him in the Tory Lobby. From what I have heard since, I understand that my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Mr. Boyden) voted with the Government because he did not wish to impede the proposed debate on education.
However important educational advance may be, I cannot understand how anybody could imagine that an education debate, with no vote at the end of it, could be more important than the question of sending forces to a foreign country, with the prospect—certainly by no means as remote as some people imagine—of inflaming the situation in South-East Asia.
Let us consider the Government's position. This afternoon questions were asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey) and myself. The right hon. Gentleman was asked to advise the House about the request—which, according to him, came from the Thailand Government—for the dispatch of our forces. The right hon. Gentleman indulged in a jumble of words which I could not follow. I propose to direct a question more specifically to the Minister of State. I put the question as categorically, specifically, emphatically and deliberately as I can. Will the


Government produce evidence that either S.E.A.T.O. or the Thailand Government made a request to the United Kingdom to dispatch forces to Thailand? That is a challenge. I shall not be fobbed off with a lot of words or jargon of the kind to which we are accustomed on occasions when questions are asked.

Mr. William Yates: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the national news agencies, both here and in Bangkok, and the majority of our national newspapers, have no knowledge of such a request? I have handed that notice in to my Front Bench. I, too, will expect a proper answer at the end of the day.

Mr. Shinwell: I can only support what the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mr. W. Yates) has said by reading from the columns of The Times of 18th May. It vindicates my observation about the fortuitous deception on the part of the Government. If I were to call it deliberate deception I might involve myself in some difficulty. The Times is a reputable organ, unlike the Guardian, which has departed from its old-time radical democratic traditions. I hope that I shall be forgiven for mentioning the Guardian, because it never mentions me. It is now one of the most biassed newspapers in the country.

Mr. Warbey: Although it has departed from its former radical position, nevertheless, on this question, even the Guardian is opposed to sending troops to Thailand.

Mr. Shinwell: The operative word is "even". How it happened I do not know. My case against that newspaper is that it is biassed. It was originally one of the greatest newspapers in the world. One used to read its columns with conviction that what was contained in them was being told without bias or prejudice.
However, I turn to a more reputable newspaper, which I hope hon. Members will take notice of. It said:
The United States made a new appeal today for other S.E.A.T.O. countries to send troops to Siam, although Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the Siamese Prime Minister"—
who is regarded by knowledgeable people as the military dictator of Siam—

is reported to have said that his Army backed by United States forces is strong enough to stop any Communist incursion from Laos.
The United States plea was made at a press conference here tonight by General Paul Harkins, United States military assistant commander in Siam and South Vietnam.
He said it would be useful to have troops from other S.E.A.T.O. nations in Siam: the presence of other troops would heighten the show of solidarity by S.E.A.T.O. in the face of pro-communist moves in Laos. Marshal Sarit Thanarat is said to have told his Cabinet yesterday that all S.E.A.T.O. countries except France were willing to send token forces to Siam, and had been thanked for their offers. No formal request has yet been made for assistance.
Siamese Foreign Ministry sources said that the United States had possibly suggested to S.E.A.T.O. members that they should send some troops and that Siam would have no objection. They pointed out that Siam had not formally asked the United States to send Marines, but had agreed when America suggested it.
I suggest to the Government, including the Prime Minister and the Lord Privy Seal, that without any request they offered to send a token force of Royal Air Force fighters. Whether the Thailand Government have accepted the offer we do not know, but if they have we should like to have evidence of it. In particular, we want evidence that the Thailand Government, either through S.E.A.T.O. or directly, made a request to the British Government to send them, and that it was not General Harkins who made the request. The whole of what happened last Thursday is associated with the truth of what actually occurred in relation to Thailand.
Of course, if we are to send forces, let us send useful and substantial forces. Let us not make ourselves a laughing stock. The force that is to be dispatched —when, we do not know—is apparently one that was engaged in an exercise and came back to the United Kingdom or Singapore. Now it is going to Thailand again. What will it do when it gets there? The Prime Minister says that it will have a stabilising influence, but it will have nothing of the sort. It is not to be compared with the huge forces at the disposal of the United States, which have already been sent there.
Why did the United States send forces there without being requested? My right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson), in a speech which was made


in his usual able fashion, said some things with which I am in fundamental disagreement. He referred to the United States activities in Laos and the decision to send forces to Thailand. He seemed to whitewash the United States. I take another line. I believe that the motivation for America's intervention in South-East Asia is dictated by one factor alone, namely, her desire to contain the Republic of China.
There is some justification for this. The Americans have announced their intentions over and over again. Everybody understands the American ideology. I do not say that they are insincere, or lacking in conviction, but we must realise that the American ideology at present—it has been the same for a considerable time, but it is more pronounced than ever—is to destroy Communism, to arrest its growth, or to weaken it in some fashion. I suggest that this cannot be done by military means. I have never thought that it was possible to destroy or weaken Communism by military means.
I was a member of the Labour Government which had to face awkward situations in Abadan and Malaya, and I said this over and over again. If we want to achieve success in our efforts to prevent Communism becoming the ruling factor throughout the civilised world—or the uncivilised world; it depends on one's view of the matter—then it seems to me that the only way to do so is by economic, industrial and sociological means. There is no other method. And after all, there are vast funds, materials and resources at the disposal of the United States which could be used in a sociological, industrial and economic fashion to achieve success in halting the advance of Communism more easily and expeditiously than by adopting military methods.
I believe that to be the cause of trouble there. I fail to see why we should associate ourselves with the United States in that effort. We do not like Communism any more than they do. But I do not believe that anything our country can do, either by military means or by any other means at our disposal, will succeed in thwarting the efforts of the Communist countries throughout the world.
I want to turn to one other matter, but before doing so I must say another word about the origin of this debate. I have been looking up the records and perhaps the House will be interested. Last week the Government refused a debate, presumably on the ground that they have the sole prerogative of determining whether troops or forces should be dispatched. There are precedents of which I think the House should take note. In case I am challenged later, let us take one which is extracted from the archives of the Labour Government. There is no secret about it, no question of violating the Official Secrets Acts.
In the case of the Korean adventure, hon. Members will recall that the United States took action and the Security Council responded by condoning that action. Then we were asked to make a contribution, and we agreed. But I can tell the House that on 29th June, 1950, almost simultaneously with the decision to send forces—there was a token force to begin with which was built up into the Commonwealth Brigade, and we sent one or two naval vessels—there was a debate in this House. That is one example.
Now I come to other examples since the present Government came to power. In the case of Suez, on 30th October, 1956, there was an announcement in this House about the British ultimatum, and a debate took place upon it. It was also debated on two subsequent occasions, on 31st October and 1st November. It was on 31st October that the first air offensive began.
Take the case of Jordan. There was a debate in this House on 17th July, 1958, which coincided with the sending of British troops. But there was also a debate on the situation in the Middle East on the 16th, before the request from Jordan for British intervention was received. The debate is relevant to the decision to send forces—

Mr. S. Silverman: And on the 17th there was a vote.

Mr. Shinwell: That is not in my record, but I have no doubt that the hon. Gentleman is correct.
Take the case of Kuwait, which is much more recent. There are varying views about whether that adventure should have taken place. Some regarded


it as a "phoney" adventure and some believed that the suggestion of Iraqi aggression was conceived by people with sinister motives. I will not enter into the merits of the question. All I wish to say to the House is that an announcement was made on 28th June, 1961, in both Houses, of the willingness to send British support if a request was received from the Ruler of Kuwait. On the 30th a request for military assistance was made. Two days later there was a debate in the House of Commons. I think that is conclusive, and if the Minister wishes to challenge what I have said, let him do so at the end of the debate. If that is right, there is no justification at all far the Government refusing to have a debate on the subject of dispatching troops to Thailand.

Mr. S. Silverman: Or for the Opposition's refusal, either?

Mr. Shinwell: I am not discussing at this stage the question of whether forces should be sent. That is a matter for debate. Incidentally, the Government refused a debate last week and now we are having it, so that they might as well have had it last week—

Sir Kenneth Pickthorn: And very few of us are having it.

Mr. Shinwell: I am sorry, I did not catch that.

Sir K. Pickthorn: I said that very few of us are having a debate.

Mr. Shinwell: I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman—or I should say the intellectual gentleman—not "learned" but "intellectual"—may have an opportunity later to take part in the debate.
I have concentrated on one aspect of the subject. I am not dealing with disarmament, with N.A.T.O. or with any other subject, but merely with the subject of Thailand. Having done that, I leave it to the House to judge. That is a subject which we should have been discussing last week and in my view the Government will have to discuss is before long.
What will happen there? Will there be trouble? Is there aggression or evidence of it? I do not believe that there is. If there is, let the evidence

be produced. It is no use the Prime Minister coming along and saying that Royal Laotian Army troops were scurrying through the frontiers of Thailand, which meant that sooner or later the Pathet Lao forces would follow them up, and that would be an act of aggression. There is no evidence of it at all —none whatever. It has now quietened down. Indeed, it was quiet before it quietened down.
I am not saying that the British Government and the British people should not support occasional efforts to resist aggression. I am all for the independence of small countries, and of this country which is now being threatened. By the way, I noticed that the hon. Member for Cornwall, North, in addition to discussing disarmament, N.A.T.O. Thailand, and all the rest, began to discuss the Common Market. I suppose that that is because, as the hon. Gentleman told us, he cannot be present when we have a debate on the Common Market.

Mr. Scott-Hopkins: In point of fact, I did not discuss N.A.T.O. nor did I say that I wished to discuss the Common Market at any length.

Mr. Shinwell: The hon. Gentleman did discuss the Common Market and I suppose that he was entitled to do so as long as Mr. Speaker permitted it. I understand that the hon. Gentleman will not be present when we have a two-day debate on the Common Market—two days to discuss one subject and only one day for half-a-dozen subjects—but we shall bear his absence, to use a hackneyed phrase, with the utmost fortitude.
I repeat my challenge to the Government and I hope that the Lord Privy Seal will learn about it. Let the Government produce evidence that they were asked to send troops. Let them state the terms of the request and give us the date. Let them do that, and then the Government will have vindicated themselves. If they cannot, the Government stand condemned.

7.18 p.m.

Commander Anthony Courtney: I am glad to speak after the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) and I am sorry that so much time was taken up discussing procedural


matters which have no relevance to foreign affairs, which is the subject of the debate. I would excuse myself for not following the right hon. Member for Easington, but I wish to take up a point raised by the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) and by his right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. P. Noel-Baker). I refer to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of which there are reports in today's newspapers. I wish to bring that into the special context of what I propose to make the main burden of my speech, which is the pressing and acute problem of Berlin.
The right hon. Member for Easing-ton may perhaps remember the time to which I refer. It is twelve years since I wrote a long paper to the Chiefs of Staff deploring the tendency I saw in Germany in those days of the United States authorities to make a rather rapid issue of the rebirth of the West German Wehrmacht. If there is substance in these allegations in the newspapers regarding the activities of the C.I.A. in South-East Asia and if my right hon. Friend believes as a result that it is desirable to make representations to our American friends and allies, I suggest that he might add also that the danger could well exist at present in Germany.
I should like to throw out an idea on the very pressing and dangerous question of Berlin. I hope that I shall not repeat too many of the very wise things which have been said on both sides of the House. I suggest that we clear our minds for a few moments by considering the Berlin question not simply as a political matter but as a military problem. I suggest this because the peculiar circumstances of Berlin and the brutality of the situation which faces us there are such as to make it a question which can, and may in my view, well be settled by force—either physical force, economic force, or—heaven help us if this happens —armed force.
We have seen physical force in operation on a number of occasions over the last year. I refer specifically to 13th August last year when the physical wall was set up behind which are incarcerated 2¼ million West Berliners. We have seen economic force in the imposition of the barge dues on traffic passing on the Mittelland Canal and on the Elbe.

This was an imposition two years ago by the Russian authorities through their East German satellites.
I remind the House that a Zollgesetz is under discussion in East Germany—it may even be passed for all I know—by which tariffs and duties could be placed on goods in transit by land from West Berlin to Western Germany. This would make the economy of West Berlin quite insupportable and could eventually strangle the Western sectors of the city.
I hardly like to touch on military force. We all remember the interference, quickly ceasing, and, using new techniques—what we used to call "window" during the war, the dropping of metallic leaflets in the air routes to and from West Germany to West Berlin.
I suggest that for all these reasons we can justifiably consider the matter as being one of military more than political importance in the sense of the word which I have just given. A corollary of that, if we were to accept it, is that we should take Berlin in our thinking outside the context of foreign affairs. We should not, or we should try not to, when dealing with the Russians allow Berlin to be introduced as one particular card in a widespread game of international politics. I am a pessimist in these matters, and I must confess it. Should my estimate of the situation be correct and should eventually by one of the three aspects of force which I have mentioned, or by a mixture of them, the Berlin problem be settled to our disadvantage, we might in the meantime, by having treated this as a purely political issue, have given way on other points and have given concessions on other matters of political policy which could not be redressed afterwards.
I will take the attention of the House for a few minutes back to the origins of this deplorable situation which we face so continually in Berlin. Three-power agreements were signed in London in 1944. These were solemnly negotiated agreements on Berlin in which the Soviet Union participated. Hon. Members will remember that France was not then a signatory and did not come in until the London confirmation of these agreements in the following year.
I think it is fair to make the point that our American allies must accept a very major share of responsibility for these agreements, as they must accept the responsibility for political and military decisions taken in 1945 which might have redressed part of this situation. These agreements left 2¼ million Berliners 110 miles behind the Western frontier of the Soviet zone of Germany in the two Western sectors, as it was at first decided, and in the three Western sectors as it eventually became. The London Agreements were signed in good faith. There was no reason at that time to think that the Soviet Union herself was acting in anything but good faith in connection with these agreements. These agreements, as we all know, were confirmed at Potsdam in the following year. That was a treaty which guaranteed the economic and political unity of Germany. Included in it was a second negotiated settlement of the Berlin problem—as we thought—signed in good faith by the four Powers now concerned.
There was no reason at that time to suspect Russian good faith. When eventually we started to learn a little more about our Russian ex-allies we started to know them a little better. The Russians are adept, when they wish to go against an agreement entered into, at first making it unworkable and then causing circumstances in which the other party, having signed the treaty, can be shown to be in the wrong. I have put this badly, I suspect, but the Slavonic mentality is one with which I have had a great deal to do. I admire immensely the technique by which they perform these convolutions.
Since the Berlin blockade, which was ended in April, 1949, by a third negotiated settlement on Berlin, signed solemnly by the four Powers concerned, it has been shown to all of us that without enforceable guarantees, in the Western sense of that word, it is not possible to rely on Russian good faith in signing treaties and observing them, at least in questions touching Germany.
Perhaps I may remind the House of the rather remarkable conjunction of events in that spring of 1949—not only the agreement which ended the blockade, the third negotiated settlement on

Berlin, but the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and—this is very important and has a bearing on the first—the final victory of the Communist forces in China. Sometimes in assessing Russian motives, which I have a feeling we do too little, we neglect such aspects of foreign affairs as this kind of coincidence.
In Russian terms there are 2¼ million hostages for somebody's good behaviour 110 miles behind the lines in the cold war which faces us at present. This is not new. The breaches of faith which brought it about are no new thing either. It is by no means unknown to this mentality. But it would be wrong of us to associate this type of behaviour only with Bolsheviks and the Soviet Union. If we hark back in history to the Congress of Vienna, we would remember that Tsar Alexander solemnly signed a document giving independence to Poland. We all know what happened subsequently. It resounded to the heavens all through Western Europe as an illustration of the perfidy of Imperial Russia when signing treaties and the utter lack of reliance which could be placed upon a Russian signature.

Mr. W. Yates: My hon. and gallant Friend is advancing a very interesting point on foreign affairs. I understand that the United States Government are now negotiating with the Soviet Union on a most intricate problem concerning Berlin. Is my hon. and gallant Friend saying that the Americans are just wasting their time?

Commander Courtney: I was just going to deal with that point. We are now approaching the fourth negotiated settlement of the Berlin problem in which we and the Americans principally are going into action on the political level, to resolve this dreadful problem —and it is a dreadful problem. Those of us who know Berlin, West Germany and Königswinter and who visit Soviet Russia as frequently as I do, realise what a fearful problem it is. I personally —and this is the answer to my hon. Friend—am afraid that in the present circumstances, as I see them, I do not see it as a realistic conception to produce a negotiated settlement on Berlin which would provide concrete guarantees without which we must not sign.

Mr. S. Silverman: What should we do then?

Commander Courtney: I am dealing with this question broadly and I do not wish to take the time of the House by suggesting easy solutions to what is a desperately intractable problem.
On the hard facts of the situation, when we think in terms of possible force and think of it outside the context of pure negotiation, we have two advantages. The first springs from the presence of Western troops in Berlin, the stabilising effect that this has, and the remarkably fine duty which I believe they perform there. May I mention the Commandant of the British sector of Berlin, who has just left his job after two years, Major General Sir Rohan Delacombe, who, in my opinion, has performed a signal service to the cause of world peace during his tenure of that terribly difficult appointment?
We have the military danger of attack, although I do not believe that it is very real, and we have always the danger of an incident—perhaps of tanks confronting each other across the Friedrichstrasse check-point, which may lead, through a process of escalation, to what we all fear moist in this world. The presence of these troops, while we have them in Berlin, is one of the great factors operating, in my view, in our favour.
The second has been touched on by my hon. Friend the Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Scott-Hopkins), who is, unfortunately, not in his place, and that is the rocky state of the East German economy. It is, I think, true that Soviet Russia has found it necessary to bolster up the East German economy to keep it functioning at all, and there is good reason to believe that the high level of inter-zonal trade between the D.D.R. and West Germany is all-important to the D.D.R. Unfortunately, the figures are not published officially—I wish they were; that is one of my complaints against the West Germans. It is clear that without the continuance of that inter-zonal trade—brown coal and potash one way and capital goods the other way—the East German economy would crumble.
I am in agreement with my hon. Friend when he says that it is in the interests of the West and of this country in particular to support East Germany

economically. Where I do not agree with him is in the way we should do it. Here I must declare my interest because it is my business to deal in commercial affairs with the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and I hope that that business will not fold up as a result of what I am saying today.
I believe that we should, in our own interests, support a high level of inter-zonal trade because if we are right, and if the East German economy is being bolstered up principally by that inter-zonal trade, and if, as I believe the 2 Billion ostmark loan and Russian guarantee to support the East German economy is not sufficient for its purpose, then it is in our interest to see that the level of inter-zonal trade continues.
The second factor which tells in our favour is this. The one major event which could break the flow of inter-zonal trade, and so as a corollary disrupt the East German economy, would be action by force, physical, armed or economic against West Berlin, and for that reason I believe that despite the alarms and excursions which go on so frequently, time may well be on our side
I turn to the Russian attitude to this great problem. I think that one hon. Member on the Front Bench opposite may have more experience than I have in this matter. I think, however, that I am the only hon. Member of this House who is able to say that he was in Moscow in 1941, listening to the German artillery outside the city. To spend any length of time doing that gives one an impression of Soviet Russia which is necessarily unique. We used to say in the Military and Naval Mission that the honeymoon of about six months between ourselves and the Russians which obtained at that time was much too good to last, and, as we all know, it did not last
Looking at the German problem through Russian eyes, and particularly this question of Berlin, I think that the Russians who have their roots deep in history feel that they are at the end of a long road—a road which perhaps started in the 13th and 14th centuries with victories over the Teutonic order of knights. One of the first was when Alexander Nevsky defeated the Teutonic Knights in the 13th century. It is no accident that one of the first Orders of Gallantry created


in 1941 was that of Alexander Nevsky. With two world wars behind them and with the clear effect of their appalling mistake, recognised by the Russians, of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939, with 12 million Russians dead as the price they paid, do we in this House really think that the Russians, with their grip on Berlin, will not squeeze the last drop of usefulness out of the 2¼million German hostages in their hands?
I speak on these lines because anyone who deals with the Russians and knows them cannot fail to see it. What action should we take about it? I think that action with the Russians is facilitated by the fact that they are human beings. They have fears—a tremendous fear of Germany is one of them—fears which we share in the opposite direction. They have a particular fear of nuclear weapons and, great people as they are, they are very afraid of these things. But they also have an ability to laugh at themselves.
I like a story about the Armenian radio, which is typical of Soviet jokes at the present time. To the question, "What will the citizens of Soviet Armenia do in the event of a nuclear attack from the West?" the reply was, "In the event of an attack by the capitalist Powers each citizen of Soviet Armenia should dress himself in a white sheet and walk slowly and quietly towards the cemetery." Supplementary question. "Yes, comrade. We understand this is a useful measure of socialist defence, but, please, why slowly and quietly?" Reply. "Fathead, to avoid panic, of course."
Speaking in a foreign affairs debate, it is necessary to try and be constructive. What action can back-bench Members urge on the Government? What can we urge my right hon. Friend to do in these circumstances? I suggest that with our experience in this country, and also with the fact that, barring two accidents, we have never been at war with Russia for the whole of our history, we are in a good position to influence our allies in the common front which we are making to the Russians, particularly over the Berlin problem.
If I could suggest a line of aproach to my right hon. Friend it is, could he

not tell, say, the French to be a little less intransigent over the question of talking to the Russians? Could not we ask him to ask General de Gaulle for a moment to neglect French logic, which we all know and admire so well, and to be a little irrational and perhaps a shade more human in approach to the Russians? To the Americans could not we say, politely, that this is primarily a European matter, that we have been Europeans for many hundreds of years, and could not the Americans perhaps forget the great prestige issue by which they think of Berlin as the confrontation between two great colossi in the world today? Could they not get it out of their minds that difficulties at the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint should always be backed up by tanks and by sending battle groups along the autobahn? To repeat the point which I made earlier, I think that my right right hon. Friend will be well advised to remind his American opposite number of the misgivings which we have in Ger. many, too, regarding the operations of the central intelligence agency.
To the West Germans we might say, could not they be a little less inflexible in their attitude to this appalling problem, perhaps in repudiating the thoughts which lie behind the Hallstein doctrine? Could not they come here a little more and listen to the amount of time spent in a foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons on purely German problems? The debate this afternoon has ranged over the world, and I think that it would do our German allies good to know that there are frontiers in the world to discuss other than the Oder Neisse line.

Mr. R. T. Paget: I have found the hon. and gallant Member's speech most interesting, but earlier he said that there was no point in negotiating an agreement with the Russians at a time when they were already in default on their agreements. Is not what he is saying almost exactly the opposite?

Commander Courtney: The two things are consistent. If the hon. and learned Member waits for my argument to evolve he will understand it. I am discussing extracts, not negotiations, and I am telling my right hon. Friend that he might give a little advice to our German allies


in this respect. Could they not treat the East Germans, their own kinsfolk, not as the pariahs which they seem to regard them at present? They trade with them to the extent of about£80 million a year. Could not that be developed a little more? If we are sending a junior Koenigswinter delegation over to Berlin in the comparatively near future, could not the West Germans perhaps facilitate arrangements for our team to talk with the East German F.D.J.? I think that contact between the young might prove one of the most fruitful means of resolving these problems, while at the same time negotiations between Governments remain as difficult as I have said previously.
What shall we say to the Russians? I have great faith in the Russians' common sense. They are realists. They do not think as we do. They cannot be trusted, as we have seen, to fulfil agreements entered into under Western conditions. My right hon. Friend was right to quote a passage from Mr. Khrushchev's speech in Bulgaria stating that while Socialism and capitalism existed in the world there could be no quarter between the two systems.
I am sorry to have been rather long and also rather pessimistic, as normally I am an optimist. But I am not an optimist about the Berlin situation. I believe that the Government's policy in respect of the German and Berlin problems is right. We should be grateful to my right hon. Friend, and particularly to his noble Friend, for all that they do and are continuing to do to resolve this terribly difficult situation. I pledge him my support in any action that he may take in the matter.

7.47 p.m.

Mr. Arthur Henderson: I do not propose to follow the hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East (Commander Courtney) in dealing with the problem of Berlin except to say to the Lord Privy Seal that I wish well the exploratory talks which are taking place between the United States and Soviet Governments with, I hope, the full approval by Her Majesty's Government of the United States Government's proposals
This debate has ranged over a wide number of topics and many countries. As

a result, I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who has described this debate as about the worst foreign affairs debate in the forty years during which he has been in the House. I have been here for about the same period and, like him, have taken part in many of these foreign affairs debates, and I cannot remember one as ragged and scrappy as this.
I hope that in future there will be some limitation put upon the number of subjects which are dealt with in a foreign affairs debate, and I also hope that it will not be found necessary to mix defence topics with foreign affairs in a debate of this nature. I hope that I shall set an example which has not altogether been set by some previous speakers, for I shall confine what I have to say to under ten minutes. I believe that the more hon. Members speak for only a short time the more are able to catch Mr. Speaker's eye.
I want to deal first with the problem of Laos. Frankly, I do not see how we can avoid supporting the Government or any other Government in so far as they are seeking to implement obligations which have been undertaken in a treaty such as the Treaty of Manila. Subsection 2 of Article 4 provides that if there are fears in one of the member States about the possibility of aggression certain arrangements can be made under the Treaty, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington made the point with much justification that the Government have only themselves to blame because they have not produced evidence to the satisfaction of many hon. Members which justifies them in carrying out their obligations under subsection 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty of Manila.
It is not sufficient for the Prime Minister this afternoon, when he was asked whether this matter would be referred to the Security Council, to indicate that this action was being taken under Article 51 of the Charter. The Lord Privy Seal knows perfectly well—indeed I put a Question to him the other day about it—that under Article 34 the Security Council has to deal with any situation which may lead to international friction. If the United States Government, Her Majesty's Government and the other Governments concerned


considered that they had to take this action because of the danger of inter- national friction, a fortiori there should have been a case for taking the matter to the Security Council under Article 34.
We must not be misrepresented in the criticisms we are making. My criticism relates to the failure so far on the part of any of the Governments concerned to bring this matter before the Security Council.

Mr. Heath: May I interrupt the right hon. and learned Member on one point purely as a matter of fact? I misunderstood him when he put the Question the other day about Article 34, but Article 34 is not mandatory. It says the Security Council "may" take action, not "must" take action.

Mr. Henderson: I am quite prepared to accept the correction from "must" to "may", but the Security Council is composed of a number of member States and any one of them could bring the matter before the Council.

Mr. S. Silverman: Referring to the Treaty of Manila and the obligation of the United Kingdom under it if a request for aid is made—I do not deal with the question of whether any request was ever made—is there an obligation on the Government of this country to accept that there is a real threat of aggression, or to find out the merits of the claim, whether it is real or bogus?

Mr. Henderson: I should imagine that normally a Government would have taken the necessary steps in consultation with other Governments to satisfy themselves about the facts of the situation and whether they justified the action being taken.
Another point I want to deal with is the Nuclear Tests Conference at Geneva. Most of us have been disheartened and discouraged by the lack of progress at that Conference. The main stumbling block appears to be failure to secure agreement on the question of verification. The Soviet Union, I understand, say that they will not agree to on-site inspections and the United States Government and Her Majesty's Government will not agree to enter into a treaty unless there is some provision for on-site inspection in cases of doubt.
I hope we shall have some light thrown on the difficulties tonight by the Minister of State. I understand that the difficulty is that there is a fundamental, or very deep, difference between the Soviet scientists and the Western scientists. The Soviet scientists take the view that it is possible by existing means of verification under national control to verify every conceivable kind of test at high altitude, atmospheric, under the sea or underground. On the other hand, the Western scientists have advised the Western Governments that it is not possible in every case to verify tests by existing means of verification.
If there is this fundamental difference between the schools of scientists in the West and in the East, why do the Government not propose that these investigations should be referred to an impartial body of scientists appointed by the United Nations? Let us have a completely impartial international body of scientists investigating the scientific facts in relation to the feasibility of detecting whether tests of any kind have actually taken place. If as a result of a report by this international body of scientists it was established that the Soviet scientists were right in their view that all tests could be verified by existing means, that would seem to be a justification of the Soviet attitude that there should be no test ban treaty providing for on-site inspections on their territory. If on the other hand this impartial body of scientists establishes that only in a certain proportion of tests could it be definitively established that tests had taken place whether at high altitude or underground, there would be an overwhelming case supporting the views of the Western Governments at Geneva that in case of dispute there should be on-site inspection.
I ask the Minister of State, can we be told if Her Majesty's Government accept the proposal of the neutrals, that in cases of dispute in the circumstances I have outlined an impartial international body of scientists should be given the responsibility of carrying out these on-site inspections and they should not be appointed by the British Government, the United States Government, the Soviet Government or any other national Government? I believe that would go a great way to reassure the Soviet Union.
I make a final point on the question of disarmament. I agreed very much with what my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) said this afternoon about the closeness that has resulted in the formulation, first by the Soviet Government and secondly by the United States Government, of very comprehensive and detailed schemes for securing general, comprehensive disarmament. I believe that an examination of those two schemes shows that there is a great deal of common ground. There are differences of timing—whether bases should he eliminated in the first stage and whether there should he total elimination of vehicles of nuclear delivery in the first stage or the second stage and so—on but I believe there is a sufficient common denominator of agreement on paper to justify an actual agreement in future.
The whole thing is bedevilled by lack of confidence between the East and the West. These major problems of bases, the extent to which nuclear vehicles are to be eliminated in the first stage and the question of manpower, cannot be dealt with in what I call the "committee stage". I believe the only way in which we can make a substantial advance is for the heads of Government to get together. If the time has not come for a summit conference, why cannot President Kennedy, Mr. Khrushchev and our Prime Minister go to New York next month for the meeting of the General Assembly as heads of their delegations? There need not be the formal organisation of a summit conference. The fact that they would be in the precincts of the United Nations headquarters would provide them with opportunities for discussions with each other which might result in a greater basis of understanding and agreement to give their Foreign Secretaries and delegates instructions to get on and make further advances at Geneva. That is the way in which we should seek to deal with this problem in the next few weeks.
I believe that in spite of all the disappointments in the past few weeks, and in spite of the ten weeks of wrangling at Geneva, there is still a ray of hope. If both sets of Governments—East and West—will only be as genuine in their actions as they are in their speeches and their letters, we can look forward to

some progress along the road to general disarmament.

8.0 p.m.

Mr. John Farr: I shall follow the good example of the right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson), and speak for only a short time. With great respect to him, having regard to the considerable time that he has been in this House, I would differ with him in that I think that a far-ranging and far-reaching foreign affairs debate is quite a good thing. Problems are continually arising all over the world, and it is quite proper to bring into a discussion on foreign affairs the question of the means of power at one's elbow to implement one's own foreign policy.
Although I disagreed almost entirely with the right hon. Member for Easing-ton (Mr. Shinwell), I found, as always, that he provides the House with a great deal of entertainment. I thought that the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) would probably do better to turn his attention once again to financial matters. I was not at all impressed with his remark that it was futile to insist upon an independent deterrent. Our foreign policy hinges on our possession of an independent nuclear weapon.
I found great difficulty in understanding the official Opposition line, and the line, as far as one can understand it, of the Liberal Party, which is to abandon our own independent deterrent. I find that extremely puzzling and illogical. Over a number of years we have at last succeeded in building up a really effective independent deterrent, but most hon. Members, I do not say all of them, in the two parties opposite now say that having achieved that effective independent deterrent at some considerable expense to the taxpayer, we should at once abandon it, do without it, and shelter behind whatever deterrent the Americans may be prepared to use to protect this country.
I want to dwell for a moment on the strange anomaly that it should be the Labour Party that advocates abandoning an effective independent deterrent, and sheltering behind an American one. The foreign policy of the Labour Party is very far removed from that of the American Government—

Mr. Harold Davies: I should hope so.

Mr. Farr: One would think that if the Labour Party really thought that at some time in the dim and distant future it might win a General Election and have to provide a Foreign Secretary, it would like to have a certain amount of power at its elbow so that its voices would be listened to at the conference table on matters of international import. The Labour Party may not have any particular advice to offer for solving international problems, and may not be particularly concerned about them, but one would think that just in case it was called upon, for a time, to run our foreign affairs, it would like more than a penny or a twopenny whistle to blow on when announcing its views.
Even stranger to me is the very muddled thinking of those who advocate complete unilateral nuclear disarmament. A section of the Labour Party, and a large corps of other people, periodically march from Aldermaston and to American air bases, and generally kick up a row. I have never seen one of those marches, but I have seen photographs of them, and films of them on television. I think that hon. Member on both sides will agree that what strikes one most about the vast majority of them is their real youth. With all due respect to one or two hon. Members here, there are very few greybeards amongst them; the vast majority are in their 'teens—aged, perhaps, 16, 17, or 18.
Like many other hon. Members, I have been canvassed by them, and I know that they are really sincere in their belief—

Mr. S. Silverman: I speak as one of the non-greybeards who took part in marches from time to time; my beard is yellow. Does not the hon. Gentleman realise that whether the unilateralists are right or wrong, they answer his earlier criticism of the official policy of the Labour Party and of the Liberal Party? He complained that if we abandon our own nuclear weapons without committing ourselves to the abandonment of nuclear weapons generally, we put ourselves in the somewhat embarrassing and dishonourable position of not bearing the burden ourselves but of allowing our friends and allies to bear it for us.
To cure that criticism, we can go one step further, and say that not merely will we not have these weapons ourselves, but we will not be defended by them by any other country. That might be right or wrong, but would he not give the unilateralists the credit for having satisfied his major criticism of that policy?

Mr. Farr: I am much obliged to the hon. Member for that very relevant interruption. I was about to elaborate a little on what I said earlier. I hope that I have made it quite clear that I believe that the vast majority of those younger people in the C.N.D. movement are sincere, and truly believe that they are—perhaps in a feeble way—doing something to try to bring about a better world; and to try to abolish, in their own way, however misguided it may be, the terrible threat of a nuclear war.
The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) said, "Surely it would be much better if the whole world, East and West, abandoned the nuclear deterrent. We should then have a far more peaceful place to live in. Surely it is far better to do that than to have unilateral disarmament by this country." I do not agree with him at all. I think that idea accounts for there being so many very young people in the C.N.D. movement, because, when they reach the age of maturity—19, 20, or 21—

Mr. S. Silverman: Or 99.

Mr. Farr: —they suddenly think, "That is all very well, but what am I walking up and down here for? What happens if we are successful, and we get the whole world to abandon nuclear weapons?" One does not have to be a mathematician to see that if we in the West, together with the Russians and France, abandon the nuclear deterrent we will be faced with a vast concourse of armed conventional strength. The Eastern countries—including Russia and China—today have a population of more than 1,000 million people on whom they can draw. It seems simple enough to me that if it came to a conventional showdown without the threat of a nuclear exchange we should very soon go under, as would all the countries of the West, and we would be swamped by a yellow tide.
I wish to make a plea for the possible inclusion of Red China in the United Nations. It is obvious that there is trouble at home in China. It does not need a clever person to know the old dodge used by the leader of any nation when there are difficulties at home. It has been done many times—the drawing of a red herring across the trail so that the people's discontent at home is temporarily transferred and focussed on an enemy abroad. It may be that the comparative peacefulness of Red China might not last. After all, in twenty years' time Red China will certainly be a nuclear Power.

Mr. Harold Davies: Within a couple of years.

Mr. Farr: I said certainly in ten to twenty years' time, possibly within two or three years. In any ease, she will undoubtedly have a population of 1,000 million people. When those two factors are combined we get the most powerful nation on earth with which to contend and unless we do something about her entry into the global debating chamber of the United Nations we shall make a farce of that organisation and its proceedings.

8.13 p.m.

Mr. Jeremy Thorpe: I shall be brief because a number of hon. Members wish to speak. While I intend to comment on the interesting speech of the hon. Member for Harborough (Mr. Fan), and particularly on his reference to hydrogen bombs and our nuclear policy, I wish to deal first with Thailand, because the general feeling in the House is that there is a lot of information we still require on this issue from the Government.
One of the unsatisfactory characteristics of a foreign affairs debate in which we range like some great Cook's tour over the world is that it gives the Minister, with the best will in the world, insufficient time in which to deal with all the questions raised. I would have thought that of all the questions facing us the one about which the House of Commons was entitled to the fullest information was that concerning the dispatch of British troops to any theatre in the world. I wish to make it clear that we are not satisfied with what has been said by Government spokesmen and

they must not be surprised that we on the Opposition benches feel that, after Suez, we cannot trust this Government, especially in foreign affairs. It is for that reason that a number of questions must be answered by them.
The performance of the Prime Minister last week was extraordinary and possibly without Parliamentary precedent. He came to the House and said, in effect, "I want to tell hon. Members that if we receive an invitation to send troops to Thailand we will accept it, but we have received no invitation yet. I thought I would tell the House this because I am sure that it would like to know what our response will be if we receive an invitation." The Prime Minister might have said, "We do not know how many troops we will have to send or from which wing of the Forces they will come—the Army, Navy or Air Force."
He did not tell us for how long the troops would be there, what was the purpose of the visit or what formal request was expected. No, the Prime Minister merely said that if an invitation was received the troops would be sent out. One might almost say that it was cadging for an invitation. We heard from the Lord Privy Seal that the formal invitation to Britain to send troops was received only yesterday. This is an extraordinary piece of Ministerial behaviour, and I am tempted to ask whether the Prime Minister intends to give a weekly projection of what might happen the following week in the event of certain other circumstances happening.
We want to know the specific nature of the fears expressed by the Thailand Government; whether the contingent of British forces will be exclusively under British control; what is to be the relationship between our troops and the 5,000United States troops who are already there; where they will be stationed and whether they will be on the Thailand-Laotian frontier or will merely remain in the capital as a token force. We should also like to know to what extent they would be involved in the event of a frontier incident. These are the sort of questions to which the House of Commons is entitled to an answer. I will say no more about Thailand,


although much remains to be said. I realise that other hon. Members wish to speak.
Regarding the Athens-N.A.T.O. Conference, the defence policy of the Liberal Party has been referred to accurately by the hon. Member for Harborough and inaccurately by the hon. Member for Cornwall, North (Mr. Scott-Hopkins). To suggest that the policy of abandoning the independent British nuclear deterrent is synonymous with unilateral disarmament is wholly untrue and, since the hon. Member for Cornwall, North has a Liberal candidate with only 900 votes behind him, I suggest that he does some research.

Mr. Scott-Hopkins: Would the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) not agree that doing away with the H-bomb and handing over that side of defence to the Americans is virtually unilaterally disarming ourselves regarding the H-bomb?

Mr. Thorpe: There might be some sense in that conclusion if that was the Liberal Party's policy. The hon. Member's argument is purely academic, but I will educate him in this subject, if only for home consumption in North Cornwall.
The Lord Privy Seal, in an extremely interesting passage, said there were two factors which existed in regard to nuclear weapons. The first was the feeling on the part of certain European Powers that in the event of a show-down America, which is, of course, the predominant nuclear Power in the West, might feel that their territories were expendable. The Lord Privy Seal implied that this was one of the reasons why there was a feeling of insecurity among some of the European partners in N.A.T.O. and the reason why some nations felt that they should possess their own independent nuclear deterrent.
The second was that there was a feeling that far greater information could have been exchanged between the nuclear and the non-nuclear N.A.T.O. partners. That is, I suppose, another reason for an independent deterrent. I do not agree with it, but it is none the less a reason. The hon. Member for Harborough used what I choose to call the "prestige argument"—that without it one is at a Wis. As Aneurin Bevan once said, it

is like going naked into a council chamber. I do not accept this because I believe that the weapon is a deterrent only if it deters.
Since the 1957 White Paper said that in the event of nuclear war there is no defence of Britain, it follows that Britain would not independently use it but only in concert with her allies. If there is any hon. Member who would be prepared to see Britain use it independently the sooner we know about his views the better for the safety of the country. The last time that we independently used force was with conventional weapons at Suez in 1956, which is not regarded as the most conspicuous of our military successes.

Mr. Farr: The hon. Member has spoken for ten minutes and has said very little. What he said, however, was what was not the official Liberal Party policy in connection with the nuclear deterrent. This was in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Cornwall, North. Would the hon. Member be kind enough now to tell me and other hon. Members who are very interested what is the official Liberal Party policy? I should dearly love to know.

Mr. Thorpe: If the hon. Member does not know by now I must despair of him.

Mr. Scott-Hopkins: Does the hon. Member himself know?

Mr. Thorpe: The hon. Member for Harborough asked the question and I assume that he would like an attempt on my part to answer it.
I was about to say that the Athens Conference is a very real move towards the defence policy which the Liberal Party have been advocating and it has been accepted now by the official Opposition. It is that the deterrent is of value only if it is a Western deterrent as opposed to a British, French or Italian deterrent, which will be created in five or ten years, and that we must work towards the deterrent power of the West being placed in joint N.A.T.O. control.

Mr. G. Brown: Oh.

Mr. Thorpe: The right hon. Gentleman may disagree, but this is a view which many distinguished strategists have taken, including Field Marshal Sir John Harding, who is highly regarded


as a strategist. He says that the nuclear bomb possessed by Britain has no deterrent value whatsoever and becomes a weapon of deterrence only when possessed by the Western Alliance as a whole, or alternatively by the United States. I suggest that what the Lord Privy Seal said about the Athens Conference removes, or begins to remove, the fears which have prompted other Western Powers to try to manufacture their own independent nuclear deterrent.
Just as I prohesied in May last year that by July of last year we should be applying to join the Common Market and this was howled down by both sides, so I now prophesy that in eighteen months this Government will have completely abandoned the idea of an independent nuclear deterrent. I believe that the Athens communiqué is a very useful step in that direction.

Mr. G. Brown: I do not disagree with the hon. Member about the independent deterrent, but is the hon. Gentleman advocating that control over the strategic nuclear weapon should pass from the White House to what he called joint N.A.T.O. control?

Mr. Thorpe: There will always remain a White House control, obviously, because it is an American weapon. I am also suggesting that N.A.T.O. as a whole should possess a nuclear weapon and that the decision about its use should be a N.A.T.O. decision.

Mr. Brown: Oh, no. Ask the Liberal Leader.

Mr. Thorpe: It is clear that the effect of the Athens communiqué is that it is removing the argument in favour of independent nuclear deterrents being possessed by the European Powers and it is a move towards a joint Western bomb in the possession of the Western Alliance. Whether the Americans would give up theirs remains to be seen, because theirs is a credible weapon and ours is not.

Mr. Brown: What about the N.A.T.O. one?

Mr. Thorpe: That is credible, but an independent British deterrent is not. [Interruption.] Other hon. Members wish to speak and I have given way.

Mr. Brown: But not to me.

Mr. Thorpe: The right hon. Gentleman is not at a bye-election now. He is in the House of Commons.
It is in Berlin that we find the sharpest division between the Russians and the free world. In this country there has been a tendency—though not on the part of Her Majesty's Government or on the part of hon. Members—to regard the 2 million West Berliners as being expendable in an overall political settlement. There was a time when the Prime Minister was saying on the golf course that all this had been got up by the Press. Opinion in Britain was very soft on the responsibilities we have towards the people living in West Berlin. Just as there is a danger of being inflexible and rigid—the argument which was levelled against John Foster Dulles—there is also a danger in weakness and appeasement on Berlin.
The two dangers, I should have thought, was of a military flare-up and on the question of access. As to a military flare-up, I agree with the hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East (Commander Courtney) that this is not an immediate likelihood, and I should like to share with him in paying a great tribute to the calm bearing and judgment which have been displayed by the British forces in West Berlin. It is a situation totally different from that which the average military would find, for a particular incident could lead to a flare-up at any time, and they deserve considerable credit.
As to access, the American 13-nation plan was a great step forward, because in suggesting that the two Berlin City governments should be represented we have an acceptance of an East and West Berlin association, which it is true Herr Ulbricht has not accepted, but in Which, without the bedevilling question of recognition, one was able to associate both halves of Berlin. One would have thought that Dr. Adenauer, in opposing this so violently and saying that he would prefer the Pankow men, as he referred to the D.D.R., was stirring up for himself far greater trouble, because by being so inflexible he was making more likely the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany independently and thus a far greater association with the East German Government.
The American plan, now officially killed, was a step in the right direction.


When it was initially raised it had a far friendlier reception than the previous plan, but Herr Ulbricht, for what he is worth, and who presumably speaks only on instructions, put forward an alternative plan under which the nations would be only a court of appeal in case of dispute and would have no executive power.
The Lord Privy Seal said that he was pleased that there was a lull but that this did not mean that the Government would not try to take the initiative. We have heard nothing during the debate from the Government about their intentions with regard to Germany. Do they want to see a demilitarised zone in Germany? Are they prepared to give way to the Norstad plan for overlapping screens and inspection posts? What initiative are they prepared to take with regard to the U.N. presence in Berlin, which was, I think, raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Grimond) at least two years ago?
As the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) said, we have not heard even a passing reference to the Rapacki Plan and the idea of nuclear disengagement in Europe. To what extent is de facto recognition of the D.D.R. to be used as a bargaining counter in negotiations? How firm are the Government prepared to be in persuading the Germans that the question of regaining the lost territories is now purely academic, though it is still one of the real political issues which, I think, the Russians are frightened about?
I believe that immobilism, which is what we have had in West Berlin, may be a necessary posture, but it is certainly no substitute for a coherent policy. I hope that, when the Government reply, we shall have far more information about Thailand and a far clearer indication of what they intend in regard to a Berlin settlement.

8.30 p.m.

Mr. Stephen Hastings: I am still as fogged now about what the Liberal Party's defence policy is as I was before the hon. Member for Devon, North (Mr. Thorpe) spoke.
Perhaps it is a pity that the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) was not present. He asked for

a defence debate, and we very nearly had one. It now seems that we are to have two nuclear systems instead of one in Europe. In addition, the British nuclear deterrent with one finger on the trigger is incredible, but a N.A.T.O. deterrent with, presumably, fifteen fingers on the trigger, is credible.
Perhaps, before the next General Election, these things will become a little clearer than they are now. The contribution by the hon. Member for Devon, North, amusing though it was, has done little to help the country as a whole to interpret Liberal policy.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman on one point. He paid a well-deserved tribute to the bearing and performance of our troops in Berlin. I was there recently myself, and I heartily agree that events there place a tremendous strain not only on the troops, but on our officials in many branches of the foreign service. It is a war of nerves the effect of which falls as heavily on those in Berlin, perhaps, as at any other post abroad, and they deserve the tribute which the hon. Gentleman justly paid to them.
It has been said that this debate goes too wide. I hope that the House will not be irritated when I say that I intend to take it a little wider. I shall try to make my remarks as short as possible, concentrating upon one aspect of foreign policy which, although it is a little outside the matters mentioned already today, is, I believe, of the greatest importance.
My right hon. Friend said in opening that Communist aims do not change and that the statements made in Bulgaria recently by Mr. Khrushchev bear this out. I agree entirely. Mr. Khrushchev said, in addition, only a few days ago, that "by a law of social development" the world would ultimately live under Communism. This, despite tributes paid in this debate to the Russian character and despite optimistic signs from time to time, is still the basic Marxist philosophy. Until it changes, we cannot afford to relax for a moment.
What should our policy be? As I understand it, the policy of the Government is to remain everywhere firm, but, at the same time, reasonable. This I entirely endorse. It is difficult, but


not impossible, to remain reasonable and to appear as such in the Assembly and corridors of the United Nations, in the chanceries of the world, and at international conferences, such as the present Disarmament Conference, but I wish to deal briefly with another level of the struggle, a range of activities in which it is less easy for the West to compete.
I refer to subversion and the use of what the Communists term "front organisations", what Lenin, that master strategist of Marxism, referred to as the "transmission belts", that is to say, the means by which the engine of the party manipulates and drives the mass of innocent people without their knowledge of what is really going on. These organisations are ubiquitous. They are, of course, already largely discredited in Europe where they are well known.
I need name but a few: the World Peace Council—how innocent it sounds —the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and so on. There is a list of professional-seeming front organisations, too. I will mention only one, because of what I have to say later, the International Organisation of Journalists.
Discredited largely in Europe and in the Western world, these front organisations are not so discredited or so well understood in all countries of the world, among the newly emergent countries and those which have gained their independence recently. It is here that the danger from this form of activity lies.
There are three main limbs to the Soviet offensive into the newly independent world and the underdeveloped countries of the Far East, Africa and Latin America. I wish to take Africa as my theme, because it seems to me to be the theatre in which we in this country, and, indeed, Europe as a whole, can affect the situation positively and make a real contribution more than we can in either of the other two areas, despite the talk we have had tonight, and rightly so, about the situation in the Far East.
On the evidence as I understand it, I believe that the Russians' plan in Africa is this. It is not to produce ideological converts—the complexities of

the Marxist-dialectic have little to say to most Africans—but to train cadres, or teams, or groups of Africans in all the methods of subversion so well known and practised by Marxists and to place them, as time goes on, in influential positions so that when the time is ripe they can take over these countries one by one by, if necessary, violent revolution. This, the Communists have made plain, is in their view, justified. They said so last year at the Congress of 81 Communist parties in Moscow.
The main lines of action in this scheme seem to me to fall, first, in the trade union field in independent Africa and, secondly, in the student sphere. I shall try to deal briefly with these two and to impress what I believe is the danger of it on my hon. Friend the Minister of State.
First, trade unions. On 25th April last, Moscow Radio announced that there was a school for trade union militants open in Moscow at which there were more than 30 activists from African trade unions. There are other schools of this nature spread behind the Iron Curtain. One is at Bernau, in East Berlin, another is in Prague and another in Warsaw. I understand that there are others, but I am unable to give their whereabouts. Perhaps no one else this side of the Iron Curtain can give them either.
Not only trade union work is taught in these schools, indeed, it plays a fairly small part in their curricula. Other things are taught, such as subversion and Marx-Leninism. The first course launched at Bernau in 1958 lasted two years. Students came from Zanzibar, Somalia, Ghana, Ceylon, Sierra Leone, Kenya, the Sudan, Mali, the Congo, Togo, Morocco, Guinea, Senegal, the Cameroons, the Central African Republic, Niger, Algeria and Mauretania. Eighty graduated in 1961. A third course is in process, and all but three of the students on it are reputed to be Africans. To give one more example of this activity, there were 94 representatives from Africa at the World Federation of Trade Unions' conference in December last. They included, sad to say, representatives from most of the independent Commonwealth countries.
In Africa itself, as opposed to these front organisations working outside the


continent, there is the All-African Trade Union Federation. There are six secretaries, or there were when the first executive committee was set up, three of whom were trained by the World Federation of Trade Unions. From what is known of that organisation, this means, in ordinary common sense, that these three are Communists.
What are the aims of the All-African Trade Union Federation? It started in all innocence. Many Africans who went to the first conference genuinely believed that it would not be affiliated to one side or the other. But, as things have turned out, its aims are these: first, to combat by any means it can the efforts of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which, to those not versed in these matters, is the equivalent trade union federation working in the free world which has a school at Kampala in Uganda and which does much useful work. Some is not as useful as it might be perhaps, but, nevertheless, of use, and it is a target for the activities of the A.A.T.U.F.
The second aim is to influence the trade union congresses of the emergent, newly independent countries, and, indeed, those countries not yet independent, to affiliate themselves to this Communist front organisation rather than to the I.C.F.T.U. There are straight examples of this activity in Rhodesia to my certain knowledge. There is a considerable influence over A.A.T.U.F. from the Ghana T.U.C. and Mr. Tettegah plays a prominent part in its activities. All this seems to me to add up to a fairly clear pattern.
I want to pass from that to the other activity I mentioned, namely, the question of students and the lure of education for the African and the way in which this, also, is being exploited by Communism. The trade union activity is, of course, effective, but not, perhaps, so much as this. Anybody who knows independent Africa is readily and immediately aware of the understandable longing everywhere for education. It is this which is being exploited. Certain standards are required for African students who go to Western universities and this is understandable; with universities and colleges behind the Iron Curtain, no qualification is required

for Africans. This is understandable, because the Iron Curtain countries are not interested in education for these students, but in indoctrination and in teaching subversion and Marx-Leninism.
Numbers of African students make long and sometimes illicit and hazardous journeys to get into the pipeline which takes them finally to universities behind the Iron Curtain. They go through Entebbe, up to Khartoum, and on from there. I understand that during the last three-year period, there have been between 500 and 600 from East Africa alone.
It is arguable, and one reads it in the Press, that although this activity may be going on and is unfortunate and unpleasant from the Western viewpoint and, perhaps, from the point of view of the Africans concerned, nevertheless there are ten times more students in Western universities than there are behind the Iron Curtain. It is also argued that a few of them—because only very few so far have come back—have expressed dissatisfaction because they were badly treated and that they did not appreciate the course. That, however, is no reason why we should in any way be complacent about the situation.
After all, this effort is only three years old. If no more than a small proportion of those taken behind the Iron Curtain come back convinced by the doctrines they have been taught, Communism will have a formidable spearhead in Africa. We must also remember that African students who spend their time in Western universities go back with an education limited to academic knowledge; but those who come back from behind the Iron Curtain are trained exponents in a revolutionary technique. This is a very different affair altogether.
I do not want to burden the House with more on front organisations. I have discussed the main lines, but there are others. For example, there was a meeting not long ago of the International Organisation of Journalists, so-called, at Bamako, in Mali, at which there were delegates from almost all the French territories of independent Africa. It was said that the principal aim was "to further the great work of liberating Africa". Applying the Communist interpretation to that, it seems to me to have little to do with journalism.
There has also been a congress of the same sort organised by the International Women's Democratic Federation, also in Mali, with delegates from all over Africa—Nigeria, Algeria, South Africa, Mali, Morocco, Somali and Kenya. I do not wish to dwell upon it, but there is also the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, with a Chinese and a Russian representative upon it, sitting in Cairo. There is another organisation known as the African Association in Cairo, which pays particular attention to so-called liberation movements in Central Africa and the South. [Interruption.] Does the hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) disagree with me?

Mr. S. Silverman: I do not know. What I am wondering is what this has to do with the debate.

Mr. Hastings: If I interpret correctly what the hon. Member says, he thinks that the Communist penetration, which is making steady headway throughout Africa, has nothing to do with the foreign policy of this country. In my view, that is not the case. That is why I am trying to describe what I believe to be a particularly menacing aspect of our foreign affairs problem. If the hon. Member does not like it, I quite understand. I am not giving way again. I am sure that the hon. Member's ideas and mine on these subjects are radically opposed and that any exchanges will make little difference and will bring us no closer together.
I should like, in conclusion, to make one or two specific recommendations. The first concerns the co-ordination of Western policy in Africa. Surely, we will not be able to contain this menace unless we can co-ordinate our policies, particularly between the countries of Europe and the United States. What sense does it make for the Americans to support us as wholeheartedly and sympathetically as they have done for years in Europe, and yet at the same time to pursue policies in Africa which, to say the least, are often opposed to ours?
Surely, with our experience of that continent, it would be better for us to work out a viable policy together. I feel that here the advantage lies with us, and I hope, if it is not happening

already, that the Government and my right hon. Friend will be doing their best to pursue this and ensure that as far as possible American policies in independent Africa are in line with those of ourselves, France and the other European countries concerned.
The next recommendation I have to make is concerned, paradoxically enough in a foreign affairs debate, with our own T.U.C. I had the good fortune not very long ago, when serving abroad, to watch the work of a British ex-trade union official working with the Foreign Office in an emergent country on trade union matters. I believe that his work was vastly useful, and I hope that some means can be found of encouraging or facilitating our T.U.C. to send representatives abroad to work more actively than perhaps it is doing at the moment among the emergent trade union movements in independent Africa.
The I.C.F.T.U. does good work, and I quite see that for our T.U.C. it is difficult, since it is a member of the I.C.F.T.U. At the same time, its view of these things is different. The T.U.C. believes in an organisation built up from below rather than large headquarters with masses of typewriters, and so forth, but with nothing beneath. I believe that the T.U.C. has a very real contribution to make in this field. I am sorry that I cannot interest the hon. Gentlemen below the Gangway opposite. This is a matter which should concern the Labour Party, and I hope that something can be done about it.
Thirdly, I should like to see my right hon. Friend take an interest in the promotion of an African Institute in this country. The Russians, not very long ago, set up an African Institute under Professor Ivan Potekhim, on which they have spent a large amount of study and money, and even with our experience we could afford to follow their example that far, anyway. A great need is for the provision of books for students in the new emergent countries, books which are written in the languages of those countries. They need books on history and politics, presented in African terms. It is little use sending political analyses based on Greek or Roman example, or upon the history of this country. They do not understand it, and are not interested. They have to see the lessons


of the West presented to them in terms of Africa. There is a great stream of Marxist rubbish which is flowing steadily into Africa from the other side of the Iron Curtain, and I ask my hon. Friend to pay a serious attention to it.
In conclusion, I apologise to the House, and to any hon. Member who has found my remarks out of context in this debate, for spending time on Africa, but, surely, if we—and by we I mean the West, and particularly Europe—lose Africa to Communism, we will lose all hope in the long run of the great economic expansion that could take place, and also the basis of our defence policy. It concerns us more than the other two areas of offensive which I have described. Perhaps I should tell the House that in 1939 the Foreign Office had two missions abroad in Africa, in 1946 it had three, and today it has 18, which is a measure of the growth of our interest so far as foreign affairs are concerned.
We cannot solve this problem alone, because investment on a vast scale is needed, and that is one more very good reason for pursuing the integration of Europe as fast as we can—the best way of achieving a concerted policy. We have at least five years, and perhaps ten, but not more. If we manage to play our cards aright we can do much to ensure the future of these countries in prosperity and liberty. If we do not, then assuredly they will fall a prey to the skein of falsehood and intrigue which is steadily being woven across Africa by Soviet Russia and international Communism.

8.50 p.m.

Mr. Harold Davies: Time is short. I wish that the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) would not come to the House and be didactic, arrogant, and, incidentally, illogical. He advised the House to note how Russia was accepting coloured university students, yet only today we were cross-examining Treasury Ministers about the lack of money for universities which are having to cut the number of students and cannot afford to give places to British students, let alone to colonial ones.

Mr. Farr: On a point of order. Is it in order for the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) to sit on

this side of the House instead of on the other to support his colleagues?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir Robert Grimston): There is not a point of order.

Mr. Davies: I am glad to see my hon. Friend the Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) sitting on the benches opposite. Not only was the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire didactic, arrogant and illogical, but he showed that he was out of touch with the facts of life.

Mr. Hastings: Mr. Hastings rose—

Mr. Davies: I will not give way. Time is short and I propose to sit down after eight minutes.
I want now to get to the nub of the debate. As an ex-official of the Foreign Office, the hon. Gentleman was no doubt in the Foreign Office at the time of Suez and was probably one of those who agreed with the Suez action. If his speech today was an example of the kind of brief given to Ministers at that time, we can understand why Britain was in such a mess. That deals with that part of the debate.
We expected today to be dealing with something that concerns the people of Britain. I am referring to the movement of troops. The people of this country are concerned not only about the movement of forces, but about the fact that no information on this subject has been given to the House of Commons. The S.E.A.T.O. Treaty has twice today been misinterpreted in the House, and the charges made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) have not been contradicted.
These forces were asked for not by Siam, but by the United States of America. This is apparent from a report in The Times of 17th May. That day, under the dateline "Washington, May 16th", there was a heading:
U.S. asks Britain to help in Laos. Dispatch of token force sought.
It went on to say:
The United States has asked Britain to send a token military force to Siam."—
I ask the House to note that the request came from the United States.
The request was made yesterday afternoon"—


that was 15th May—
when Sir David Ormsby Gore, the Ambassador, called at the State Department. … The official view is that the request must come from the Siamese Government …
I will not quote the whole report. I have said enough for the record. The fact is that the inspiration for this move came from the United States of America.
Some of us on this side of the House know Indo-China, and have had the good fortune to visit Laos and Thailand and know the area very well. The background to this story is that after the Geneva Conference of 1954 a neutral Government was established in Laos, and Prince Souvanna Phouma, who was leading the Government, came together with his half-brother Prince Souphanouvong and formed a first-class little Government. I was in the area when this happened.
There was then a free general election. The International Supervisory Commission examined the position there, and so far we have received eleven reports from the Commission. Not one has been debated in the House, because the official view of the Foreign Office is that it is our duty, as co-Chairman, only to receive reports. So we are in the fatuous position in which we can receive reports, which cannot be debated by the House. But when the Pathet Lao increased their representation the United States Central Intelligence Agency immediately started interfering in Laos in order to upset the neutral position, trying to change the position in South-East Asia. I reported this fact to hon. Members as a result of information given to me by the Embassy in Laos.
The New York Times and other American newspapers, after the change of Government in Laos, said that the Government in Laos were appealing to the United States, and had agreed to ask for the help of S.E.A.T.O. The position has developed entirely as a result of the action of Foster Dulles when, in a fit of pique at Manila, he created the Manila Treaty, later known as the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation. There was a vital debate in this House about the Treaty, to which the late Aneurin Bevan objected, and in respect of which he divided the House.
In October, 1950, the New York Times said:

America has a right to demand a dollar's worth of fight for every dollar which it spends.
Putting it more crudely, it was saying, "We supply the brass; you supply the lives." The American glossy magazines Look and Life from time to time send experts to Indo-China. On 24th April, 1961, Life said:
Laotian civilians, even less warlike than the soldiers, watched with only mild interest as troops set up weapons in their muddy streets. To U.S. advisers, stepping up their airlift of military experts and equipment, the big question was how to get the equipment used. 'Now all we have to do', said one Western observer, is to make Laos fight.'
In June, 1961, Look said:
The millions we have spent in Laos have been wasted. Much of the money wound up in the bank accounts of corrupt politicians through whose hands American contributions have passed. Not only have the people of Laos not benefited, but we"—
the Americans—
have harmed ourselves, possibly beyond redemption.
As a result of my travels through the United States, I know that millions of decent Americans do not want war in South-East Asia. They do not know what is going on there, and are shocked and annoyed when they see that men like Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek and the members of the South Viet-Nam Government themselves are wasting dollars which could be put into the provision of food and into ploughing up the fields, and making equipment to create a new type of Asia.
If it is not careful this country will be led into another Korea. When we heard the drooling and hypocritical speeches made at the time, some of my hon. Friends and I protested against the war in Korea. The truth about Korea has not been written. I wrote an article in a periodical, when Syngman Rhee had not been heard of. He was supposed to be a democrat but no one will defend his democracy today.
Millions of soldiers, including hundreds of thousands of poor American lads, gave their lives thinking that they were fighting for democracy. If we hear again the kind of rubbish we heard from the so-called official agency it may be completely misleading to the people.
We have a duty to make it clear to the British people that at least the Labour Party will not go into the Lobby


in support of a Government that might recreate another Korea in South-East Asia.
S.E.A.T.O. is not a Treaty. It is an apology for a treaty. It has nothing to do with real defensive democracy or freedom. It is built up on the false political analogy and analysis of some of the China lobby and interests in the United States beginning primarily with the late Foster Dulles.

Mr. W. Yates: Oh.

Mr. Harold Davies: The hon. Member may say "Oh" as long as he likes, and since he has said it, we had better quote Sir Anthony Eden, from page 113 of his book, "Full Circle". The hon. Gentleman has asked for it, and he is going to get it.
I will quote from page 113 of Sir Anthony Eden's book. He is the man who got a neutral Laos and has been praised by many, including Chou En-lai, for the work he did over the settlement of neutral Laos. I think that it did much to cause his ill-health. But he did a first-class job of work for the country. He said:
Meanwhile, Mr. Robertson (U.S. Assistant Secretary of State) whose approach to these questions is so emotional as to be impervious to argument or indeed facts, was keeping up a sort of 'theme song' to the effect that there were in Indo-China some three hundred thousand men who were anxious to fight against Vietminh and were looking to us for support and encouragement. I said that if they were so anxious to fight I could not understand why they did not do so. The Americans had put in nine times more supplies of material than the Chinese and plenty must be available for their use. I had no faith in this eagerness for the Vietnamese to fight for Bao Dai".
That is my position, too. I have no faith in the fact that this is supposed to be a true battle for democracy. There is only one answer. So long as the United States has a silly and foolish foreign policy that keeps 650 million people out of the comity of nations, out of the United Nations, there is no hope of getting round the table for discussion.
We on this side of the House demand that China be allowed to come into the United Nations. China must be there to discuss this area in her sphere of influence side by side with the Soviet Union. China is a great Power. Do not let us create xenophobia against China

as we created it against the Russians. That may lead to the end of civilisation in this nuclear atomic age. For heaven's sake let the British people say, "We want no more Koreas. If 'Uncle Sam' wants to 'go it alone,' let him."

9.3 p.m.

Mr. George Brown: I cannot agree with the last words of my hon. Friend the Member for Leek (Mr. Harold Davies). In fact, in Korea we played a part; not a very happy part for us, but it was a part that we had to play. I should not be able to say, while Communists behave as they do, that there may never be other Koreas. This is not a thing we choose. It is forced on us. We have to get a clear distinction between those who force the pace and those who have to accept the consequences.
I wish to start my reply to this debate with a protest of which I hope note will be taken somewhere. It is about the absence, the total absence from the debate, of the Minister of Defence. He consistently treats this House with contumely. He does the very minimum in the House and the maximum outside. He absolutely insulted the House a week ago by coming here to answer Questions and giving us no information and then calling a Press conference an hour later where he gave a lot of information.
I understand that the hon. and gallant Member for Norwood (Sir J. Smyth), while I was not in the Chamber, challenged my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) about whether he had informed the Minister of Defence of what he proposed to say. Let me make this plain. At my request my right hon. Friend the Opposition Chief Whip talked to the Patronage Secretary yesterday afternoon. He told the Patronage Secretary not only that we should like the Minister of Defence to be present but also that we should prefer him to answer the debate. So that there should be no misunderstanding, I rang the Ministry of Defence very early last evening. I could find only the duty clerk. So I conveyed a message to him and asked him to ensure that the Minister had it last night. He undertook to do that. My message was not to ask the Minister to come. It was to ask him to answer.
Further, my right hon. Friend the Member for Huyton happened to see the Minister of Defence personally in the precincts of the House last evening. He told him the same thing. So we all gave the message. The Minister of Defence has ostentatiously stayed away from the House today. It is not that he is busy. Last week my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition told the Leader of the House on business questions that one of the major issues to arise would be what happened at the Athens Conference. In the days when I was a Minister, which were not very long, the one thing that Mr. Attlee, as he then was—Lord Attlee as he now is and as he will long remain, we hope; we hope that he will be completely well soon—laid down for us was that our first duty was to the House of Commons.
This Minister has not just been away; he has deliberately stayed away after every kind of representation to him—personally and in every way—asking him to come because we wanted to question something in which he was involved. His failure to come—his definite refusal to come—is a contempt of Parliament, and the Prime Minister and the Government ought to pay some attention to this. We are questioning why he went out of the House to give information to the Press. The Lord Privy Seal disputed that he said what we were alleging that he said. The only man who can answer is the Minister of Defence. I suspect that it is not without significance that he is the only man who has chosen not to come down here today.
No one should get the idea that defence has nothing to do with foreign policy. Defence is both the extension and the condition of foreign policy. What the Minister of Defence does conditions as well as extends what the Foreign Secretary can do. This must be pursued. It will be pursued again. It will be pursued by Questions and in every way open to us. The House of Commons has been contemptuously treated today by a Minister whom we have every right to call to account and to whom we gave every notice that we would call him to account. If a private Member, having been given notice by another private Member, failed to turn up, the House would be very critical

of him. We should be much more critical of the Minister of Defence. All that I was going to say I will say in his absence. I regret saying it in his absence. It is not part of my nature to do so. But I must make it clear that he is the man who has stayed away. Therefore, he must face the consequences.
I also regret—I may as well say this, being a blunt man—the course She debate has taken. I do not believe that the debate has taken this course because of what has been said in it. I heard some cheers a little while ago when somebody said that it was the worst foreign affairs debate he had heard in a long time in the House. There were some cheers down here. Debates in the House are not only a matter of who speaks. They are very much a matter of atmosphere. If a very few hon. Members, for reasons which have little to do with foreign affairs, choose to use the first hour of the afternoon totally to destroy the atmosphere, the subsequent debate is naturally spoiled. The responsibility for the spoiling of this debate rests on half a dozen Members. Outside this House they do not mince their words. They can be very rude.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: So can you.

Mr. Brown: I repeat that they can be very rude. I want to say to them that I do not know what they think they are doing, but they are certainly destroying great occasions when the issues of life and death that affect this nation are under consideration. They ought to be convicted of it, as they quite clearly are.

Mr. Michael Foot: Mr. Michael Foot(Ebbw Vale)rose—

Hon. Members: Hon. Members: Sit down.

Mr. Brown: I shall not give way; I am answering back.
I want to face some issues—I have deliberately taken less time than I would normally—which, I think, are important. I say to the Government that on these issues we still need some answers. The first is the related question of Laos and Thailand. I will deal first with Laos, but, of course, they are totally connected. In my view and that of my hon. and right hon. Friends, this is unquestionably an area where a neutral


Government is an absolute requirement for what ought to be the aims of our policy. There are some areas about which we could say that it would be sensible to have a tough, firm and pro-Western Government, but that would be silly in the circumstances of Laos.
Souvanna Phouma seems to be, so far as one can understand the complicated politics of that area, the only man who can run a Government there. It would be silly to hanker after Right-wing forces in Laos. I am not saying that our own Government are doing that. What I am saying is that they must put enormous pressure on their colleagues—I mean specifically their American colleagues—to make quite sure that this is understood.
I share the discontent that other people have expressed on reading The Times report this morning about the C.I.A. activities in that area, which seem to run contrary to the State Department. I understand that our Government cannot stand up here and publicly condemn its ally. That, of course, would be absurd. I should like to ask the Minister who is to reply for as clear an undertaking as he can give that our views on this are being made perfectly plain in the White House to the American Administration. It would be quite ridiculous if we did not somehow, within proper confines, let our American friends understand—and there is no suggestion that I am anti-American—that this endangers the whole Western world and cannot go on, especially when it is in such a dangerous area.
On the other hand, I would say to some of my hon. Friends, "Do not get this out of perspective. It is not only the C.I.A. which goes off the rails. The Communists do this particularly in this area and the only difference between them and the C.I.A. is that they seem rather better at it". Do not let some people talk as if it were only the C.I.A. which does this sort of thing.

Mr. W. Yates: Who gave the order to the Communist Pathet Lao to take Nam Tha?

Mr. Brown: I do not know who gave the order but I suspect that there was a good deal of incitement on the other side. When we talk about this we

should be quite clear that this is being done by the other people all the time, and jolly cleverly indeed. I should like to ensure that a very clear warning is given in all quarters that the build-up going on in Thailand at this moment will not be allowed to encourage obstructionists in Laos. We must see that the people whose names are so freely used do not assume from this that they can go on in that way. As far as we can stop it, they must not be allowed to make this assumption.
I turn to Siam. Questions have been asked by my right hon. and hon. Friends which I think had better be answered clearly. The main question was whether we were asked to help. I understand that we were, first of all, at the Council meeting, where the Thailand representative read the communiqué from the Prime Minister of Thailand, making a general appeal to what I think he called their friends to consider their plight. I think that those were the wards. That was the first appeal, and I gather that we considered that appeal. I understand that in the last few days when it came we had an actual request to go in. This must be made perfectly plain, because it will answer the question of my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who has left the Chamber. He wanted to know, have we gone in after the receipt of a direct request?
Let us get it clear that I endorse, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition did, the going in; if we were asked to go in, there was no choice but to go in. I have taken this view about other occasions in the past and I have not altogether been in agreement with my party. The hon. Member for Nelson and Colne (Mr. S. Silverman) pointed it out roughly in his Tribune article. But when you have an obligation, you honour it.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: The right hon. Gentleman may regret it.

Mr. Brown: I may regret it. I may regret many things, but I honour them at the time I have to fulfil them. What I regret is not the honouring of them; if I regret anything, it is ever having made the commitment. But I do not fail to honour my commitment, having made it, when I am called upon to


pay. In this case I am not only honouring it but I feel sure that I shall not regret it, and I will tell the House why.
This is a very important area to the world, a very important area to the West. Hon. Members have only to look at the map to see how very important the area is. If one is a democratic Socialist—and I am—one can see what the consequences to democracy and democratic Socialism would be if that area were wholly taken over by the Communists.
I endorse it, but I must have, and the House must have, an assurance from the Government that we were asked and that we therefore responded. I am sorry that my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell) left the Chamber so quickly. He was pretty free with criticism and I wanted to answer him. I did not agree with his view about the limitations. He did not say "limitations", for he said that there was no case for military intervention anywhere. I do not agree with that. Having regard to his record as Minister of Defence, I was a little surprised that he said it. But I will go this far: military intervention by itself is not enough. There are other things which we have to do. Military intervention might hold the field; one hopes that it does. But I will suggest to the Minister some positive policy things which we have to do.
First, we must, with our co-Chairman, reconvene the Geneva Conference on Laos to deal with the alleged breach of the cease-fire. We must reactivate the International Control Commission to examine on the ground what actually happened. We must do our best to put pressure on our allies, and on the U.S.S.R. and China, to put pressure on these princes—I have never known so many princes in my life—to act together in the forthcoming negotiations. Finally, I attach enormous importance to this: if the threat develops or looks like developing, we must report it to the Security Council and summon the Security Council, otherwise we shall be in a very dangerous and, I think, silly position. We have to take these positive political steps as well as the military steps.
With that I leave Laos and turn to the second issue, which I regard as of tremendous importance, the tests. Here

the situation is changing and it would be very silly to discuss it as though it were not changing. The fears we had about fall-out just do not seem to be borne out any more. This came out, not about the American tests but from the Russian tests. We thought that things would happen, but they did not in fact happen. It is no use blinding our eyes to the facts. I do not know if it makes the situation any better—although, of course, it makes it better in that people do not suffer from the tests. I was surprised to read the Guardian article from which I gathered that there was no trace at all in Britain of any fall-out from the United States tests, just as there was less from the Russian tests than we had expected. We must keep in mind that this is not quite the problem which a year ago we thought it might be.
The position of hon. Members on this side of the House was made perfectly clear by my right hon. Friend, and I hope that it is no longer challenged. A lot of quite unreal things are being said outside this House. We condemned, and still condemn, the breaking of the moratorium. That was our protection. It was broken, and Mr. Khrushchev himself said that if any one nation broke it then it would be inevitable that other nations would start tests. Those were his words which I quoted at the Labour Party Conference, and, of course, it turned out that he was right. He having broken it, someone else started. We in the Labour Party regretted that the others felt they had to start, but he was quite clear that that would happen, and so it did. He broke it knowing that it would happen.
Since then the Labour Party has kept straight in line on this matter. We condemn and we regret it. We called upon all to stop. My right hon. Friend, when he went to America, used all the influence he had with the Administration to get them to stop. We exerted all the pressure we could upon them in an effort to get them to hold off while yet another attempt was made to get an agreement, and, even if it were thought that the Russians had an advantage, nevertheless, to agree to do that if an agreement were forthcoming.
That failed, not because the Americans did not try but because the Russians would not pick it up, as they


did not do at any stage. All this talk about guilty men in which people sometimes jolly easily indulge is wholly contrary to the facts. There was nothing—and there can be nothing, unless we are unilateralists—which justifies saying that if the others go on and on we will never feel that we have to restart. Nothing that happened at Blackpool and nothing in our conference resolution justified that, but we did press for holding off. We pressed for the extension of the holding off even beyond the first date in order that attempts should be made to start talks again.
This is our position, and remains our position. We have been quite honest, clear and genuine about it. Of course, gentlemen who are unilateralists are entitled to say that we should stop any way, but they are not entitled to attribute that position to us because we are not unilateralists. Some of them would do better in granting to us the same moral considerations that they claim for themselves. The only hope for the world is a real international agreement, but let us make quite clear to the Russians that this must mean some on-site inspection. I do not see how an agreement would not include that. The more we say this to the Russians the better I think it will be because they have a great interest in stopping some day. I do not think it would be any advantage to the idea of getting an agreement on tests to slip out on this.
I now turn to my third point, which is the one we had hoped to make to the Minister of Defence, and would have been the major part of the winding up of this debate had that Minister condescended to come. I refer to the Athens Agreement. I repeat what I have just said—defence is to foreign policy as foreign policy is to defence. The Defence Minister is part of the foreign policy team. It is quite stupid to treat those as separate Departments. Each can buck the other up; each can destroy the other's attempts.
What are the issues that arise from Athens? It is no good hoping to get a reply from the Minister of State, because he has been busy on other things. He may well read out a brief, but that is a poor substitute for a reply to a debate, and we do not ask him to do that. We

shall ask elsewhere. Serious issues arise from Athens, and one is the issue on which I earlier intervened in the Lord Privy Seal's speech—the question of the provision of nuclear weapons to N.A.T.O.
In every document we have had a reference to the commitment of nuclear weapons to N.A.T.O. What does it mean? Is it all window dressing? The Lord Privy Seal today said that nothing has changed about control; that control remains where it was before. In that case, it is all window dressing. We cannot provide nuclear weapons to N.A.T.O. or commit nuclear weapons to N.A.T.O. unless we commit the control. If we are not committing the control we are not committing the weapons and, in that case, it is all window dressing.
What so often worries us on this side is that our Ministers say one thing in Europe, or America, or wherever they happen to be, and a totally different thing in this House. We are now confusing everyone. Ministers are getting away with it over there, and they are getting away with it here because in each country they tell the right thing—but they are completely confusing foreign policy because no one quite knows where they are.
If we are committing nuclear weapons to Europe, to N.A.T.O., I will totally oppose it. I think that it would be entirely wrong. I was fascinated to hear the spokesman of the Liberal Party, speaking with the approval of his leader —[Interruption.]—say tonight that we should have a N.A.T.O. deterrent—[Interruption.]—Oh, yes. Polaris, Minuteman, a three-quarter megaton weapon—not under the control of the President of the United States or the Prime Minister of Britain, but under the control of fifteen nations, some of whom are very big and powerful and have great political issues to settle, and some of whom are very small. If I may say so to the Liberal Party spokesman, he should give a great deal more thought to consequences before he opens his mouth on the subject.
This, however, we must make clear to the Government. Instead of saying one thing to us and another to Europe, they should come clean. We should know whether they mean that strategic


or middle-range ballistic missiles should be committed to Europe—or provided to Europe; they use both words. What do we mean by "middle range"? If we are talking about Davey Crocketts, those weapons that an infantry man might carry, that is one thing—although I understand that those weapons do not exist at the moment, because they have been withdrawn—but with Polaris, with a three-quarter megaton head, and with Minuteman with a half-megaton head—or whatever it is—we are talking of very big stuff We only use those strategically, and they should not be in the hands of N.A.T.O. But, apparently, reading the communiqué, we agreed to that at Athens. We should get this clear.
Do not let us forget that the Second Allied Tactical Air Force and our own, as things now stand, will start nuclear warfare before anyone else gets going. We talk about the equipment and conventional arms of the soldiers on the ground—and I realise that some consider that this is a defence matter that should not be in a foreign affairs debate —but these air forces will start nuclear warfare before the soldiers even get going. One cannot run a foreign policy directed to one strategy if one is deploying and equipping one's air force to be run in a different way.
Foreign and defence policy cannot be placed in two separate compartments. That is why the Minister of Defence should be here. Whatever the Lord Privy Seal and the Foreign Secretary think they are doing, the Minister is committing us to something and he should be here for questioning.
The question of B.A.O.R. must be cleared up. The Minister has never told the House that we are to increase the number of men involved from 51,000 to 55,000. Nor has he informed the House that there is a risk of the figure reaching 64,000 or even 75,000. Was this information given by the Minister to Pressmen. As has been mentioned, the right hon. Gentleman summoned a Press conference. A circular went out—I know this and I know his Chief Press Officer, who would not have done this without authority—with a special letter apologising for a previous date not having been kept and saying, in effect, "The Minister wants you to come, nevertheless, at 5 o'clock tomorrow."
Having got them there, we do not know what the Minister said but every one of those Pressmen, like The Times correspondent, reported the following day that a triennial review was going on and that the number of men would be increased certainly to 55,000 and possibly higher. It is not credible that that could have happened unless the Minister said it. We have been told that a tape-recording exists, and while the Leader of the House was not here earlier when I spoke about the Minister of Defence I trust that he will read my remarks in the OFFICIAL REPORT.
The Minister of Defence who treats this House so cavalierly and whose veracity we doubt—and not we alone, for this is the attitude in Europe and America too—now knows, if he did not know earlier, that a tape-recording of his Press conference is in existence. I repeat the request that was made earlier; will the Leader of the House see that that tape-recording is transcribed with no "cooking"—[HON. MEMBERS: "Cooking?"] I mean no deletions—and the transcription placed in the Library? We shall then be able to question the right hon. Gentleman, for he has kept diplomatically away from the House tonight.
There are many other points which I should like to raise, although I have dealt with the major issues that have been spoken on in the debate today. I sympathise with the hon. Gentleman who is to reply because to some of the questions he cannot possibly give an answer. However, that is not our business. It arises out of the way in which this Government choose to arrange their business.
The main aim must be a disarmament agreement and we are nearer to it than it might have appeared possible on other occasions. There is room for movement and I trust that the Government will put all their energies and efforts into getting this movement by us and the Russians, for we cannot do it without them, towards the centre so that we may look forward to a disarmament agreement that will be real and effective and provide the only way out of this problem.

9.35 p.m.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. J. B. Godber): I would at least agree with those last few words of


the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) if I cannot agree with some of the rest of what he said. Certainly my hope is that a disarmament agreement can be arrived at. I hope to refer to that subject later in my speech.
I must start, however, with a reference to the right hon. Gentleman's remarks and those made earlier about my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence. I regret that the right hon. Gentleman has felt it necessary to speak in this way about my right hon. Friend. I have little doubt whatever that my right hon. Friend could quite easily speak for himself, and there is no need for me to stand up in his defence. [HON. MEMBERS: "Where is he?"] This is a foreign affairs debate, whatever anyone says. The right hon. Member for Belper was reminded from his own side of the House of the need to talk about this matter from the foreign affairs aspect. Defence is closely linked with foreign affairs, but it is not the same thing and the right hon. Gentleman must understand that distinction. I would also remind the right hon. Gentleman that the Leader of the Opposition last Thursday, when talking about today's debate, specifically brought in the question of disarmament.

Mr. G. Brown: Also Athens.

Mr. Godber: I agree, and it was for that reason that I was summoned from Geneva specifically to speak on that point, and it was only yesterday that a request was made to my right hon. Friend.

Mr. Brown: Last Thursday, certainly, and I believe the previous Thursday, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said to the Leader of the House in questions on business that Athens would be one of the major issues in this debate.

Mr. Godber: The right hon. Gentleman has not understood what I have been saying. I said that the Minister of Defence was approached only yesterday after arrangements had been made that I should come back to deal with this. I am naturally sorry that I should have to disappoint the right hon. Gentleman by appearing at the Dispatch Box, but he should understand the reasons for this.

Mr. H. Wilson: We are grateful to the hon. Gentleman for coming all the way from Geneva to speak to the House. That ought to be said, but the conduct of the Minister of Defence was raised in the House on successive Wednesdays after the Athens Conference. He was given official notice of the points to be raised. He need not have come to wind up the whole debate. He need only have come to say "Yes" to our request that a transcript should be placed in the House of Commons Library so that we could study what was said in the House as compared with what was said to the Press. Can the hon. Gentleman tell us why the Minister of Defence has not even shown up, let alone spoken in this debate?

Mr. Godber: I was explaining the reasons why my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence was not winding up the debate. As to why he is not here at this point, I understand that he had a word with the right hon. Gentleman last night—

Mr. Wilson: Me?

Mr. Godber: Yes, and that a discussion took place privately between the two right hon. Gentlemen, so I am informed. My right hon. Friend said that he would try to get in, but I understood that he explained to the right hon. Gentleman that he had a very full programme and while he would do his best he could give no undertaking. That is what I have been told, and the right hon. Gentleman must pursue the matter on another occasion. I can only give the information as given to me. My right hon. Friend, I understand, said that he would come if he could, but he gave no undertaking.
The other point is that my right hon. Friend during two Question Times recently has gone very fully into matters which hon. Members have raised, and, with regard to this specific Press conference, this is a most extraordinary proposal that has now been put forward. My right hon. Friend is being asked to provide a transcript. I should have thought of a Press conference, of all things, that it was not very necessary for anyone to provide a transcript. I should have thought that there was ample evidence and ample cross-checking of


what was being said. My right hon. Friend has distributed a concise report of that conference.

Mr. G. Brown: Very concise.

Mr. Godber: It has been published, and there were plenty of Pressmen there who I am sure would have said so if they did not agree with it. This is an attempt to blow the thing up in a ridiculous way, and I very much regret that this has been done. I see no need whatever for such a transcript and no reason for it at all.

Mr. Paget: Will the hon. Gentleman—

Mr. Godber: No; I have not time to give way further on this matter. I want to make a constructive speech in reply to points made in the debate.

Mr. Paget: This is lying and cheating, and the hon. Gentleman knows it.

Mr. Godber: That is a gross misstatement to make and quite intolerable.

Mr. Paget: Then publish the tape.

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. and learned Gentleman must not say that. There are other methods, if he wishes to do it, but they are out of order now.

Mr. Godber: I think that I will leave that point there. I agree with hon. Members in various pants of the House who have said that there has not been opportunity for this debate to develop as, I think, we should all have wished it to develop. To that extent, I agree with something which the right hon. Member for Belper said in winding up. It is a great pity that, with so much to be said, there has not been opportunity to say it. As to whether there were too many subjects chosen for the debate, that is not a question for me.
I wish to deal very briefly with the points made about the Athens meeting —there will be ample opportunity to take them up again—because I thought that the right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) gave a very imaginary account of what, so he said, was decided at Athens on defence matters and of the duties carried out there by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence.
As my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal clearly explained, the defence decisions at Athens were concerned with improving consultation and the exchange of information on nuclear policy. They were not concerned with matters of basic policy. That is a very important distinction, which was, I thought, made abundantly clear by my right hon. Friend when he spoke earlier. I should have thought that the communiqué made the matter perfectly clear. It is said in the communiqué that
the balance between the conventional and nuclear forces must be the subject of continuous examination".
In other words, this is going forward, and it will be examined within the triennial review which is now under way. There will, therefore, be plenty of opportunity for further discussion of it on later occasions.
Another question now under consideration by the N.A.T.O. Standing Group in Washington is General Norstad's proposal for a more forward strategy, that is to say, one in which the N.A.T.O. forces aim to engage an aggressor decisively as near the N.A.T.O. front line as possible. The Standing Group will, no doubt, make its report to the appropriate N.A.T.O. authority in due course, but this is a matter of discussion at present. That is the point I make now. There is a great deal more work which must be done before we come to these crucial decisions on these matters.
Meanwhile, it is clearly in the interests of the Alliance that it should be seen and understood that there are no fundamental divisions on the broad strategic concept. I emphasise that because of comments which have been made in regard to the British and the United States position in this regard. This is why, as long ago as last November, in the debate on the Address, my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence made plain that we support General Norstad's proposals, subject, of course, to the normal consultation and discussion within the Alliance. As to the British contribution, the position of Her Majesty's Government, that we wish to fulfil our obligations to the Alliance, was made plain in the defence debate.
When the right hon. Member for Belper was winding up, he referred to the


strength of B.A.O.R. This has been referred to before and the figure of 55,000 was given by my right hon. Friend in the defence debate. His references to it can be found in column 334. There is no mention of 75,000 at all, and my right hon. Friend assures me that he never made that reference.

Mr. H. Wilson: What about the Press conference? He said it there, did he not?

Mr. Godber: As far as I know, he did not.

Mr. Wilson: Let us see the record.

Mr. Paget: Let us have the tape.

Mr. Godber: I have already dealt with that point, and I do not propose to go over it again.
The right hon. Member for Belper then asked further questions about what my right hon. Friend said this afternoon in regard to the arrangements for these weapons, whether they had been, to use his word, committed "or earmarked or in any way provided. They have been put in a position—one can use what words one likes—where they will—[Interruption.] A word of that nature implies that they are provided there for that use. The main point is that the control of them remains the same at it has always been. That was made quite clear by my right hon. Friend this afternoon when he said or implied—I will re-read what he said—that there would be no alteration in existing arrangements for authorising the use of nuclear weapons. But it has provided that assurance and guarantee which was required by some of the European members of N.A.T.O. —this has to be faced by right hon. Members opposite—that these weapons would not be withdrawn from their requirements in case of need. That assurance is there.

Mr. Thorpe: Mr. Thorpe rose—

Mr. Godber: I am sorry, I cannot give way. Time is getting on and I have a great deal more to say.
I wish to say a few words about the question of Laos and Thailand. I think that I should deal first with the specific question asked by the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). Nam Tha fell on 6th May. On 15th May a communiqué was published by the office

of the Prime Minister for Thailand in Bangkok stating that the Thai and United State Governments had agreed that some units of the United States force should be stationed in Thailand. In 16th May there was a special meeting of the S.E.A.T.O. Council at which the Thai representative drew attention to this communiqué of 15th May and invited other friendly Governments to give consideration to Thailand's situation.
In view of this and of the provisions of the Manila Treaty, we consulted immediately on the measures which we could take, and it was made clear on 17th May by the Prime Minister in this House—I hope that the right hon. Gentleman is following the dates—that we would be prepared to make the Hunter squadron available if the Thai Government were to request this.
On 23rd May the Thai Foreign Minister conveyed orally to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Bangkok the formal acceptance of the Thai Government of our offer to send a squadron to Thailand. In signifying acceptance, the Thai Foreign Minister asked Her Majesty's Ambassador to convey to the Foreign Secretary an expression of the Thai Government's appreciation and thanks. That led up to the statement by the Prime Minister in the House today.
That is the sequence of events. It is abundantly clear that it is exactly as was stated.

Mr. S. Silverman: Mr. S. Silverman rose—

Mr. Godber: There are matters in regard to tests with which I must deal.

Mr. W. Yates: Will my hon. Friend lay—

Mr. Godber: No.

Mr. Yates: —the document in the Library?

Mr. Speaker: If the Minister does not give way, the hon. Gentleman cannot persist.

Mr. S. Silverman: On a point of order. If a Minister is asked when he received a certain request and what were its terms, and when he gives an answer which clearly shows that he never received any request at any time from anybody, do not our rules of debate permit us to ask further questions about the matter?

Mr. Speaker: I have no power to dictate to a Minister what he should say in the course of his speech. It follows that no point of order for me arises.

Mr. Shinwell: This confirms my suspicion.

Mr. Godber: I wish to take up a question asked about Thailand and Laos. In discussing the origins of the recent fighting in Laos, certain hon. Members referred to a build-up by Government forces at Nam Tha. I do not deny that this could have taken place.
The factor that we should not overlook, however, is that the Communist forces attacked the garrison at Nam Tha and that they occupied the town and pursued the garrison to the South. Those are the facts. [Interruption.] I am talking now in relation to Laos. Elements of the garrison retreated in disorder across the Thai frontier. The Communist move took them well across the ceasefire line in the area of Nam Tha, at least forty miles beyond the cease-fire line. That is my information. Therefore, this was a clear breach of the undertaking they had given that they would not take advantage of present circumstances to improve their positions.
That evidence of bad faith on the Communist side at a time when all hoped that the remaining differences among the nations might soon be resolved has clearly had a serious effect upon confidence. The build-up was certainly nothing comparable to the actual fighting and pursuit of the troops.
Many other issues have been raised with which I should like to deal, but it is essential that I should say one or two words concerning nuclear tests in relation to some of the comments which have been made. The right hon. Member for Huyton and, I think, the right hon. Member for Belper both made the point that while they opposed all tests, once the Russians had tested we could not say that the United States should not test. Both right hon. Gentlemen made quite clear that the official Labour Party position was that reluctantly they could not disagree with the need for these tests.
Of course, there was reluctance on the part of President Kennedy, just as there was on the part of the Prime Minister,

too. Nobody wished to get involved in this sordid race again. After the Russian build-up of last autumn, however, it became inevitable, particularly as the Russians, even after their series of tests, refused consistently to come to an agreement.
It is necessary that the House should be quite clear in regard to this, because sometimes one gets rather garbled stories about just why the Russians would not agree. The treaty put forward by the Western Powers in April, 1961, had in it only the minimum safeguards necessary to secure that the treaty was implemented. All the talk about espionage does not bear examination. The numbers of people involved would be infinitesimal in regard to the territory concerned. It is abundantly clear that this was purely a manœuvre because the Russians did not wish to sign a treaty.
When we met in Geneva on 28th November last year, when I met with the Russian and American delegation, we were confronted with a situation in which the Russians rejected absolutely the findings of the 1958 experts committee. They wished to start an entirely new basis of discussion in which they wanted to say that national detection systems alone were sufficient for atmosperic tests, under-water tests and high altitude tests, but not for underground tests. They left out underground tests and proposed a moratorium for them. There is no international consensus of scientific opinion to justify that stand.
The right hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) asked specifically what was our position in regard to calling another meeting of international scientists. Our position is that we have asked for it. I have repeated that request again and again at the recent discussions at Geneva until I am almost tired of saying it. I did it again only on Tuesday.

Mr. A. Henderson: Scientists to be appointed by the United Nations?

Mr. Godber: That is not an aspect that we have chosen. What I have done in response to the eight-nation memorandum is to suggest that the uncommitted nations should bring forward their scientists to meet with others, so that it would not be simply the East


and West meeting together. They indicated that in cases where they had adequate scientists, they would certainly not be opposed to doing that. The Russians have consistently refused in every way to have anything to do with such a body. They refused time and again, but this is essential if we are to make progress on the basis of the eight-nation memorandum.
I want to say a word or two about the eight-nation memorandum, because it is really the key to the whole problem at the moment. This was put forward by the eight neutral nations after they had heard or read a number of our discussions in the sub-committee, and it is based on three things. First, on a system of detection which would be based and built upon existing national networks—not relying on national networks but based and built upon them—so that it was an international system of detection. Second, it proposed an international commission of highly qualified scientists which, again, is very similar in idea to what had been proposed in our April, 1961, treaty. The third and key point was the point about on-site inspection, and here I was glad to hear what the right hon. Gentleman had to say about this, because this is the key to any solution of it.
The wording in relation to on-site inspection in this document makes it difficult to get a complete picture, because it is so involved. Eight nations got together and tried to get a compromise document. They say in paragraph 4 that the parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories for on-site inspections, and, in paragraph 5, that the parties should consult as to what further measures, including verification in loco, would facilitate the assessment and the parties concerned would, in accordance with this obligation, give full co-operation.
It can just be argued that there is no specific obligation here, but I think it is stretching things to argue that. We have said that this implies, and we feel certain that it does imply, the obligation of on-site inspection but the Russians keep saying merely that they accept inspection within the terms of paragraph 4 of this document, but will not go on to elaborate it. Only the day before

yesterday at Geneva, I asked them to specify where they stood in relation to that as a genuine indication of good faith. I asked them to say on how many occasions a year they expected to invite inspection, but they have refused to answer that question. They said it was unwarranted. This is the difficulty we are up against.
I still hope that we shall get a treaty on nuclear tests. Obviously, the Russians are going to start testing again, and I hope that once they have done that it may make it easier. Our Mexican colleague has suggested that we should start negotiating a treaty to come into operation at a future date. If that were possible, I would welcome it warmly, and I have suggested to our Russian colleagues again that this is something we should look at.
On disarmament, I would say that we have made some progress, but it has been very hard going—very difficult slogging. Our Soviet colleagues are putting forward their ideas with great vehemence and insistence, but they seem entirely unwilling to consider any compromise on any of the main things. Very briefly, the Western plan is for a 30 per cent. cut across the board as the first stage. The Russian plan is much more selective. It provides for a 100 per cent. elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles —which is anything which can carry a nuclear bomb, in the first stage. It provides for a reduction of conventional arms, linked to a reduction in manpower of 1·7 million, but it is very unspecific in regard to that. The whole emphasis is on nuclear arms, and the great difficulty is that of verification. Here, I have challenged the Russians to show their genuineness by coming forward with a realistic suggestion of some way to solve the deadlock between those who say that verification must be in relation to the destroyed armaments alone and those who say it must also cover remainders as well. We have put forward a compromise plan—a zonal inspection plan that provides for inspection to increase by percentages as the disarmament process goes forward, but the Russians refuse to consider this. They will not put forward any suggestion of their own—

It being Ten o'clock, the Motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

PURCHASE TAX (ICE CREAM)

10.0 p.m.

The Economic Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Anthony Barber): I beg to move,
That the Purchase Tax (No. 3) Order, 1962 (S.I., 1962, No. 886) dated 30th April, 1962. a copy of which was laid before this House on 3rd May. be approved.
This Order is consequential upon the Budget decision to extend the Purchase Tax to include ice cream.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: On a point of order. I am sorry if I misunderstood what has happened. I thought that we were debating a Motion for the Adjournment and that the Question would be put to the House at the end of the debate.

Mr. Speaker: No. Under our Standing Order the Motion lapses at ten o'clock and that is why I intervened when we had reached ten o'clock.

Mr. Barber: I was explaining that this Order was consequential on the Budget decision to extend Purchase Tax to include ice cream. The Order was laid before the House on the day when we debated the Finance Bill on Second Reading, and my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary in introducing the Bill explained briefly the necessity for the Order.
What the Order does is to include ice cream among the goods which are "prescribed goods" for the purpose of Section 12 of the Finance Act, 1954. That section deals with the assessment of Purchase Tax on unfinished goods, and provides that tax on any goods which are prescribed goods is to be assessed on the value they would have if they were finished and complete, even though at the material time they have not yet been put into that condition.
The present Order is necessary to enable us to deal with a practical problem in connection with the sale of ice cream. There is available nowadays a substance known as "soft" ice cream, which is made ready for sale, immediately before consumption, in special machines which are installed in

ice cream vans or on the counters of retail shops.
This ice cream is prepared from what are known as complete ice cream mixes. These mixes are substances which contain all the physical ingredients of ice cream, with the possible exception of water, and which apart from the possible addition of water need only aeration and freezing to become palatable as ice cream. Many of the people who make up ice cream for sale from these mixes are traders on their own account, and, if nothing further were done, they would be legally liable to Purchase Tax registration as manufacturers of ice cream.
But registration would obviously be a great inconvenience for these traders and also, incidentally, for the Revenue. As the House knows, a registered Purchase Tax trader has legal obligations about keeping accounts and making returns at regular intervals of the amounts of tax due from him, and many of these small traders might find it difficult to comply with these requirements, and, of course, keeping in touch with people who do not trade from fixed premises would be a problem on the Customs and Excise side also.
This Order enables us to avoid these practical difficulties. Recognising the fact that the complete ice-cream mixes which these traders use are really ice cream in an unfinished form, the Order gives authority for assessing tax on the mixes by reference to the wholesale value which they would have if they were already converted into finished ice cream. In this way the amount of tax on the mix will he equated with the amount which the trader would have to pay on the finished ice cream if he were registered. The result will be that there will be no need for registration of these traders, or for fiscal control over them.
The principle underlying the Order has the agreement of the trade associations concerned with ice cream and ice-cream mixes. The Order will make no difference whatever to the estimated revenue from ice cream. It will make no difference to the retail price. What the Order will do will be to save a great deal of trouble for all concerned, and I commend it to the House.

10.5 p.m.

Mr. Douglas Jay: This is a ridiculous Order, introduced to amend a ridiculous tax, by a ridiculous Government. The Economic Secretary's very few remarks have not justified the extraordinary action of the Government in the least. If there is such a thing as soft ice cream—which I can well believe—why could not the Government have discovered it before the Budget and the Finance Bill? It is bad enough that these foodstuffs should have had a tax clapped on them for the first time by a party which has always claimed that its policy is to reduce and not to raise taxation; it is even worse to have a Chancellor, who claims that his object is to simplify taxation, not merely bringing new substances and foodstuffs into the field of tax but also introducing a new rate of 15 per cent. to apply to these foodstuffs, which, incidentally, raises instead of reduces the number of rates of Purchase Tax now in force, thereby complicating and not simplifying the tax.
No, a further complication is introduced. We had the Budget Resolution first, on 9th April. That defined this tax as applying to
ice cream, ice lollies, water ices and similar frozen products, and prepared mixes and powders for making such products.
We then had the Finance Bill, printed on 16th April, which included the same formula for describing ice cream, in the Eighth Schedule. But on 30th April the Government made this Order, amending the definition. It is extraordinary that they should have discovered, at this stage, that it was necessary to have additional legislation which would provide that incomplete and unfinished ice cream is to be treated for this purpose as if it were complete and finished ice cream.
The Economic Secretary did not explain whether this correction was found to be necessary because the Government have made yet another mistake and have fallen into yet another muddle. Why does this have to be done by way of a Purchase Tax Order, and not by an amendment to the Finance Bill? This is an extraordinary way of proceeding. First, the Government introduced a Finance Bill, but before it has become law—indeed, even before it has reached the end of its Committee stage—we find

ourselves in the process of amending it by a Statutory Instrument.
This Order shows that all the Treasury Ministers—and we have only one here tonight—are in an advanced state of confusion, even in respect of the procedure by which they are trying to impose this unnecessary tax. I hope that the House will divide against the Order, as a protest against this confusion as well as against the tax.

10.8 p.m.

Mr. Barber: I shall try to deal very briefly with the points raised by the right hon. Member for Battersea, North (Mr. Jay). First, he asked why we did not discover this point before the Budget. The reason is that before my right hon. and learned Friend announced his proposals it was impossible to have discussions with the trade. Anybody looking at the way in which the proposals for this extension of tax were dealt with by Her Majesty's Customs and Excise will agree that great credit is due to them for the enormous amount of preparatory work they were able to do without any consultations whatever.
The right hon. Member went on to talk about increases or decreases of tax. The Order has no effect whatever on the yield of tax. The right hon. Member then asked why we were not going to amend the Bill.

Mr. Jay: The hon. Member is surely not denying that the Government are imposing a new tax of 15 per cent. on this and other foodstuffs as a result of the Finance Bill and this Order.

Mr. Barber: By the Finance Bill we are imposing a tax of 15 per cent. on ice cream. If we did not have the Order the same yield of tax would be available to the Exchequer by means of extending registration for Purchase Tax purposes to thousands of small retailers throughout the country who, technically, are manufacturers of ice cream. This is something that we want to avoid.
The right hon. Gentleman then asked why we did not propose to amend the Finance Bill instead of adopting this procedure. As he will see, the Order was made on 30th April, to come into operation on 8th May, that date being the date when the Purchase Tax on ice cream became effective. If the right hon.


Gentleman will consider the timing of the Finance Bill, I think that he will agree that it would have been quite impossible to have moved an Amendment in time for this to coincide with the coming into operation of the tax.
The right hon. Gentleman has talked about opposing this Order. If the Opposition are seriously considering opposing it, let me remind the House briefly of the effect of the Order. What is the effect on the consumer of ice cream? The answer is nil. It makes no difference to the retail price. What is the effect on the Exchequer? The answer is nil. It makes no difference to the yield. What is the effect on several thousands of small traders? The answer is that it will save them a great deal of trouble and that, in fact, is the effect of this Order. That being so, it seems to me to be utterly incredible that any hon. Member, understanding what the Order is about, should consider opposing it.

Mr. Jay: If it is in order for the Economic Secretary to make two

speeches, I suppose that it is in order for me to do so—

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Sir William Anstruther-Gray): It would not be in order unless with the leave of the House.

Mr. Jay: That, of course, was what I meant, Mr. Deputy-Speaker.
What the Economic Secretary has said confirms my argument. What it amounts to is that, first, the Government made a mistake in introducing the original Budget Resolution on the Finance Bill. Then they discovered that they could not overcome the mistake because of the timetable, except by the unprecedented procedure of amending the Finance Bill during the Committee stage, not by an Amendment to the Bill but by a Statutory Order. I think that in protest against this procedure and this muddle the House should certainly divide against the Order.

Question put:—

The House Divided: Ayes 131, Noes 69.

Division No. 202.]
AYES
[10.12 p.m.


Agnew, Sir Peter
Fisher, Nigel
Macpherson, Niall (Dumfries)


Aitken, W. T.
Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)
Mathew, Robert (Honiton)


Atkins, Humphrey
Godber, J. B.
Mawby, Ray


Balniel, Lord
Goodhart, Philip
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.


Barber, Anthony
Goodhew, Victor
Miscampbell, Norman


Barlow, Sir John
Grant-Ferris, Wg. Cdr. R.
Nabarro, Gerald


Barter, John
Green, Alan
Neave, Airey


Batsford, Brian
Grimond, Rt. Hon. J.
Noble, Michael


Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)
Gurden, Harold
Osborn, John (Hallam)


Berkeley, Humphry
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Page, John (Harrow, West)


Biffen, John
Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)
Page, Graham (Crosby)


Black, Sir Cyril
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)


Bossom, Clive
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Partridge, E.


Box, Donald
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)
Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)


Boyle, Sir Edward
Hastings, Stephen
Peel, John


Braine, Bernard
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth


Brown, Alan (Tottenham)
Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward
Pitt, Miss Edith


Bryan, Paul
Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Pott, Percivall


Buck, Antony
Hinchingbrooke, Viscount
Prior, J. M. L.


Butcher, Sir Herbert
Hirst, Geoffrey
Pym, Francls


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Holland, Philip
Quennell, Miss, J. M.


Channon, H. P. G.
Hopkins, Alan
Rawlinson, Peter


Chataway, Christopher
Hughes-Young, Michael
Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin


Chichester-Clarke, R.
James, David
Ridley, Hon. Nicholas


Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)


Cleaver, Leonard
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)



Collard, Richard
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Roots, William


Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Kerans, Cdr. J. S.
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard


Corfield, F. V.
Kershaw, Anthony
Skeet, T. H. H.


Costain, A. P.
Kimball, Marcus
Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd &amp; Chiswick)


Courtney, Cdr. Anthony
Kirk, Peter
Smithers, Peter


Craddock, Sir Beresford
Lambton, Viscount
Summers, Sir Spencer


Crosthwaite-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver
Leavey, J. A.
Taylor, Frank (M'ch-st'r, Moss Side)


Cunningham, Knox
Leburn, Gilmour
Teeling, Sir William


Curran, Charles
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Temple, John M.


Dance, James
Linstead, Sir Hugh
Thomas, Peter (Conway)


Doughty, Charles
Litchfield, Capt. John
Thompson, Richard (Croydon, S.)


du Cann, Edward
Longden, Gilbert
Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
McLaren, Martin
Thorpe, Jeremy


Elliott, R.W.(Nwcastle-upon-Tyne,N.)
McLean, Neil (Inverness)
Touche, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon


Emery, Peter
Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)
Vickers, Miss Joan


Errington, Sir Eric
Macmillan,Rt.Hn.Harold(Bromley)
Walder, David




Ward, Dame Irene
Wolridge-Gordon, Patrick
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Williams, Dudley (Exeter)
Woollam, John
Mr. J. E. B. Hill and Mr. Rees.


Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Yates, William (The Wrekin)





NOES


Bennett, J. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Houghton, Douglas
Rankin, John


Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Redhead, E. C.


Bowden, Rt. Hn. H.W. (Leics.S.W.)
Hunter, A. E.
Reynolds, G. W.


Boyden, James
Hynd, John (Attercliffe)
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Janner, Sir Barnett
Robertson, John (Paisley)


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas
Rodgers, W. T. (Stockton)


Cliffe, Michael
Jeger, George
Rogers, G. H. R. (Kensington, N.)


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)
Ross, William


Darling, George
Kenyon, Clifford
Short, Edward


Davies, Harold (Leek)
MacColl, James
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)


Deer, George
McInnes, James
Skeffington, Arthur


Diamond, John
McKay, John (Wallsend)
Sorensen, R. W.


Driberg, Tom
MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Edelman, Maurice
Mendelson, J. J.
Taverne, D.


Edwards, Walter (Stepney)
Mitchison, G. R.



Fletcher, Eric
Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)
Thomas, George (Cardiff, W.)


Foot, Michael (Ebbw Vale)
Oram, A. E.
Thomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)


Ginsburg, David
Owen, Will
Wainwright, Edwin


Gooch, E. G.
Pargiter, G. A.
Warbey, William


Greenwood, Anthony
Parker, John
Weitzman, David


Hayman, F. H.
Pavitt, Laurence
Wilkins, W. A.


Healey, Denis
Probert, Arthur
Wilson, Rt. Hon. Harold (Huyton)


Hilton, A. V.
Proctor, W. T.



Holman, Percy
Pursey, Cmdr. Harry
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:




Mr. Lawson and Mr. McCann.

Resolved,


That the Purchase Tax (No.3) Order, 1962 (S.I., 1962, No. 886), dated 30th April, 1962, a copy of which was laid before this House on 3rd May, be approved.

TOMATOES (IMPORT DUTY)

10.22 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. Niall Macpherson): I beg to move,
That the Import Duties (General) (No. 6) Order, 1962 (S.I., 1962, No. 885), dated 30th April, 1962, a copy of which was laid before this House on 4th May, be approved.
This is a short but slightly complicated Order, and perhaps I may be allowed to explain it to the House, although it is highly technical. On 17th May, 1960, the House approved an Order introduced by my right hon. Friend—S.I., 1960, No. 811—which raised the duty on tomatoes exceeding 1s. 3d. per pound c.i.f. in value from 4d. to 6d. from 16th May to 31st May. The intention of that Order was to subject Dutch glasshouse tomatoes to this higher rate of duty during that period while allowing entry of Canary Island tomatoes grown in the open at the ad valorem duty of 10 per cent. I remind the House that from 1st November to 30th April the duty on tomatoes is ad valorem, from 1st June to 31st October specific, and in May it is both, depending on the c.i.f. value of the goods. The intention of that Order has not been fulfilled. Imports of Dutch tomatoes in the second half of May, 1961, were nearly 60 per cent. higher than in the same period of 1960, and 45 per cent. of that much higher total qualified for the lower rate of duty, compared with 29 per cent. in 1960.
To make the purpose of the Order clear, it is necessary to understand that most Dutch tomatoes are sent here on consignment, and it is not until the tomatoes are sold that the residual c.i.f. price, after deduction of selling costs and duty, is known. Last year, if the price realised on the market were 1s. 6⅓d. per lb. or less, the duty payable was at the rate of 10 per cent. on the c.i.f. price. If it were more, the duty was at the 6d. per lb. rate. But that meant that as soon as the market price was in danger of falling below 1s. 11d. the importers of Dutch tomatoes preferred to reduce the price to 1s. 6⅓d. per lb. and to obtain the same c.i.f. return.
Not unnaturally, this had a serious effect on the return which British growers could obtain. Last year, as supplies built up, the price fell from a minimum of 3s. per lb. on 18th May to a minimum of 1s. 6⅓d. per lb. on 25th May. As soon as the ad valorem duty came to an end on 31st May, prices rose again substantially to almost 2s. Both in 1960 and in 1961, imports from Holland chargeable at 10 per cent. were confined to the last seven working days in May. It is quite clear that with the tariff as it was up to 16th May British growers were not getting the protection which the 1960 Order was intended to provide and which the House approved without a Division. They were getting only 9d. per lb. at this time last year against 3s. a week earlier and 1s. 9d. to 2s. early in June.
To rectify the position, the present Order was laid before the House on 4th May and came into effect on 16th May. All it does is to make from 16th to 31st May the specific duty of 6d. per lb. applicable to tomatoes the c.i.f. price of which exceeds 1s. per lb. instead of 1s. 3d. per lb. as was the case in the last two years.
The proposed change was discussed with the Dutch Government. The Dutch recognised that the circumstances were unusual and that the change was not designed to provide increased protection against Dutch supplies in the normal sense. We believe that it is unlikely appreciably to affect the quantity of tomatoes imported from Holland or the returns to the Dutch growers. What it will do is to help British growers to get the kind of return which the original Order was meant to secure.
I hope that with this explanation of this simple Order with a somewhat complicated background the House will agree to approve it.

10.26 p.m.

Mr. George Darling: The House will be grateful to the hon. Member for his explanation of this Order. Although its purpose is to vary the import duty on tomatoes for a very limited period, in fact it leaves the tariff of 6d. per lb. on the main bulk of imported tomatoes.
We on these benches are not opposed to import controls, but we say that import controls, whatever form they take —in this case the tariff—ought to be imposed for a constructive purpose and not merely to give protection if protection will not lead, as in the case of tomatoes, to better marketing, packing, grading, transportation and growing. I am not suggesting that our tomato growers are inefficient, but if this tariff, whatever form it takes over the next four months—and there are opportunities for further variations during the summer period—will merely shelter our present marketing arrangements in this country, then it will not serve the purpose which the hon. Member mentioned.
It is not so much the protection of a tariff in regard to price that the home grower wants, because, as the hon. Member said, the Order will not make a great deal of difference to price. If the hon. Member looks at the wholesale price returns in the trade journals, he will see that there are enormous variations of price throughout the provincial wholesale markets of this country for the same grades of tomato. To put a 6d. tariff on Dutch tomatoes will not make a great deal of difference to the overall average price, because already Dutch tomatoes are being sold at quite different prices all over the country in the wholesale market.
We are concerned about the fact that at the moment English tomatoes are scarce. That is the report which is received from all the wholesale markets. The English growers are having a pretty rough time, and this awful weather is not helping them. All I think this Order will do during the present summer is to shelter our present inefficient methods of marketing.
We shall not oppose the Order. We did not oppose the previous import duty arrangement. But since the original Order of which the hon. Member has spoken came into operation two years ago, we have had the Horticultural Marketing Council set up, and the Government have spent a considerable amount of money in trying to finance the work of that Council. We have had the Cucumber Marketing Board, which is still in existence and is supposed to be working.
Yet we still have in this country for marketing horticultural produce probably the most inefficient system of any country in Europe. We have no cooperative arrangements with growers, we have regional markets situated in the wrong places, and we have expensive transport arrangements which ought to be cut out. If the effect of the Order is to shelter that system without encouraging improvements, I do not think the growers will get any benefit out of it, and certainly the housewives, the customers, are not going to get any benefit out of it.
I would ask the hon. Gentleman, therefore, to answer two or three questions. Is this the last alteration we are to have in the basic Order? Are we to have alterations in the fortnightly periods during June, and then monthly in July and August, when the tariff already varies from 4d. to 6d. and back to 5d., 4d., to 2d? Are these tariff arrangements to continue? Could he tell us what the supply position is going to be? If the effect is to cut out imports, when, perhaps, we may have insufficient English and Scottish supplies of tomatoes, as in previous seasons, the consumers will suffer a great deal. Have these questions been taken into consideration to make sure that, whatever the Government do now about these tariff arrangements, the consumers will be guaranteed adequate supplies of tomatoes, preferably from the home growers, but certainly from abroad if we have to rely on imported tomatoes, and at reasonable prices?

10.32 p.m.

Sir Peter Agnew: The Opposition should keep a sense of proportion as to the effects of this Order. Whatever may be the condition as to modernity or otherwise of the present marketing arrangements of our horticultural industry, it is, quite certain that this Order, the scope of which is to end in fifteen days, will have no effect one way or the other on the marketing arrangements. At a time when the Common Market negotiations are in process, it would be idle to deny that the tomato industry, particularly the glasshouse industry, is in a state of apprehension as to its future if we enter the Common Market. The horticultural industry is taking great steps, steps


which it is able to take as a result of the schemes of encouragement which the Government have given, very limited and modest as they are, to improve its marketing arrangements, particularly in the form of increasing associations of producers to market their produce cooperatively. Therefore I think the right attitude for this House to take to this Order is to express a very moderate fifteen days' worth of gratitude on behalf of the industry that at any rate during that time there is to be an increased duty on the imported tomatoes, which must reflect itself to some extent in the returns which accrue to our producers. To that extent, I welcome the Order.

10.35 p.m.

Mr. J. M. L. Prior: I wish to join my hon. Friend in extending thanks to the Board of Trade for introducing this Order tonight. Most of these tomatoes are landed either at Great Yarmouth or Boston, and thus the growers in those areas feel rather more strongly on the subject as they see it rather closer at hand than do other growers in the country. They have been pressing for the last year to have this slight alteration made. I know that they are grateful, as we are tonight.
The future of the tomato industry is not really under discussion at this moment, but this Order will certainly help to keep the tomato industry going for another year or so. I thank my hon. Friend for introducing the Order tonight.

10.36 p.m.

Mr. Eric Fletcher: I wish to raise another paint, though not on the merits of the matter, because from the debate which we have so far had it looks to me as if the House will wish to approve the Order. I am rather concerned about the timing of the Motion tonight. The Order seeks to increase the rate of import duty for the limited period of fifteen days from 16th May to 31st May. The Order was made on 30th April and was laid before the House on 4th May. It was made to come into operation on 16th May and to operate, as I have said, for fifteen days until 31st May.
Today is 24th May. It may have been that the House would have wished to disapprove of the Order, in which

event, it seems to me, it would have been stultified in so doing by the fact that the Motion to approve the Order was not moved until today, the 24th May. I want to ask the Minister, and particularly the Leader of the House, as it is a matter which affects the rights of the House, why the Motion to approve the Order has been delayed until 24th May. Why was the Order not brought before the House either on 16th May or earlier? Does it not make rather nonsense of our procedure it an Order laid on 4th May seeking Parliamentary approval for something which is to operate between 16th May and 31st May is only brought before the House for approval on 24th May, half way through the period during which the Order is to operate and after, presumably, it has been in operation for a week?
It so happens that we shall approve the Order, but it might have been the case that the House would wish to disapprove of it. It seems to put the House in a ridiculous position, if by having postponed the moving of the Motion until today the House is deprived of its ordinary right of disapproving of the Order. I ask the Leader of the House to give the matter his attention, because it seems to me that if Motions of this kind—trivial perhaps though they may be or meritorious though they may be—are delayed in being brought before the House it makes a nonsense of our procedure.
I hope that the Minister or the Leader of the House will explain why the House has been put in this rather ridiculous position of not having had an opportunity of discussing the matter before today.

10.39 p.m.

Mr. N. Macpherson: With the leave of the House, I will deal first with the question of timing. Although this is not, as the hon. Gentleman knows, entirely a matter which is in my hands or those of my Department, I would say that it is by no means without precedent for it to be dealt with in this way. As I have said, when the last tomato Order came before the House it was also after it had come into operation. There was certainly no discourtesy meant. It is by no means unprecedented.
The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hillsborough (Mr. Darling) wanted to be assured that it was not the case that all the Order would do would be to shelter inefficient methods of marketing. I can tell him that competition is extremely keen. What happens is that during May supplies from the Canary Isles are tailing off and more or less finish during that month—possibly running over a little into June. I believe that supplies are about a week later in this current season—for all too obvious reasons.
Home-produced supplies last year were roughly the same as those coming from Holland, and, again, there were about equal supplies coming from the Channel Islands. There was, therefore, pretty acute competition. Last year, the supplies from the Canary Isles tailed off rather more quickly, possibly due to the operation of this duty, but they, too, are at about the same level. So far, the Dutch supplies have been about a quarter of the total during May, after which they rise, and so also do the supplies from home production and from the Channel Islands.
The hon. Member asked whether this was the last alteration in the basic Order. I would not for one instant say that it was necessarily the last, but at any rate no other alterations are contemplated at the present time. We have no applications to do so at the moment. He also asked for an assurance about supplies. We have no reason to believe that the hothouse supplies will be any other than adequate.
The hon. Member finally asked whether the customer would be guaranteed adequate supplies at reasonable prices. The purpose of the Order is to secure a rather better return for the home grower in this limited period of two weeks before the specific duty comes wholly into operation, and all tomatoes are chargeable at 6d. It makes very little difference to the consumer, it will give the grower a rather better return during the last period of two weeks, and in particular during the last week of May.
That was the time last year when the break came and when the importers of Dutch tomatoes found it expedient to reduce their prices sharply in order to take advantage of the 10 per cent. duty. The price of British-grown tomatoes

followed suit, and the growers secured a much lower return than it was reasonable to expect. That is the sole purpose of the Order. I do not think that it will affect the consumer adversely, but it will, as my hon. Friend the Member for Worcestershire, South (Sir Peter Agnew) said, benefit the British grower —or, rather, those British growers who have to bring their tomatoes forward at this time.

Mr. Fletcher: I can only intervene again with the leave of the House, but I was disappointed with what the hon. Gentleman said on my procedural point. He said that there was a precedent for this procedure, but that does not justify the method by which this Order has been brought forward. Perhaps the Leader of the House will say that he feels that it is not really treating the House with courtesy to delay bringing forward an Order like this long after the start of the very limited time in which it is to be in operation.

10.44 p.m.

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Mr. Iain Macleod): Of course there is no discourtesy to the House. The hon. Member for Islington, East (Mr. E. Fletcher) is very experienced in the ways of the House and knows that there is not only an immediate precedent in this case but that there are a considerable number of precedents. It may be that, as he said, it is a bad precedent, but there can be no doubt that it has happened on many occasions before.
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will also realise the difficulty there is in trying to meet the convenience of the House, particularly, I may say, at this time of year, when the Finance Bill —and I think that this is, perhaps, the main reason—occupies so much of our time. Naturally, the Finance Bill being exempted business and one never being able to say whether or not the House will go on all night, perhaps till breakfast time, we would not wish to put down an Order of this nature for approval by the House. I hope that these special circumstances will explain the position. I can assure the House that no discourtesy was intended.

Mr. John M. Temple: Is my right hon. Friend aware that whether or not it is a good precedent,


the tomato producers wanted swift action? The Order has provided that action. Although retrospective, it has been swift action and it will be very much appreciated by the industry.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Import Duties (General) (No. 6) Order, 1962 (S.I., 1962, No. 885), dated 30th April, 1962, a copy of which was laid before this House on 4th May, be approved.

EMPLOYMENT (CAERNARVONSHIRE)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. J. E. B. Hill.]

10.45 p.m.

Mr. Goronwy Roberts: I am glad to have this opportunity to raise once more the subject of employment in Caernarvonshire, and I particularly wish to press the case of the southern half of the county, including the Lleyn Peninsula and towns such as Pwllheli and Portmadoc.
The Minister is well aware of the agonising unemployment which has been the lot of this county for more than a quarter of a century. The results of this are reflected in two sets of figures which were brought to my notice the other day. In 1911 the population of Caernarvonshire was 119,000. Today it is still 119,000. This means that the natural increase which one would conservatively put at about 35,000 to 40,000 in that period has been wiped out by emigration arising out of long-term chronic unemployment.
It is true that in the post-war years things improved. Our population went up to 124,000 by 1951, but many things happened in that year, the most ominous being the advent of the party opposite to power, and the slide began again. From 1951 onwards we faced another decade of decline.
The other set of figures I would put to the Parliamentary Secretary shows that the rateable value of the county in the last few years has remained static. Comparing like with like—that is, 1956 with last year—we find that while five years ago our rateable value was £1,483,038, today, five years later, it is only about £1,000 higher. That means that fewer

and fewer people are bearing increased rate burdens.
The key to the revival of the county is, of course, employment. It is the decline in opportunities for work that has driven our young people away and reduced the social and economic strength of the area. For centuries our people depended on two heavy industries —agriculture and quarrying. More machines on the farms has meant fewer farmworkers. And the advent of cheaper, though inferior, roofing materials has meant rapid contraction of our slate and granite quarries.
The answer, which we have repeatedly urged on the Government for many years, is the introduction of new industries. I am glad to say that now, at last after years of agitation, a great new modern factory has established itself in my constituency. I refer to the Ferodo factory near Caernarvon which is already employing 500 men, a number which we hope in time will be doubled. That is a boon to a long-suffering area. The coming of this excellent firm to the Caernarvon-Gwyrfai district has transformed our prospects. Nevertheless, the situation in South Caernarvonshire, about which I wish particularly to speak, is causing us great and growing anxiety.
We have to expect that next winter the level of unemployment in South Caernarvonshire, in the peninsula itself, will be greater than ever, ranging from 7 to 9 per cent., or even perhaps 10 per cent., of the insured population. By that time, the nuclear power station at Trawsfynydd, in the neighbouring county of Merioneth, will be completed, and many South Caernarvonshire men who now work there will again be thrown on the dole. It is possible—we hope it will not happen—that the present insensate and indiscriminate closures of local railway branch lines also will throw upwards of 100 men out of work in that area.
My plea tonight is that the methods which admittedly have resulted in the establishment of a fine new industry in Caernarvon should be employed to achieve similar results at the southern end of the county, in the Portmadoc area and Pwllheli.
It is likely that the same old objections to introducing new modern industry to


North-West Wales will again be heard. It will be said, for instance, that such industry will spoil the natural beauty of the peninsula, as if derelict cottages, dwindling villages, and school-leavers with no hope of work are beautiful to behold. I hope that the Board of Trade will resolutely set its face against such a sterile argument. The fine new factory in Caernarvon is itself a refutation of it. It takes its place naturally against the magnificence of Snowdon. It adds to the beauty of the scene and enriches a deeper beauty, the lives of the people.
There is the second objection, with which we are painfully familiar, the objection that North-West Wales is too far from the raw materials and markets on which modern industry depends. On this point, I cannot do better than quote from the impressive speech delivered at the opening of the new factory in Caernarvon by Mr. R. G. Soothill, chairman of Turner and Newall, of which Ferodo is, of course, a unit. He said:
The establishment of industry away from the traditional concentrations of production has been, in our experience, entirely successful. Its further development, in appropriate cases, cannot fail to strengthen the economy of the United Kingdom, and we are happy to feel that this new venture takes a worthwhile place among the current attempts to achieve a more balanced location of industry.
If anybody still doubts the suitability of the labour which we can provide, let me once more quote the words of this distinguished industrialist. Speaking of the success of the Caernarvon factory, he said:
Much is due to the enthusiasm of our Welsh recruits and the speed with which they have adapted themselves to wholly unfamiliar routines.
The labour is, in fact, not only suitable: it is enthusiastic. It is also available. In the Pwllheli-Portmadoc district, there is a pool of at least 500—possibly 600—men on whom to draw, not to mention the hundreds who, working in far away towns, would be delighted to return to man the new factories, and, I would add, to man the choirs, the churches and cultural societies which are the pride of this part of Wales.
The sites for new industry also are available. The county council has seen to that. Two of these sites are former Air Ministry and War Department properties, which are fully serviced with

electricity, water, sewerage, roads and extremely useful buildings. I refer, of course, to Penrhos and Llanberis. There is a slight difficulty about Llanberis, and perhaps the Parliamentary Secretary can help us.
The county council wishes to buy the site and has offered the price which the district valuer has stated, and twice reiterated, to be the true and fair one. The Air Ministry, however, demands a price almost three times as much, and unless that Department gets the price, it will put up the property for auction. If this happens, the site may well be developed in bits and pieces by speculators instead of being developed as a unit, as a small trading estate, under the central direction which only a body like the county council can provide. I hope that the Parliament Secretary will look closely into this matter and see whether he cannot assist us by using his good offices with the Air Ministry to achieve a workable and useful compromise whereby our county council can move in the matter.
Still on the subject of sites, we have understood for some time that a light engineering firm has been keenly interested in a site a few miles outside the town of Pwllheli, but there are disturbing rumours that the hon. Gentleman's Department is tending to discourage the firm from coming to the area or, at least, withholding practical support from it. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary can reassure me about this. It would be a cruel blow to an area which has suffered far too much for far too long if a reputable firm which is anxious to come into the district were turned away through lack of official encouragement. It would certainly make nonsense of the fact that South Caernarvonshire is scheduled as a development district under the Local Employment Act, 1960.
I now turn briefly to the need to encourage existing industry in the county. First, the slate industry. This industry has peculiar difficulties which drive up its costs in comparison with those of prefabricated materials, and yet it is nationally necessary. Hon. Members may be familiar with a recent report which states that a large number of houses built since the war are seriously deficient and in need of substantial repair. This is one of the consequences


of the short-sighted policy of using cheap and inferior materials, especially for roofing—a policy partly forced on builders and local authorities by the high interest policy of the Government. Then, there was the crisis earlier this year when the North of England was ravaged by heavy storms, resulting in an emergency demand for slate which the industry, in its inevitably contracted state, found the greatest difficulty in providing.
We have 5 million houses roofed with slate. If the industry is allowed to decline and even to disappear, the country as a whole will suffer. The capital cost of re-roofing those 5 million houses with any other roofing material would be colossal. Surely, this must make the future of the industry, small as it is in comparison with other industries, a matter for central Government attention.
I have time to mention only one other industry in the county—the dairy industry—although a good deal could be said about forestry and tourism. South Caernarvonshire is a land flowing, with milk. The honey, presumably, will follow if the Parliamentary Secretary has carefully followed what I have said.
May I give one example of what can he done to encourage the dairy industry. Thirty years ago our farmers got together and set up a co-operative creamery to deal with the cascade of milk that flows from our farms. It was an extremely successful venture and the Committee followed an enlightened policy of ploughing back profits. About five years ago it spent £50,000 on new cheese-making machinery. Unfortunately, the Milk Marketing Board then refused them a permanent allocation of milk for cheese making and the result is that for many months of the year the machinery lies idle while great quantities of milk are transported at great expense from the locality to more fortunate creameries in other parts of the country.
The employment aspect of this is very important to us. During the flush period, that is during the summer months, with an intake of about 22,000 gallons a day, we employ about 130 men. But in October we shall be down to 3,000 gallons a day and about 20 to 30 men will lose their jobs. I hope that the Parliamentary Secretary will look at this point too. It has its employment

aspect, and I put it to him as one of the Ministers responsible for employment.
That is the two-fold solution to our long-standing chronic problem of unemployment—the introduction of new industries and encouragement and support for existing ones. The fine new factory outside Caernarvon has encouraged us in the county to think that we may be facing a brighter and better period, and any credit which is due to the hon. Gentleman for that good beginning I most freely give, but let him not weary of well doing almost as soon as he has started.

11.2 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Mr. Niall Macpherson): I am grateful to the hon. Member for Caernarvon (Mr. G. Roberts) for the way in which he concluded his remarks, but I regret the way in which he began them. I think that whatever Government had been in power we would have seen this tendency for people to leave the countryside, which has been pretty common all over Western Europe at any rate, and also, I think, in North America.
I rejoice with the hon. Gentleman at the opening of the new Ferodo factory at Griffiths Crossing. I saw it from the outside in the course of its construction, and I noted from the Guardian of 16th May that it hoped to recruit up to 830 men in due course.
I sympathise with the hon. Gentleman in his fears for the future of those at present employed in Trawsfynydd power station, but I think that he probably overestimates the effects in the nearer future. I understand that the second reactor is not due to be completed until May, 1964, although a reduction in employment on the site may start in the course of this summer.
The hon. Gentleman's main concern tonight has been about the unemployment that may result in South Caernarvonshire next winter and thereafter. I agree with him that there can be no question but that it is possible nowadays to plan industry in such a way that it does not detract from the beauty of the countryside, and I agree with what he said about the fact that in these more spacious places with beauty around one gets better working conditions, and that where labour is available it will


probably stay available. There is less turnover of labour, and this represents a great reduction in costs. I wish that more of our industrialists would realise that one of their greatest costs is the turnover of labour, and the fact that they have to train and re-train men year after year. If they could hold their labour force and treat it well, in happy surroundings and good conditions, as happens in some of the remoter places, their costs would be much reduced.
In existing circumstances it has been difficult to interest prospective industrialists in South Caernarvonshire, but I can tell the hon. Member that it is not for lack of trying. He will be interested to know—although it may not sound a great deal—that in Caernarvonshire as a whale, in the last twelve months, 14 sites and five buildings were suggested to 26 industrialists, 16 of whom either came themselves or sent representatives to see them. Only one has within this period set up in the county, and I regret to tell the hon. Member that it was not in his constituency. I agree that sites are available.
I should like to lay the disturbing rumours, to which the hon. Member referred, about Portmadoc. I do not agree for an instant that the Board of Trade has been withholding practical support. I am assured that the Controller for Wales went personally to a great deal of trouble to interest this firm in the site, and that he took the representatives out to see for themselves. We should have been delighted if the firm had decided to go through with the suggestion, but we must always remember that the final decision whether or not to go to a place finally rests with the firm.
The hon. Member also mentioned other sites, in particular the site at Llanberis. According to my information he exaggerated the difference between the valuation placed on this ex-R.A.F. depot by the district valuer and that placed on it by the distinguished independent valuer who was called in because of the disagreement on valuation between the Air Ministry's valuer and the county council's valuer. Over a long period, unfortunately, it has not been possible to agree on a price between the Air Ministry and the county council. It was hoped that by calling

in this independent valuer a solution could be reached. As that is not so, and the county council has felt unable to accept the valuation, I am informed by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Air that he feels there is no alternative but to put the value of the property to the test by public auction.

Mr. Roberts: The independent valuer appointed by the Air Ministry made no valuation of his own. All he said was that it should be put up for auction. He has made no suggestion which we can accept.

Mr. Macpherson: That is not the information that I have received, but we are both working with second-hand information on this point, and perhaps we should leave the question there. Certainly there is no doubt that we should like to see this site put to good use. We regard it as a pity that it has not been possible to do this sooner.
The hon. Member referred to one of the traditional ploys of this part of Wales, namely, slate quarrying. He carried out an excellent advertising campaign for slate this afternoon, and there is a great deal in what he said. I understand that, broadly speaking, about three-quarters of the slate produced is produced to repair houses and only one-quarter for new houses. The demand must come from those whose responsibility it is to keep their houses in repair. It would be extremely difficult for the Government to intervene on this, although any slate enterprise is in the same position as any other enterprise in a development district in that it can apply for assistance to expand if it wishes.
I was shown a photograph taken from the Liverpool Daily Post showing the hon. Gentleman on a visit to the site of the new Dinorwic Quarry, which I understand is using labour saving devices and shows great signs of progress. I am told that there is a much better feeling in slate circles about the future. Deliveries in the first three months of this year have exceeded those in the same period last year. That is a welcome development because there has been a tendency to run down for so long. We can only hope that it is an ill wind, or even an ill hurricane, that blows nobody any good and that as a


result of what happened in the Midlands last year people will pay more attention to the necessity to maintain supplies of slate.
I do not think the hon. Gentleman would expect me to say much about the Caern Co-operative Creamery. It goes outside my departmental responsibilities. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman himself debated this in the House within the last year with my hon. Friend the Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture. As to the honey, that is a matter for the bee rather than for me.
To summarise, the Government's development of industry policy will continue to be directed primarily to helping development districts, of which the hon. Gentleman's constituency forms part.

The rate of industrial growth in Wales in the past two years was higher than in Great Britain as a whole. Wales obtained 8 per cent. of the total additional employment estimated to arise from industrial development certificates issued, although her share of the insured population of Great Britain engaged in manufacturing industry is only 3·5 per cent. That shows that the distribution of industry policy which we are following is not without result. I fully agree with the hon. Gentleman that we would like to see it having greater results in his part of the world, and I can assure him that we will continue to do all we can to that end.

Question put and agreed to

Adjourned accordingly at thirteen minutes past Eleven o'clock.